Many Western and Middle Eastern countries met the August 7, 2026, announcement of the Saudi Arabia-Pakistan-Turkey “Mecca Pact” with cautious optimism. Coming amid rising tensions between Iran and the United States, the pact could help isolate Tehran, deter potential aggression against Saudi Arabia, and foster diplomatic cohesion among Sunni countries in addressing regional challenges.
Skepticism is warranted, though. The coalition faces structural weaknesses rooted in the Middle East’s political culture and the internal dynamics of its members. Beyond concerns about the lack of a shared threat, divergent national interests, and the absence of an enforcement mechanism, two deeper issues stand out: the region’s lack of a cooperative political culture, and the chronic instability of its key players.
The coalition faces structural weaknesses rooted in the Middle East’s political culture and the internal dynamics of its members.
Consider the Arab League, one of the oldest regional bodies, established even before the United Nations. Despite the Arab League’s founding ideals, it has functioned more as a symbolic forum than a real alliance. Gamal Abdel Nasser, the president of Egypt and a champion of Arab unity, formed a new country, the United Arab Republic, by merging Egypt and Syria, but the new federation collapsed due to divergent politics. Nasser instead initiated the first Arab-Arab war when he intervened in the 1962–70 Yemen Civil War. Iraqi President Saddam Hussein, another self-defined Arab world leader, launched another inter-Arab war when he ordered Iraqi forces to annex Kuwait in 1990. In both cases, the Arab League was toothless. A lack of shared commitment to collective security leads to recurring failure.
The 1955 Baghdad Pact, later rebranded as the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), sought to create a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)-like structure for the Middle East. CENTO included Turkey, Pakistan, Iran, and Iraq, but local rivalries tempered ambition. Afghanistan, for example, refused to join CENTO due to the presence of Pakistan, with which it had a recurring dispute over the so-called Pashtunistan issue. CENTO survived after Iraq’s 1958 revolution but could not survive the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran. Iraq subsequently invalidated its 1975 Algiers Agreement with Iran when Saddam ordered the invasion of his neighbor. In each case, internal upheavals and rivalries dismantled formal regional alliances in the Middle East.
The Gulf Cooperation Council, formed in 1981 to deter Iran’s export of revolution, has fractured repeatedly, most notably with the 2017–21 rift involving Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates on one hand, and Qatar on the other. Similarly, Pakistan’s shifting relationship with the Afghan Taliban, once seen as a religious if not ideological ally, has now turned adversarial.
In the 1990s, there was hope that Muslim-majority Turkey could build a lasting partnership with Israel. Ankara and Jerusalem deepened their military and intelligence ties, and Israel sought to strengthen these relations and expand them into other areas of cooperation. But with the rise of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP), that cooperation unraveled. Turkey has since aligned with Hamas, a terrorist organization. Today, Turkish leaders regularly use inflammatory rhetoric toward Israel, contributing to a regional cold war.
In the wake of the Arab Spring, there were various proposals for an “Arab NATO,” none of which bore fruit. Most recently, Gulf Arab states rejected an Egyptian proposal to form a broader Arab defense alliance.
The Mecca Pact may serve short-term goals, but it rests on shaky ground, particularly over Gaza, terrorism, and regional dominance.
The Mecca Pact may serve short-term goals, but it rests on shaky ground, particularly over Gaza, terrorism, and regional dominance.
On Gaza, the divide is clear: Turkey openly supports Hamas, while Saudi Arabia views the group with suspicion, especially given Qatar’s close ties with the group. On Israel, paths diverge further. Turkey maintains ties, but escalates tensions, while Saudi Arabia has no formal ties but quietly considers normalization. Pakistan, meanwhile, is perhaps the region’s most rejectionist state after Iran, although its record toward the Palestinians is also historically spotty; despite Islamabad’s pro-Palestinian position today, in 1970, Pakistani troops helped King Hussein II put down the Black September Palestinian revolt in Jordan.
The weakest link today is likely Turkey. Erdoğan’s foreign policy has been inconsistent, shifting between Russia, Europe, and the United States. However, Erdoğan’s embrace of political Islam remains consistent; today, President Donald Trump’s friendship notwithstanding, Erdoğan stands as one of the most prominent regional supporters of Islamist terrorist groups. Such an ideological stance is fundamentally at odds with Saudi Arabia’s anti-Muslim Brotherhood vision of regional stability, Saudi Arabia’s support for Yemen’s Islah and the Sudanese Armed Forces notwithstanding.
True cooperation requires more than tactical alignment; it demands shared values and trust. On that front, the Mecca Pact remains deeply compromised. When the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps launched drones and missiles at Saudi Arabia, Pakistan did nothing—even though Riyadh and Islamabad had earlier signed an alliance. Given the region’s history of short-lived alliances and the deep fissures within this one, it is reasonable to expect that the Mecca Pact will falter when tested.
