Abstract
Christians in the Islamic Republic of Pakistan endure a modern form of dhimmitude—not through the classical jizya tax implemented generations ago, but through systemic socioeconomic subordination, draconian blasphemy laws, and ideological portrayal as internal threats in a civilizational conflict with the West. This paper explores the hybridized concept of “neo-dhimmitude” and highlights how traditional dhimmi status has evolved in Pakistan through integration with local structures (such as South Asia’s caste and biraderi systems), state-sponsored Islamism, and post-9/11 geopolitical narratives. Protection, in this framework, exacts a steep price —blocked socioeconomic mobility, curtailed human rights, and presumed disloyalty. These dynamics betray Pakistan’s 1947 founding vision of religious pluralism, converting the nation into an Islamist hierarchy that relegates Christians and other minorities to perpetual second-class citizenship. Ultimately, addressing neo-dhimmitude will require sustained efforts to restore the liberal principles of Pakistan’s founding and dismantle the legal, social, and ideological structures that perpetuate minority subordination.
Jinnah’s Promise Betrayed
In the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, a nation founded in 1947 partly on the promise of religious equality and pluralism, Christians—native to the land long before the partition of India in the same year—find themselves relegated to an insecure existence as perpetual second-class citizens. Despite Muhammad Ali Jinnah’s visionary declaration that faith would have “nothing to do with the business of the State” and his assurance of equal citizenship for all, the intervening decades have witnessed a consistent erosion of this ideal.
Through successive waves of Islamization—culminating in General Zia-ul-Haq’s sweeping reforms from 1977 to 1988—Pakistan has transformed into a state where systemic discrimination, draconian blasphemy laws, and deep-seated social hierarchies converge to impose a modern form of subordination on its Christian minority. Today, Christians number roughly 3.3 million (approximately 1.5-2 percent of the Pakistani population), yet they endure what can be described as neo-dhimmitude—a hybridized oppression that echoes historical dhimmi status without the classical jizya tax, instead enforcing inferiority through socioeconomic exclusion, the constant threat of mob violence and judicial persecution, and ideological vilification as Western proxies.
This neo-dhimmitude manifests in multiple, interconnected dimensions—the fusion of Islamic hierarchy with South Asia’s enduring caste and biraderi systems that: (1) Confines Pakistani Christians—many descended from Dalit converts—to menial labor and sanitation work; (2) Weaponizes blasphemy laws (in particular, Sections 295-B and 295-C of the Pakistan Penal Code), which serve as a “hanging sword” over daily life, enabling false accusations, prolonged detentions, and extrajudicial killings; and (3) Geopolitical frames that cast Christians as internal threats in a civilizational struggle against the West. Recent events, including devastating mob attacks on Christian communities in Jaranwala in 2023 and elsewhere, underscore the persistence of this dynamic.
The U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom’s 2025 Annual Report continues to designate Pakistan as a Country of Particular Concern for its “systematic, ongoing, and egregious” violations of religious freedom. Far from the egalitarian society Jinnah envisioned, Pakistan’s Christians embody a tragic paradox—native yet alienated, protected in theory, but subordinated in everyday practice.
The Erosion of Pluralism—From Founding Ideals to Islamization
Far from Jinnah’s pluralist vision, Pakistan has relegated Christians and other minorities to second-class citizenship.
Pakistan was established in 1947 as a homeland for the Muslims of British India, with Islam serving as the central rationale for its creation. Yet, at its founding, the new state was envisioned with an inclusive and secular character by its principal architect and founder, Jinnah. In his landmark address to the Constituent Assembly on August 11, 1947, Jinnah declared: “You are free; you are free to go to your temples, you are free to go to your mosques or to any other place of worship in this State of Pakistan. You may belong to any religion or caste or creed—that has nothing to do with the business of the State.”[1]
With this declaration, he promised a pluralistic society where religious identity would remain a private matter, detached from governance, and affirmed equal citizenship for all, irrespective of faith. Jinnah demonstrated this by appointing representatives of religious minorities, including Liaquat Ali Khan, a Shia Muslim, and Sir Muhammad Zafrullah Khan, an Ahmadi Muslim, to the first cabinet. It is worth noting that Jinnah himself was born into a family of Ismaili Shias, who were aligned with Twelver Shia Islam.
