American critics of President George W. Bush’s 2003 U.S.-led ouster of Iraqi President Saddam Hussein argue that the United States spent hundreds of billions of dollars only to turn Iraq over to Iran.
That was always a calumny. Iraqis are both independent and realists. Many recognized the influence of both the United States and Iran in their country and maintained their independence by playing both off each other to create balance and space to maneuver. This might frustrate a generation of American policymakers, but Iraqis are realists.
Too many American analysts also ignored that, in democracies, politicians evolve based on circumstances. If then-Senator John Kerry could explain with a straight face that he was for the Iraq war before he was against it, if Senator Lindsey Graham can flip-flop on President Donald Trump, and if Secretary of State Marco Rubio can change positions repeatedly on Russia and Ukraine, why should Americans not expect Iraqi politicians to also pivot? Both Ahmad Chalabi and Nouri al-Maliki ended their careers tilting toward Iran, but their perception of U.S. betrayal guided their positioning; they were not always anti-American.
Firebrand cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, once the bane of America’s existence in Iraq, reinvented himself as a voice against the ruling Shi’ite elites’ corruption and Iran-backed militias.
Opportunism also prevailed. Former Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi was perhaps the most permissive prime minister Iran-backed militias had, never mind his reputation in Washington. Firebrand cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, once the bane of America’s existence in Iraq, reinvented himself as a voice against the ruling Shi’ite elites’ corruption and Iran-backed militias. Qais al-Khazali, a Shi’ite cleric who heads Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq, is alongside Maliki the face of that corruption but has signaled to anyone who will listen that he seeks to follow Muqtada al-Sadr’s path to normalization and reconciliation. Khazali will not ever be pro-American, but he does not want to be perpetually anti-American, either. Frankly, he seeks to conduct business the Iraqi way to enrich himself and his brother without having to worry about being on the wrong end of an American drone.
Certainly, some Iraqi politicians—the Badr Corps’ Hadi al-Amiri, for example—long ago sold their souls to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei for ideological reasons but may be more an exception than the rule.
When the U.S. invaded Iraq in 2003, the State Department and the Central Intelligence Agency argued that “internal” Iraqis had more legitimacy than those like Chalabi who spent lengthy exiles in the West. In practice, however, this meant that the new Iraqis who came of age or spent decades under Saddam, in the Islamic Republic, or in Bashar al-Assad’s Syria grew up absorbing a constant stream of anti-American propaganda. When American tanks rolled into Iraq, they believed the worst about the United States. With time, many moderated and recognized the United States was not the evil empire they imagined or were taught.
The question Washington must now consider, especially with Iran teetering, is whether the United States will work with former adversaries. As bitter as the Vietnam War was, President Bill Clinton re-established ties in 1995, two decades after its end. The same time has now passed since the height of the Iraqi insurgency.
President Trump prides himself as a dealmaker. Perhaps, rather than ignore Iraq or forever condemn Iraqis who once sided with Iran, he might try to co-opt those who want a future more integrated with the Middle East and the West.
He should start with Faiq Zaidan, the president of the Federal Court of Cassation, in Iraq who previous American administrations have accused of Iran-sympathy and an overly aggressive approach to judicial interference. Much of the castigation of Zaidan was partisan; those who lost rulings sought to delegitimize the man who ruled against them. Indeed, Iraqi politicians the State Department or Central Intelligence Agency favored sometimes launched the suits that created precedents that undermined Washington’s desired positions; had they not filed the case, Zaidan’s rulings would not have constrained their actions or benefited competitors.
It is more important to win adversaries over and put conflict behind, than to continue it into perpetuity.
Regardless, Zaidan, like Khazali, now signals he has changed his approach. The Official Supreme Judicial Council has followed suit and declared this month that the state should exclusively control weapons because the era of armed struggle had ended and law and development are more needed. Zaidan is staking such a position not because Washington holds a gun to his head, but because it is the right thing to do.
As Iraqis work to form a new government, Zaidan has also become a voice urging adherence to constitutional deadlines. Again, this signals maturity against the backdrop of Maliki, Kurdish leader Masoud Barzani, and others who cultivate vacuums for their own personal benefit at the expense of Iraqi security. Zaidan has also become much more vocal both on judicial independence and on the necessity of the courts to defend free speech.
Trump’s MAGA supporters resent what they see as perpetual war. At the same time, Rubio seeks to recalibrate the State Department to work with more agility in a way that truly benefits American interests. Perhaps now, Trump and Rubio should approach Iraqi leaders with generosity, recognizing that co-opting and convincing former opponents can be far wiser than bludgeoning them. Here, they should turn to the wisdom of President Ronald Reagan. As he negotiated with Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev in Iceland four decades ago, Reagan cited the old Russian proverb, “doveryai, no proveryai,” (“trust, but verify”). Reagan understood it is more important to win adversaries over and put conflict behind, than to continue it into perpetuity.
With more than 70 percent of Iraqis born after Saddam’s fall, Iraq today is a fundamentally different country than Americans realize. As Zaidan’s comments signal, applying Reagan’s wisdom is long overdue.
