Syria’s oil and gas sector once anchored state revenues and energy security. Before 2011, the country produced roughly 380,000 barrels per day of oil and about 25 million cubic meters of natural gas daily, generating 20-25 percent of government income and sustaining near self-sufficiency. That system collapsed with war, sanctions, and institutional breakdown.
By 2019, production had fallen to just 15,000 to 30,000 barrels per day as infrastructure suffered extensive damage, skilled labor fled, and key fields slipped out of state control to the Islamic State and the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces. Informal extraction accelerated reservoir depletion and environmental damage, while sanctions severed access to markets, finance, and technology. Syria still holds an estimated 2.5 billion barrels of oil and 8.5 trillion cubic feet of gas but reserves alone no longer guarantee recovery.
Damascus now claims momentum is returning. Syrian officials estimate that restoring the broader energy system will require more than $30 billion, with electricity infrastructure alone needing roughly $10 billion. Within that figure, around $10 billion would rehabilitate oil and gas operations including wells, pipelines, refineries, and production capacity.
Syrian officials estimate that restoring the broader energy system will require more than $30 billion.
Recent territorial shifts have fueled optimism within interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa’s inner circle. After a ceasefire with the Syrian Democratic Forces, the Syrian government reasserted control over major energy assets in Deir ez-Zor, Raqqa, and Hasakah, including the al-Omar oilfield, Syria’s largest, with more than 900 wells, and the Conoco gas complex. These assets once produced up to 210,000 barrels per day from fields such as al-Omar, Rmelan/Suwaydiyah, and al-Tanak, theoretically capable of generating $4.6 billion to $6.1 billion annually if restored.
On January 19, 2026, Syrian Petroleum Company Chief Executive Officer Yusuf Qublawi announced that Shell would exit al-Omar, transferring its stake to Syrian state operators after suspending activity in 2011 because of European Union sanctions. Qublawi said exports would soon resume, Syria would resume its ownership of the field, and Western firms such as Chevron and ConocoPhillips could return. The Syrian government hopes that the easing of restrictions by the United States, European Union and United Kingdom that previously blocked investment, trade, and technology transfers will enable it to jump-start its energy sector.
Yet ownership shifts on paper do not resolve the sector’s structural constraints. War damage remains extensive. Years of illicit extraction degraded reservoirs, polluted land and water, and triggered public health crises. Block 26 alone lost more than $3.8 billion in illegally extracted hydrocarbons after 2017. Refineries at Banias and Homs require large-scale rehabilitation, while pipelines and processing facilities need billions of dollars in upgrades. Electricity generation has collapsed to roughly 1.6 gigawatts from a pre-war 9.5 gigawatts, worsening fuel shortages and operational bottlenecks.
Analysts consistently warn that restoring output will be gradual and technically complex. Sovereignty does not translate into production without security, regulatory clarity, and experienced operators.
Financing remains the decisive barrier. Even with eased sanctions, investors face an economy that has contracted by 84 percent since 2010, leaving roughly 90 percent of Syrians in poverty. The $10 billion required for oil and gas covers drilling, equipment, infrastructure, and workforce training, but total reconstruction needs range from $250 billion to $600 billion. Private capital is essential, yet perceptions of risk deter major firms. Smaller, higher-risk investors may enter, but they cannot mobilize capital at the scale required without multilateral support and debt relief.
Sovereignty does not translate into production without security, regulatory clarity, and experienced operators.
Insurance further constrains recovery. Political instability, sanctions exposure, and environmental liabilities make coverage scarce or prohibitively expensive. Without insurance, large-scale projects stall before they begin. Technology access presents another obstacle. Before 2011, joint ventures with Shell, TotalEnergies, and the China National Petroleum Corporation supplied the expertise needed to manage Syria’s heavy crude and complex reservoirs. Sanctions halted technology imports and maintenance, leaving domestic operators without advanced drilling, processing, or environmental control capabilities.
Market access also remains uncertain. Syria must compete with established OPEC producers, while rebuilding export routes, including pipelines to Turkey or Europe, would require additional capital and political coordination. As energy analyst Carole Nakhle notes, rehabilitation is possible but depends on political stability and a credible regulatory framework.
Interest is emerging cautiously. The Syrian Petroleum Company reports talks with U.S. firms, Persian Gulf companies, and regional contractors. Turkey is restoring a gas pipeline from Aleppo, while Egyptian firms Enppi and Petrojet plan infrastructure investments. More than ninety Arab and foreign companies have expressed interest. Major international firms, however, remain hesitant. As Nakhle warns, rebuilding Syria’s energy sector will be slow, risky, and heavily dependent on policy coherence and security conditions.
Ultimately, Syria’s oil and gas problem is political, rather than geological or technical. Ownership transfers and selective sanctions relief cannot substitute for enforceable contracts, credible institutions, and a governing authority capable of guaranteeing security and compliance. Until Damascus can offer legal certainty, operational safety, and unrestricted market access, Syria’s hydrocarbons will generate headlines, not reconstruction.