Jinnah’s commitment to equality proved short-lived. Pakistan’s shift began shortly after independence, influenced by Islamist thinker Maulana Abul Al Maududi, who argued that Pakistani Muslims required protection from the perceived negative cultural influences of Christians and other religious minorities. Aside from this framing, Maududi did not consider Christianity to be a valid religion, let alone divine. He contested that early Christians distorted and fabricated the message of Jesus and maintained that Christian scriptures are untrustworthy and unreliable.[2] Following Maududi’s footsteps, the Constituent Assembly adopted the Objectives Resolution in 1949, framing the future constitution as enabling Muslims “to order their lives in the individual and collective spheres in accordance with the teachings and requirements of Islam as set out in the Holy Qur’an and the Sunna.”[3]
By 1956, the country officially became the Islamic Republic of Pakistan under its first constitution, establishing the primacy of Islam and introducing protections for the majority faith against actions “intended to outrage religious feelings.”[4] This early institutionalization of Islamic supremacy effectively relegated Christians and other minorities to a form of neo-dhimmitude—protected yet subordinate in an increasingly Islamic state, thus setting the tone for more aggressive marginalization.
Subsequent leaders accelerated Maududi’s trajectory. Under Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s Pakistan People’s Party, policies including the nationalization of schools and colleges fostered discrimination against minorities, marking the first sustained official effort to marginalize non-Muslims from the national mainstream.[5] The process reached its climax during General Zia Ul Haq’s military regime (1977-1988), which deepened Islamization across education, law, and finance by embedding Islamist ideology into the structures of the Pakistani state.[6] In a 1981 interview with The Economist, he likened Pakistan to Israel as an ideological state, warning that removing Islam would cause it to collapse.[7] Historian Ian Talbot describes Zia’s era as “the end of state neutrality” toward minorities, with a clear courting of Sunni Islamism.[8] Post-Zia efforts by secular politicians to reverse these changes have largely failed, exacerbated by militant Islamism fueled by Pakistan’s role in the anti-Soviet jihad in Afghanistan between 1979 and 1989.[9]
The legacy of Zia’s “end of state neutrality” has evolved into a contemporary neo-dhimmitude, consigning Christians to second-class status, as seen in the ongoing discriminatory policies in the education sector of Pakistan. Discrimination has persisted in the education system, with curricula often including discriminatory content against minorities, as witnessed in 2020, when the Governor of Punjab mandated compulsory study of the Qur’an for higher education students, which offered no viable alternative for non-Muslims.[10] Although the Pakistani Constitution guarantees religious freedom, a 2023 Freedom House report rated the country as only “partly free” due to these and other concerns about the effective protections of the constitutional rights of Pakistani Christians.[11]
Such discriminatory structures perpetuate neo-dhimmitude for Pakistan’s Christian minority, who—estimated at around 3.3 million (1.5-2 percent of the population in the 2023 census, though church sources claim higher numbers)—are primarily concentrated in Punjab.[12] Unlike many Hindus and Sikhs who migrated during partition, most Christians—primarily descendants of Dalit converts from Hinduism in the late 19th and early 20th centuries—were native to the territories that became Pakistan, and did not migrate en masse in 1947. At the time of partition, non-Muslims comprised roughly 14-23 percent of the population in the territories forming Pakistan (with estimates varying due to migration and violence), but today they represent only about 1.5-2, percent with some sources saying the number could be as high as 3.7 percent. This dramatic decline underscores the erosion of Jinnah’s pluralistic ideals and sets the historical stage for the contemporary realities of neo-dhimmitude, where entrenched hierarchies through legal, social, and ideological mechanisms confine Christians to diminished and degraded statuses.
Neo-Dhimmitude in Contemporary Pakistan—The Plight of Religious Minorities
Pakistan’s treatment of its religious minorities, particularly Christians, reflects a complex evolution from the country’s founding vision of pluralism to a reality shaped by increasing Islamization and majoritarian pressures. As documented in scholarly analyses, the nation has witnessed a steady erosion of tolerance since the 1970s, a development that accelerated under regimes prioritizing Sunni Islamic identity over inclusive citizenship. This shift has created conditions where minorities experience conditional protection, systemic discrimination, and vulnerability to violence—patterns that echo historical Islamic concepts of dhimmitude while adapting to modern state mechanisms.
The term neo-dhimmitude offers a useful framework for understanding this phenomenon because it emphasizes not a rigid revival of medieval practices, but a fluid, contemporary adaptation where “protection” of non-Muslims is contingent on submission to an Islamic-dominated order, which is enforced through constitutional amendments, blasphemy laws, educational curricula, and societal pressures rather than overt medieval pacts.
