US special envoy for Syria Tom Barrack this week called for the repeal of the remaining US sanctions on Syria.
Writing on his X account, Barrack contended: “The US Senate has already demonstrated foresight by voting to repeal the Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act – sanctions that served its moral purpose against the previous, treacherous Assad regime but now suffocates a nation seeking to rebuild.”
The US envoy expressed his support for the “completion” of this “act of statesmanship,” suggesting that the removal of all remaining sanctions on Syria would grant the Syrian people the “right to work, trade, and hope.”
In less than a year since it took power, the HTS regime has already presided over three instances of bloody sectarian violence, conducted by forces under its banner, against the minority Druze and Alawite communities.
Barrack’s statement is the latest indication of current US policy on Syria, confirming that Washington appears committed to removing the remaining tools of coercion against the emergent regime of President Ahmed al-Sharaa and the Sunni Islamist Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) organization.
The prospect of removing the remaining sanctions could have been used by Washington to ensure appropriate treatment by Damascus of its Syrian minority communities. This now seems unlikely.
In less than a year since it took power, the HTS regime has already presided over three instances of bloody sectarian violence, conducted by forces under its banner, against the minority Druze and Alawite communities. The direction of US policy appears to suggest that carrots, rather than sticks, are now to be the sole instrument used to discourage future acts of this kind.
Barrack further commented this week that “Syria is back on our side” following a joint raid conducted by US special forces and Damascus-aligned security forces in the area of al-Bab, in northwest Syria. The raid resulted in the capture of Ahmad al-Badri, a known member of the Islamic State.
But the very positive mood currently emanating from Washington regarding the new regime in Syria does not reflect the situation on the ground. Rather, an undercurrent of sectarian violence remains the daily reality in Syria, albeit one that the powerful spotlight of Western policy interest has moved away from.
Extremely difficult situation
An Alawite source from Syria’s western coastal area described the situation to this reporter in the following terms: “We are in an extremely difficult situation, especially for women. Since March 7 [the date of the large-scale attacks and killings of Alawite Syrians by Sunni Islamist forces associated with the government], there have been documented abductions and rape cases happening almost daily.
“The most recent one was a gang rape in a village very close to my own. These crimes are not isolated incidents. They are part of a pattern of systematic intimidation and destruction of our community fabric.”
The Syrian Kurds, too, despite optimistic pronunciations for the cameras, are observing the situation with caution and concern. Isolated Kurdish communities in the neighborhoods of Sheikh Maksoud and Ashrafieh face an ongoing blockade by government forces.
Tensions in these areas escalated in early October, when government-aligned forces advanced toward the neighborhoods. An effective siege remains in place. Checkpoints associated with the Turkish-supported Islamist militias al-Amshat and al-Hamzat are located on the roads connecting these neighborhoods with the rest of Aleppo.
At the same time, there has been progress reported on the issue of the integration of the Kurdish-dominated Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) into the army of the new regime. A major issue of contention between Damascus and the SDF was the latter’s determination that its units should join the new security forces as formations, with the government insisting that the SDF would disband, with members free to enlist as individuals in the new army.
Observers note that in areas of northern Syria, where ethnic cleansing of Kurdish populations took place during the Syrian civil war, the new authorities are refusing any efforts to return properties to their owners.
The latest reports suggest that the government has compromised on this issue, and that the SDF will integrate into the new structure as “three military formations and several independent brigades.” A report on the Kurdish Rudaw website noted that the YPJ, the women’s section of the SDF, would continue to exist as a brigade.
These developments appear to bow to the inevitable on the part of the Syrian Kurds. Observers note that in areas of northern Syria, where ethnic cleansing of Kurdish populations took place during the Syrian civil war, the new authorities are refusing any efforts to return properties to their owners.
Regarding the Druze population, there is a similar situation of simmering tensions. In the latest incident on Monday, two Syrian Druze, a man and a woman, were killed when an unidentified gunman on a motorbike opened fire on a bus in the northern Idlib countryside. Five other Druze were wounded. Idlib province, a heartland of support for Sunni Islamist and jihadi movements, is host to a small and isolated Druze community.
The balance of power between communities since December 2024 is clear. A US decision to halt remaining sanctions against the Damascus government removes a means of leverage on the new government, at a time when its intentions and the pattern of its behavior toward minorities remain far from clear.
The US preference toward engagement and optimism with the new authorities appears to be echoed in Israel’s current stance in the ongoing, behind-the-scenes talks with Syria. Strategic Affairs Minister Ron Dermer’s office is managing the talks from the Israeli side and is in direct contact with Assad Shaibani, the current Syrian foreign minister.
Informed sources suggest that the outlines of a security arrangement already exist, though the issue is currently not a top priority for either party. The Israeli stance, like the SDF’s, does not indicate a wholesale conversion on the part of Jerusalem to the notion of HTS moderation. Pronounced skepticism remains in this regard. But Israel is adapting itself to the prevailing mood emerging from the US, which wants quiet in Syria and believes that Sharaa may be able to provide it.
This conviction of the US administration reflects the US’s desire to avoid further Middle East entanglements and allow the region to reach its own equilibrium. But it is also clearly influenced by the perspectives emerging from the most significant patrons of the new Syrian government – Turkey and Qatar. This is significant.
Turkey and Qatar are among the major winners of the regional changes resulting from Israel’s weakening of Iran and its “Resistance Axis” in the last two years of war. The prevailing administration’s view of these players is to see them as strong, rational partners who can play a positive role.
One shrewd observer of the Trump administration recently observed that the president “believes that the principles he has pursued to success are universal.”
The envisaged Turkish and Qatari roles in Gaza, and the Qatari role in the hostage negotiations, are products of this outlook. The sanguine view toward the new Islamist regime in Syria is a further downstream result of it.
But this view of Qatar and Turkey is deeply problematic. These are states associated with a Sunni Islamist outlook, and have energetically and actively backed Islamist and anti-Western forces from Afghanistan via Iraq, Syria, and Gaza, and across to Libya.
From where does this apparent blind spot in Washington emerge? One shrewd observer of the Trump administration recently observed that the president “believes that the principles he has pursued to success are universal.” That is, what works in business can be applied wholesale to diplomacy as well.
There’s a lot to commend such a stance. Alas, the problem is that in the Middle East, such a view will only take you so far, as demonstrated vividly over the last two years. Religious ideology, sectarian hatreds, and the resulting inevitable fanaticism and violence are real factors in the region.
In the long run, it is unlikely that positive outcomes will come from building policies that ignore these realities. When ignored, they have a way of forcing themselves back to center-stage, often at some cost.
Published originally on October 25, 2025.
