Michael Rubin, Middle East Forum Director of Policy Analysis, spoke to a February 23 Middle East Forum podcast (video). The following summarizes his comments:
Historically, U.S. policy during both Republican and Democratic administrations has assumed that any initiative starts with a “tabula rasa.”
Historically, U.S. policy during both Republican and Democratic administrations has assumed that any initiative starts with a “tabula rasa,” (blank slate). However, too often they “don’t understand the baggage of previous decisions” and its effect on the outcome. As the standoff between America and Iran escalates while two U.S. carrier strike groups are poised some 500 miles off the coast of Iran in the northern Indian Ocean, the Islamic regime is weighing the administration’s record in an attempt to glean what President Trump might actually be planning.
The question facing the mullahs is this: Would Trump use air power to bomb Iran and bring about regime change if negotiations collapse, or “would he simply cut a deal and allow the Iranians to survive?” In May 2025, the U.S. air campaign to bomb the Houthis who were targeting U.S. ships and those of Israel ended after little more than a month. Trump reached a deal whereby the rebel group would not strike U.S. shipping, but the agreement “didn’t prevent them from striking Israeli shipping.” The regime is also considering Trump’s approach to Hamas in the Gaza Strip, where the terrorist group “still hasn’t disarmed, [and] simply surviving is enough for them to try to claim victory.”
In contrast to the deal with the Houthis, the June 2025 12-day war against Iran was a coordinated operation between Israel and the U.S. In 2024, Israeli air strikes had taken out Iranian air defenses; the Israeli strikes last June took place as Iran was rebuilding them. Any deal sought by Trump would involve not only getting rid of the regime’s nuclear weapons, but also requiring it to give up its ballistic missiles and terror proxies. The enriched material for a nuclear weapon would not be addressed in such an agreement, as it was dealt with in the 12-day war. “But Iran has already enriched some uranium to higher than Hiroshima bomb levels.” Would the ayatollahs agree? There were only two times when the regime was compelled to relent after facing “overwhelming force or isolation”—the release of American hostages in 1981, and acceptance of the ceasefire to end the Iran-Iraq war in 1988.
It is likely that if the Trump administration decides to act, it will act alone without a coalition, and “the Israelis are probably going to stand down.” Politically, trust between the two allies is tenuous because of the “tendency to leak.” While the two will communicate, each will “keep their cards much closer to their chests.”
If any of the seven had been dirty bombs with radiological material, “we’d be talking about a fundamentally different calculation.”
However, while the U.S. “sees Iran developing a nuclear weapons capability as strategically untenable, Israel looks at it as an existential threat.” Israel could act unilaterally, considering the devastation that could have occurred in Iran’s April 2024 barrage launched against it, during which Israel, along with moderate Arab states, downed most of the regime’s 300 missiles and drones, with only seven getting through. If any of the seven had been dirty bombs with radiological material, “we’d be talking about a fundamentally different calculation.”
In theory, Trump could bomb Iran and target its senior officials, including Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei, in the hope that the Iranian people will rise up and overthrow the regime. However, “it’s not quite clear they will without a leader.” Iran’s minorities, such as the Kurds and Baluchis, want “some degree of federalism” but would eschew separatism. “Iran does have its own history of democracy,” and former crown prince Reza Pahlavi has standing among ordinary Iranians.
Although Pahlavi could serve in any transition, there are “other regional opposition groups,” and it is unclear if they could all work together. The Mojahedin-e-Khalq (MEK), an opposition group in the U.S., is “basically an elaborate cult and money laundering scheme.” This reality underscores the risk that, should the regime collapse, one of the objectionable groups vying for succession might take control of the country. There is also a concern that, with an Iranian resistance that is not trained or armed, bringing about regime change is in doubt. A significant leadership vacuum in a “morning after” scenario could very well find the regime’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), with a unit in every province, waging a civil war against opposition groups.
The regime prides itself on possessing “strategic patience,” believing it can outlast any U.S. attack. It is unrealistic to expect the regime’s senior leadership and its ideological IRGC units to stand down. The IRGC “controls about 40 percent of Iran’s economy” and has approximately “$100 billion in the bank.” In addition, Supreme Leader Khamenei and his family control about $100 billion themselves. It is conceivable that “the mullahs and IRGC will hunker down until the bombing stops and then return to the cities to finish the slaughter of the Iranian people.”
“No matter what,” the Iranian economy is imploding. “The question is how long the zombie regime can survive.”
While unknowns hang in the balance, the current regime functions as a “zombie” state with dwindling legitimacy. Although there is no “magic formula” to rid the Iranian people of the repressive regime, Iran does have an economic vulnerability, namely the Kharg Island oil terminal facility. The pipelines feeding the terminal handle roughly 95 percent of Iran’s crude oil exports. Because the Persian Gulf’s shallow and narrow Iranian coastline prevents supertankers from docking at most Iranian ports, the regime relies on the pipelines to get the crude to the terminal. Since hydrocarbon revenue is the primary source of funding for the IRGC and its regional proxies, targeting the terminal’s pipelines would effectively freeze the regime’s ability to pay salaries.
To evade international sanctions, Iranian supertankers float at sea to mask the origins of their oil before it is sold to China at a discount. Choking off revenue by hindering Iran’s crude exports would cripple the national budget. How long would the IRGC continue to defend the regime without salaries? “No matter what,” the Iranian economy is imploding. “The question is how long the zombie regime can survive.”