Ideological currents contribute to a broader environment of intolerance for Pakistani Christians
Historically, dhimmitude referred to the protected yet subordinated status of non-Muslims (primarily Christians and Jews, known as dhimmis or “People of the Book”) living under Islamic rule. In exchange for paying the poll-tax (jizya)—which symbolized subjection and humiliation[13]—dhimmis were granted conditional tolerance and exempted from military service. However, this came with significant economic burdens, including double taxation compared to Muslims.[14] In addition to this economic exploitation, dhimmitude has historically come with political and economic discriminations. For example, the Abbasid caliphs developed a more comprehensive system of dhimmitude law. Jurists, in their eagerness to oblige the caliph and support the program of conquest, expanded scriptures to facilitate subjugation of Christians and other non-Muslim communities.[15] Under Abbasid rule, it was forbidden for dhimmis to criticize Islam, convert to any religion other than Islam, marry a Muslim, or hold a position giving the dhimmi authority over a Muslim.[16] Dhimmis also were forced to live separately from Muslims, in special quarters of town, live in lower houses than those of Muslims, and practice their religion secretly.[17]
While “dhimmitude” has long been an established concept in Islam-focused discourses, “neo-dhimmitude” positions Pakistan as a case study in its mutation. Neo-dhimmitude avoids rehashing historical analogies and instead highlights flexibility—dhimmitude is not frozen in time but is “neo” in its adaptation to Pakistan’s democratic façade, constitutional rhetoric, and post-9/11 anti-Western sentiment. The concept of neo-dhimmitude captures the shift from Jinnah’s pluralism to Maududi/Ul Haq-era Islamization as a “neo” reinvention—whereby the Pakistani state’s “protection” of minorities morphs into conditional tolerance, echoing historical dhimmi pacts but enforced via modern tools like constitutional amendments and curriculum revisions.
Under this contemporary neo-dhimmitude framework, where minorities receive only contingent protection, Pakistani Christians face escalating threats, particularly from Islamist political groups, violent extremists, and terrorist organizations. Jamaat-e-Islami, a political group, is rooted in a Muslim Brotherhood-styled political ideology calling for the establishment of a distinctly Islamic system of government. The group currently acts as the unofficial arbiter of Pakistan’s status as a nation founded on the grounds of its Islamic identity.[18] Led by Maududi during its inception in the 1950s, its stated objective was the establishment of “a Divine Government,” which it defined as “that universal revolution in the individual and collective life of man which Islam calls for.” In the following decades, Jamaat-e-Islami evolved as “a cadre-based organization that proclaimed itself the vanguard of the global Islamic revolution.”[19]
Blasphemy accusations—often arising from trivial disputes—frequently lead to mob attacks, prosecutions, and lynchings.
Similarly, the Deobandi Ulema of the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI) participate in electoral politics while describing jihad as a sacred right and obligation.[20] While Jamaat-e-Islami seeks to take over the state through constitutional means and political stratagems, Hizb ut-Tahrir, the “Party of Islamic Liberation,” pursues the opposite approach for establishing the caliphate.[21] It is legally banned in Pakistan, but its members have been active in their covert struggle to transform Pakistan into the starting point for a global caliphate.[22]
These ideological currents contribute to a broader environment of intolerance for Pakistani Christians. As noted, Freedom House’s 2023 report on Pakistan documents how constitutional guarantees of religious freedom fail to protect minorities from discriminatory laws, social prejudice, and violence. Blasphemy accusations—often arising from trivial disputes—frequently lead to mob attacks, prosecutions, and lynchings targeting Christians, Ahmadis, Hindus, and others. Christians remain particularly vulnerable in the current climate because they face economic marginalization, forced conversions, and attacks on churches and communities. This circumstantial tolerance, where minorities must navigate a precarious existence under majoritarian scrutiny, exemplifies neo-dhimmitude—a modern reinvention where the state’s role has shifted from direct subjugation to enabling or tolerating societal and institutional pressures that maintain hierarchy.
Neo-dhimmitude in Pakistan, in brief, underscores the tension between Pakistan’s founding ideals of equality and the reality of an increasingly Islamized state that subordinates religious minorities. While classical dhimmitude provided a structured (if unequal) framework for coexistence, its contemporary form perpetuates vulnerability through legal ambiguities, extremist ideologies, and societal enforcement. Addressing this requires genuine reforms to uphold equal citizenship, dismantle discriminatory laws, and foster interfaith dialogue. Without such a change, Pakistan’s minorities will remain trapped in a precarious existence that echoes medieval subjugation in contemporary guise. The current situation is compounded by the lingering legacies of the broader South Asian caste system, in which many Christians, as descendants of Dalit converts, continue to occupy the lowest socioeconomic rungs of Pakistani society.
