Anoush Ehteshami and Democracy in Egypt

The following analysis rebuts Anoush Ehteshami's opening argument in favor of the motion that "This house believes that Egypt will become a democracy within a year." (I had argued against the motion at "Why Egypt Will Not Soon Become Democratic.")

Anoush Ehteshami ought not to have taken on the assignment of arguing “that Egypt will become a democracy within a year” because, in fact, he shares my skepticism about full political participation emerging there in so brief a time. His misgivings and circumspections number five:

Anoush Ehteshami.

To begin with, he makes the case for the continued power of the regime and its institutions, noting that “the state machinery remains penetrated by party members and Mubarak loyalists” while “the wider security establishment is thoroughly controlled by the Mubarak-created ruling elite.” From this, he concludes that “the imminent end of this regime and this president may have been exaggerated.” Obviously, this supports my argument. Second, Mr Ehteshami foresees nothing more hopeful in Egypt’s future than “what could be loosely referred to as a rocky road to democratization.” This vague term, he goes on to explain, means (1) a widening of the political base, (2) the broadening of public space, and (3) reformist forces penetrating the regime. I do not understand what this all amounts to – but it does not fit the conventional description of democracy.

Third, he predicts the emergence of a broad coalition – and then its prompt failure, leading to a consolidation of parties into ones representing Islamist, nationalist, liberal, pan-Arab, and secular outlooks. Their competition, he admits, “will be long and painful” – adjectives that indicate the process will neither be finished within twelve months nor be democratic.

The publisher promotes a book co-authored by Anoush Ehteshami: the authors “penetrate the labyrinth of Iranian politics and reveal the forces which brought Ahmadinejad to power. They argue that the power base behind Ahmadinejad represents a kind of Iranian version of American neo-conservativism.”

Fourth, and most eccentrically, Mr Ehteshami holds that economic forces will prod the country toward democracy: “Economic imperative will generate its own pressures against the government and the momentum for broad economic reforms and transparency will provide more energy for pro-reform forces.” Tell that to the Chinese with their three decades of autocratic government and accompanying economic boom. Out of this mishmash of predictions comes the less-than-ringing conclusion that in a year’s time, “Egypt will be becoming a democracy.” Well, “becoming a democracy” is not the motion: to remind, our topic is whether “Egypt will become a democracy.” Mr Ehteshami seems unable to get himself actually to make that prediction.

In short, we both agree that after a “long and painful” year, Egypt will, at best, find itself “becoming a democracy.” I thank him for helping me make the case that Egypt will remain autocratic in twelve months’ time.

Mr. Pipes is director of the Middle East Forum and Taube distinguished visiting fellow at the Hoover Institution of Stanford University. He has lived for three years in Egypt.

Daniel Pipes, a historian, has led the Middle East Forum since its founding in 1994 and currently serves as chairman on the board of directors. He taught at Chicago, Harvard, Pepperdine, and the U.S. Naval War College. He served in five U.S. administrations, received two presidential appointments, and testified before many congressional committees. The author of 16 books on the Middle East, Islam, and other topics, Mr. Pipes writes a column for the Washington Times and the Spectator; his work has been translated into 39 languages. DanielPipes.org contains an archive of his writings and media appearances; he tweets at @DanielPipes. He received both his A.B. and Ph.D. from Harvard. The Washington Post deems him “perhaps the most prominent U.S. scholar on radical Islam.” Al-Qaeda invited Mr. Pipes to convert and Edward Said called him an “Orientalist.”
See more from this Author
Gaza’s Powerful but Usually Cowed Clan Leaders Called on Gazans to ‘Launch a Popular Uprising’ and for Hamas to ‘Lift Its Hand from Gaza Immediately’
For a Sunni, An Alawite Ruling in Damascus Compares to an ‘Untouchable’ Becoming Maharaja or a Jew Becoming Tsar
Misconduct Fits a Pro-Hamas Strategy That Involves a Logic of Suffering and Martyrdom
See more on this Topic