Entrenched Caste System Dynamics: Dalit Christians and Socioeconomic Exclusion in Pakistan
At the core of the neo-dhimmitude experienced by Pakistani Christians lies the enduring influence of the South Asian caste system, which continues to subordinate and marginalize this community long after their conversion to Christianity. The vast majority of Pakistani Christians are descendants of Dalits—members of the so-called “untouchable” caste—who converted in large numbers to Protestant Christianity beginning in the 1870s, particularly in the Punjab region under British colonial rule.[23] These mass conversions largely ceased by the 1920s, but the social stigma accompanying them persisted. Following the 1947 Partition of India, most of these Christian converts in Punjab became part of the newly formed state of Pakistan, carrying with them the inherited caste-based disadvantages that have proven resilient in Pakistan’s Sunni-majority society.
The South Asian caste system traditionally divides society into three broad occupational and social categories—“defiling” (the lowest, associated with tasks deemed impure or polluting), “menial” (including occupations such as barbers, cobblers, or ironsmiths), and “clean” (encompassing upper-caste roles in priesthood, business, and governance). Pakistani Christians are largely concentrated in the “defiling” and untouchable occupations, particularly sanitation work, manual scavenging, and street cleaning. In everyday Pakistani society, the Urdu term Isai (derived from Isa, the Qur’anic name for Jesus) has become synonymous with “laborer,” “sanitary worker,” or “sweeper,” reinforcing a deep-seated social equation between Christianity and low-status, degrading labor. This stigmatizing conflation of Christian identity with dehumanizing work entrenches social exclusion and reveals how deeply the South Asian caste system has been adapted and internalized within Pakistani Muslim society.
A common greeting or introduction in many Punjabi settings includes the question ‘What is your caste?’
The persistent stratification noted above demonstrates that South Asian Muslims, despite Islam’s theological emphasis on equality, largely adopted and reshaped the indigenous caste hierarchy prevalent on the subcontinent for millennia. Consequently, Pakistan developed what scholars describe as “Islamic castes,” which blended religious identity with pre-existing social rankings. In Punjab especially, caste remains a powerful social marker, expressed through terms such as zaat, qoum, and biraderi, all of which broadly refer to clan, community, group, tribe, or nation. A common greeting or introduction in many Punjabi settings includes the question “What is your caste?”—a query that functions as a form of “benevolent coercion,” where disclosing one’s caste background becomes a precondition for social acceptance, integration, and relationship-building.[24] The revelation of a low-caste Christian identity subsequently leads to exclusion or diminished status in a given social, professional, or political interaction.
Among Pakistani Christians, the most stigmatized subgroup is the Chuhras, a casteist slur historically applied to those engaged in sanitation and scavenging work.[25] For generations, Chuhras have endured degradation, ostracism, and systemic discrimination precisely because of their association with occupations considered ignominious. This ingrained prejudice has created a hybridized neo-dhimmi in which Islamic notions of hierarchical protection intersect with indigenous casteism to produce an “invisible jizya”—a modern, informal tax paid through menial labor, economic exploitation, and perpetual poverty. The biraderi system, a kinship-based social structure rooted in caste-like affiliations, reinforces these divisions by determining access to jobs, marriage alliances, political representation, and community support, often excluding or disadvantaging Christians who fall outside dominant biraderis.
Compounding these structural inequalities is the ongoing threat of forced conversions to Islam, which further entrenches the subordinate status of Christians. A notable example occurred in 2017, when Syed Anees Shah, a public prosecutor, reportedly offered acquittal to 42 Christian prisoners facing murder charges in exchange for their conversion to Islam.[26] Father Inayat Bernard, rector of Saint Mary’s Seminary in Lahore, condemned the proposal as a deliberate strategy to “humiliate Christians” and exploit their vulnerability.[27] Such incidents illustrate how neo-dhimmitude and caste-based marginalization converge to create a multi-layered system of subjugation—one that combines situational tolerance with socio-economic exclusion rooted in the traditional caste order. In this way, Pakistani Christians occupy a uniquely unstable situation—doubly subordinated as religious minorities under a neo-dhimmi framework and as descendants of Dalits within a caste system that continues to shape social realities in light of Pakistan’s Islamic identity.
“Unholy Speech,” Unholy Laws—Pakistan’s Blasphemy Cases
Building upon the entrenched caste-like hierarchies in Pakistan, where Christians are systematically relegated to the lowest social strata, the nation’s blasphemy laws serve as another mechanism of control and subjugation. These laws, ostensibly designed to protect religious sentiments, disproportionately target religious minorities like Christians, reinforcing and deepening their marginalization within the broader societal network. By criminalizing perceived insults to Islam, Pakistan’s blasphemy laws perpetuate a climate of fear and submission, and thus mirror the discriminatory dynamics of the caste system that positions Christians as continuous outsiders in their own homeland.
The Islamic Republic of Pakistan’s blasphemy laws were adopted during the British colonial era, as a way to maintain peace in a multi-religious society.[28] Originally, the laws did not discriminate between religions and “made it a crime to deliberately and maliciously offend the religious sentiments of any religious group.”[29] However, they have more recently been appropriated by Islamists seeking to settle personal vendettas or express intolerance against various Islamic sects and non-Muslims in the country.[30] This shift has exacerbated tensions, turning blasphemy accusations into tools for violence against minorities, including Christians, who face vigilante retribution under the guise of religious protection. Notably, Pakistan is one of only seven countries in the world that has the death penalty for blasphemy.[31]
Pakistan has not always enforced blasphemy laws with the frequency and severity seen today. Following its independence in 1947, during the period spanning from that year to 1977, there were only ten reported judgments related to offenses against religion.[32] Cases escalated under Zia Ul Haq’s administration, which made additions to the Pakistan Penal Code, including Section 295-A (outraging religious feelings), 295-B (desecrating the Qur’an), 295-C (defiling the name of the Prophet Muhammad), and 298-A (defiling the names of the family of the Prophet Muhammad, his companion or any of the caliphs). During Ul Haq’s rule, the Federal Shariat Court was established in 1980 to “examine and decide the question of whether or not any law or provision of law is “repugnant to the injunctions of Islam.”[33] Unless the government lodges a successful appeal with the Shariat Appellate Bench of the Supreme Court, the Federal Shariat Court’s rulings are binding.[34]
Blasphemy laws are implemented with unequivocal and sometimes deadly force. In 1990, the Federal Shariat Court ruled that the death penalty was mandatory under 295-C of the Pakistan Penal Code and since the government withdrew its appeal against this judgment, it became binding throughout the country, although the text of the legislation has yet to be amended.[35] Pakistani Christians regard these laws as a “hanging sword,” liable to fall on anyone at anytime.[36] The ever-present threat of severe punishment, often triggered by mere rumors and allegations, creates an atmosphere of constant vulnerability for them. This vulnerability manifests in immediate threats of violence and the drawn-out ordeal of the legal process itself, where accused Christians often endure years of pretrial detention. In an analysis of 24 recent blasphemy cases where defendants were detained, the average length of time spent in detention was 59 months (more than four and a half years), with a medium of 47 months (nearly four years).[37] Such prolonged pretrial detentions, combined with the mandatory death penalty and the threat of mob violence, exemplify neo-dhimmitude in practice. Pakistani Christians are forced into a state of submission and fear, where their presence is conditioned on avoiding any perceived affront to Islamic supremacy.
Neo-dhimmitude finds concrete expression in the architecture of Pakistan’s blasphemy laws—namely Sections 295 and 298 of the penal code—which prohibit individuals from engaging in verbal or nonverbal actions deemed “insulting” to religious beliefs and practices. These provisions extend to safeguarding the perceived integrity of physical copies of the Qur’an and other religious texts, places of worship, the reputation of Muhammad, and other religious symbols. Blasphemy accusations against Christians in Pakistan often require only a minimal standard of proof. According to reports, accused individuals may be “presumed guilty” or convicted on the basis of a standard of proof below that of “beyond reasonable doubt.”[38] This inversion of justice—where accusations suffice to trigger prolonged detentions and arrests—once again reinforces neo-dhimmitude by compelling Pakistani Christians to live in deference to the majority Islamic faith. In turn, their rights to expression, security, and fair trial are curtailed under the shadow of potential blasphemy charges.
High-profile cases, such as that of Asia Bibi—a Christian woman accused of blasphemy in 2009 after an altercation with Muslim coworkers—illustrate how these laws enforce submission through severe restrictions on speech and behavior that sometimes morph into existential threats for minorities. Bibi’s ordeal involved years on death row before her acquittal in 2018. The “hanging sword” dynamic of neo-dhimmitude in Pakistan is present in her case, where mere allegations can lead to prolonged detention and social ostracism.
Critics of Pakistan’s blasphemy laws have also become targets. A widespread climate of intimidation has developed, such that those accused of blasphemy—and the legal professionals who defend or preside over their cases—are forced to either flee the country or live in Pakistan in a permanent state of fear for their own lives and the lives of their families.[39] The most notable case is that of Salman Taseer, the former Governor of Punjab, who was assassinated by Mumtaz Qadri, his bodyguard, in 2011 for his vocal criticism of the blasphemy laws and support for those, like Bibi, who he publicly supported. Taseer’s wife reportedly went from lawyer to lawyer, pleading for someone to take her case to prosecute Qadri, but was repeatedly turned away out of fear.[40] The judge who, two years later, sentenced Qadri to death, had to flee Pakistan after repeated death threats following his verdict.[41] The case surrounding Taseer highlights the entrenched and dangerous state of blasphemy laws as they pertain not only to Pakistani Christians, but to all people residing within Pakistan’s borders. Advocating for Christian victims such as Bibi can provoke deadly backlash from extremists and further isolate potential allies from intervening on their behalf. In that sense Pakistan’s blasphemy laws effectively reinforce a discriminatory system where minorities face a broader suppression of any efforts to protect or exonerate them.
Collectively, these examples of vigilante violence, targeted assassinations, and legal intimidation captures the heart of neo-dhimmitude, whereby Pakistani Christians are forced into a modern form of subjugation through fear and enforced silence. These developments echo historical dhimmi protections that demanded deference to Islamic supremacy while stripping minorities of full agency and security.
Christians as Western Proxies—Ideological Framing and Civilizational Conflict in Pakistan
The concepts of ideological framing and civilizational conflict illuminate the neo-dhimmitude experienced by Christians in Pakistan, portraying them as “puppets” or “proxies” of Western powers—particularly the United States—and as internal threats within the ummah (Muslim community). This framing casts Christians as participants in a broader civilizational jihad, justifying violence and discrimination as necessary “protection” of Islamic purity and sovereignty. If Pakistan is the “land of the pure” (from “Pak” meaning pure), then non-Muslims—particularly Christians—represent the “impure” and unclean elements in society.[42]
In Pakistan’s politically charged environment, Christians are frequently equated with the West due to their religion, amid widespread unease toward Western influence.[43] While militant groups are frequently the culprits in attacks on Pakistani Christians, a general angst against the U.S. has caused large numbers of Pakistani Muslims to target and scapegoat Christians. Islamist organizations like Jamaat-e-Islami amplify this narrative by portraying threats from the U.S., Israel, and India, while urging unity among Muslims.[44] This aligns with the group’s manifesto, which vows to end “U.S. slavery” to restore Pakistan’s independence and sovereignty, and promotes self-reliance against Western-led globalization.[45] Hizb ut-Tahrir’s ideology reinforces this view, asserting that “The Islamic countries are Muslim lands that were divided by the agents of Kafir colonialists, as part of their plan to abolish the Khilafah.”[46] The group’s anti-Western rhetoric and calls to abrogate military cooperation with Western powers have found resonance in harder-line elements within Pakistan’s military and intelligence services.[47]
This enemy framing intensifies during periods of socio-economic or political upheaval. For instance, following the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan in late 2001, Pakistani Christian leaders demanded security cover for themselves and their churches amid heightened fears. Similarly, after the September 2013 suicide bombing at All Saints’ Church in Peshawar, which killed 86 Christians, a Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) spokesman justified the attack by stating, “until and unless drone strikes are stopped, we will continue to strike wherever we will find an opportunity against non-Muslims.”[48]
Beyond the legal penalties surrounding Pakistan’s blasphemy laws, Pakistani citizens sometimes wield blasphemy accusations to settle interpersonal disputes, often leading to extrajudicial killings and mob violence.[49] It is a relatively regular occurrence for Christian-owned localities to be set on fire. Violence erupted in Pakistan in August 2023 after a Christian man was accused of desecrating the Qur’an; the attacks occurred in Jaranwala, in the district of Faisalabad in Punjab province, where a mob gathered and began assaulting multiple Christian churches and homes.[50] Two dozen homes were torched or badly damaged.[51] In May 2024, a mob of over 400 people set a 70-year-old Christian man’s house ablaze and attacked him based on allegations that some pages of the Qur’an were found burnt near his house.[52] In March 2013, dozens of homes were torched during a mob attack in a Punjabi Christian community over allegations of blasphemy made against a Christian man.
Steps Forward—Addressing Neo-Dhimmitude in Pakistan
Reclaiming Jinnah’s vision of equal citizenship remains Pakistan’s unfinished task.
Mitigating the neo-dhimmitude faced by Pakistani Christians is the primary imperative to countering Islamization and bolstering secular democratic forces within Pakistan. This requires a multifaceted approach that empowers Pakistani Christian communities while navigating the delicate balance between international solidarity and avoiding perceptions of foreign overreach by Western powers. Diplomatic, moral, or other forms of international intervention on behalf of persecuted Pakistani Christians present complex challenges and may ultimately prove counterproductive, potentially exacerbating perceptions of Western interference. The West’s reluctance to engage meaningfully with these issues has prompted some Christian leaders in Pakistan to express frustration, arguing that their suffering goes unheard globally and that the international community has effectively abandoned them.[53]
Despite judicial acknowledgement of the problem, systemic barriers persist in addressing blasphemy law abuses, which is arguably the gravest threat for the Christians of Pakistan. The Pakistani Supreme Court’s 2018 ruling in the Asia Bibi case acknowledged the rampant misuse of blasphemy laws for false accusations, signaling recognition at the highest judicial level of this escalating problem.
However, no substantive efforts to repeal or reform these laws have materialized. Former Prime Minister Imran Khan staunchly defended them, declaring in a July 2018 campaign speech, “We are standing with Article 295c and will defend it.”[54] Despite his Western portrayal as an Oxford-educated former cricketer, Khan’s rhetoric in Pakistan echoes Jamaat-e-Islami influences, framing jihad as “war for my freedom” and asserting that “Sharia is what makes us human.”[55]
International scrutiny continues to highlight the urgency of reform. In light of these ongoing issues, the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom’s 2025 annual report recommended that the U.S. Department of State redesignate Pakistan as a Country of Particular Concern (CPC) for its “systematic, ongoing, and egregious religious freedom violations.”[56] This recommendation for redesignation underscores the need for sustained pressure on Pakistan to address these violations and the persistence of neo-dhimmitude in Pakistan.
Empowering Pakistani Christian leaders would benefit from enhanced engagement with political parties, advocating their demands to local candidates to foster proactive participation in the political process. Some have proposed forming a joint think tank among mainline churches to develop concrete strategies for addressing Christian issues in Pakistan.[57] In the end, dismantling neo-dhimmitude demands a collective awakening—not just from Pakistan’s embattled minorities, but from a global community that must amplify their voices, and from within Pakistan itself, where reclaiming Jinnah’s vision of equality could transform the “land of the pure” into a haven for all its citizens, untainted by division or fear.
End Notes
[1] Muhammad Ali Jinnah, “First Presidential Address to the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan,” August 11, 1947, in G. Allana, Pakistan Movement Historical Documents (Karachi: Department of International Relations, University of Karachi, n.d. [1969], transcribed by Frances W. Pritchett, https://franpritchett.com/00islamlinks/txt_jinnah_assembly_1947.html
[2] Mamadou Bocoum, “Scholar’s Corner—How Do Abul A’la Maududi and Fazlur Rahman Position Jews and Christians in the Quran?,” Faith Matters (blog), October 5, 2015, https://www.faith-matters.org/scholars-corner-how-do-abul-ala-maududi-and-fazlur-rahman-position-jews-and-christians-in-the-quran/.
[3] “Annex: The Objective Resolution,” Pakistani.org, accessed January 12, 2026, https://www.pakistani.org/pakistan/constitution/annex.html.
[4] The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan (1956) (Karachi: Department of Advertising, Films and Publications, Government of Pakistan, 1956), Internet Archive, https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.507437.
[5] Amalendu Misra, “Life in Brackets—Minority Christians and Hegemonic Violence in Pakistan,” International Journal on Minority and Group Rights 22, no. 2 (2015): 160.
[6] Husain Haqqani, “Islamism and the Pakistani State,” Current Trends in Islamist Ideology (Hudson Institute, August 9, 2013), https://www.hudson.org/national-security-defense/islamism-and-the-pakistani-state
[7] Faisal Devji, Muslim Zion: Pakistan as a Political Idea (London: Hurst, 2013), 4.
[8] Ian Talbot, “Religion and Violence—The Historical Context for Conflict in Pakistan,” in Religion and Violence in South Asia—Theory and Practice, ed. R. John and R. King (London: Routledge, 2007), 154-172.
[9] Haqqani 2013.
[10] “Govt Makes the Quran Teaching Compulsory in Universities,” Dawn, June 15, 2020, https://www.dawn.com/news/1563606.
[11] Freedom House, “Pakistan: Freedom in the World 2023 Country Report” (Freedom House, 2023), Freedom House, https://freedomhouse.org/country/pakistan/freedom-world/2023.
[12] “Pakistan’s 2023 Census ‘Grossly Undercounts’ Christians Leading to Fewer Opportunities, Say Church Leaders,” Christian Daily International, July 2024, https://www.christiandaily.com/news/pakistans-2023-census-grossly-undercounts-christians.
[13] Bat Ye’or, Islam and Dhimmitude: Where Civilizations Collide, trans. Miriam Kochan and David Littman (Cranbury, NJ: Associated University Presses, 2002), 4.
[14] Ye’or 2002, 4
[15] Gianstefano C. Martin, The Dhimmi Narrative: A Comparison Between the Historical and the Actual in the Context of Christian-Muslim Relations in Modern Egypt (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School), Monterey, CA, December 2009, 20, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA514376.pdf
[16] Ye’or 2002, 4.
[17] Ibid.
[18] Haqqani 2013.
[19] Ibid.
[20] Ibid.
[21] Ibid.
[22] Ibid.
[23] Radhika Singha, “Caste Out: Christian Dalits in Pakistan,” The Political Quarterly 93, no. 3 (2022): 488.
[24] Muhammad Auwn, “Silent Divide: State Sanctioned Reinforcement and Reproduction of Caste in Pakistan” (MA thesis, Central European University, Department of Sociology and Social Anthropology, 2023), 1.
[25] Ibid., 3.
[26] International Christian Concern, “Pakistan’s Christian Leadership Condemns Government’s Blackmail of Christian Prisoners,” April 3, 2017, https://persecution.org/2017/04/03/pakistans-christian-leadership-condemns-governments-blackmail-of-christian-prisoners/
[27] Ibid.
[28] Zimran Samuel, Blasphemy Trials in Pakistan: Legal Process as Punishment (Clooney Foundation for Justice, September 2024), 10, https://cfj.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/Pakistan-Blasphemy-Report_September-2024.pdf
[29] Adnan Ahmed and Chinmoy Gulrajani, “Pakistan’s Blasphemy Laws and the Role of Forensic Psychiatrists,” The Journal of the American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law 48, no. 1 (2020): 105.
[30] Misra 2015, 163.
[31] Clooney Foundation for Justice, “CFJ Report Highlights Devastating Impact of Blasphemy Accusations in Pakistan,” October 21, 2024, https://cfj.org/news/cfj-report-highlights-devastating-impact-of-blasphemy-accusations-in-pakistan/.
[32] International Commission of Jurists, On Trial: The Implementation of Pakistan’s Blasphemy Laws (Geneva: International Commission of Jurists, November 2015), 10–11, https://www.icj.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/Pakistan-On-Trial-Blasphemy-Laws-Publications-Thematic-Reports-2015-ENG.pdf.
[33] Amnesty International, “As Good as Dead”: The Impact of the Blasphemy Laws in Pakistan, Index: ASA 33/5136/2016 (21 December 2016), 10, https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/asa33/5136/2016/en/
[34] Amnesty International, “As Good as Dead”, 10-11.
[35] Samuel, Blasphemy Trials in Pakistan, 12.
[36] Y.S., “Bearing the Cross of Christ in Pakistan,” The Gospel Coalition, December 11, 2014, https://www.thegospelcoalition.org/article/bearing-the-cross-of-christ-in-pakistan/
[37] Samuel, Blasphemy Trials in Pakistan, 5.
[38] Amnesty International, “As Good as Dead”, 12.
[39] Ibid., 17.
[40] Sahar Said, “The Blasphemy Behind Blasphemy in Pakistan,” Foreign Policy Association, September 3, 2025, https://fpa.org/blasphemy-behind-blasphemy-pakistan/
[41] Ibid.
[42] Misra 2015, 167.
[43] Ibid., 169.
[44] Haqqani 2013.
[45] Ibid.
[46] Ibid.
[47] Ibid.
[48] Saima Mohsin, “Tackling Religious Intolerance and Violence in Pakistan,” CNN, September 24, 2013, https://www.cnn.com/2013/09/24/world/asia/pakistan-christians-mohsin.
[49] U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF), “Blasphemy Law Remains and Impediment to Religious Freedom in Pakistan,” December 2, 2025, https://www.uscirf.gov/news-room/releases-statements/blasphemy-law-remains-impediment-religious-freedom-pakistan
[50] The Alabama Baptist, “Violence Erupts in Pakistan After Christian Accused of Desecrating Quran,” The Alabama Baptist, August 17, 2023, https://thealabamabaptist.org/violence-erupts-in-pakistan-after-christian-accused-of-desecrating-quran/.
[51] Ibid.
[52] Samuel, Blasphemy Trials in Pakistan, 1.
[53] Misra 2015, 177.
[54] “Imran Khan criticised for defence of Pakistan blasphemy laws,” The Guardian, July 9, 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jul/09/imran-kahn-accused-over-defence-of-pakistan-blasphemy-laws.
[55] Haqqani 2013.
[56] U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF), “Blasphemy Law Remains an Impediment to Religious Freedom in Pakistan,” December 2, 2025, https://www.uscirf.gov/news-room/releases-statements/blasphemy-law-remains-impediment-religious-freedom-pakistan.
[57] Aftab Alexander Mughal, “Pakistan Christians End Year of Persecution Hoping New Government in 2024 Will Bring Respite,” Archeparchy of Pittsburgh, January 2, 2024, https://archpitt.org/pakistan-christians-end-year-of-persecution-hoping-new-government-in-2024-will-bring-respite/.
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