Beirut is buzzing with speculation that Syria will oust Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri within the next few months. While this is not the first time that the Lebanese capital's rumor mills have augured the billionaire construction tycoon's political downfall, it has become increasingly clear in recent weeks that Hariri stands in the way of Syria's grand strategy for securing its hegemony over Lebanon in the coming years. The prime minister faces a difficult dilemma: comply with Syrian demands and fade into obsolescence, or stand his ground and fight.

The core issue of dispute is the ambition of his archrival, President Emile Lahoud, to stay in office after the expiration of his 6-year term in November 2004. Since Article 49 of the Lebanese constitution prohibits a sitting president from running for reelection, Lahoud cannot lawfully continue in office unless the constitution is amended to allow for the renewal or extension of his tenure. Such an amendment must be approved by a two-thirds majority of both the cabinet and the parliament. Since Hariri's bloc of supporters in the 128-member parliament (many of whom relied on the prime minister's purse strings to win election) and 30-member cabinet are both large enough to defeat such a motion, such an amendment can be enacted only by Syrian fiat.

Syrian intervention in this process would likely unfold in much the same way that it did the last time a Lebanese president's constitutional term in office was on the verge of expiring. A month prior to the end of President Elias Hrawi's six-year presidential term in 1995, the head of Syrian military intelligence in Lebanon, Maj. Gen. Ghazi Kanaan, arrived at an elite engagement party attended by most of Lebanon's political elite and announced to the guests that parliament was to approve a one-time amendment of Article 49 and extend Hrawi's tenure an additional three years. According to an account of the meeting published by the London-based Arabic daily Al-Hayat,

Kanaan then raised his hand, saying that the vote would take place by a raising of hands and would not be secret . . . Everyone looked as if they had just been through a cold shower . . . The party broke up early. Presidential hopefuls departed with their wives, one complaining of tiredness, another saying he had a headache.[1]

Although Lahoud has been quietly lobbying Damascus for a similar "miracle" for over a year, the Syrians have been (or had been until recently) reluctant to give him solid assurances of an extended tenure for several reasons. Syrian officials do not make long-term promises to Lebanese clients - decisions to reward or punish members of Lebanon's governing elite always take into account current local and regional developments. Even when a decision to do something has been made well in advance (e.g. troop redeployments and new electoral laws), the Syrians typically will wait until the last minute to reveal what it is - the appearance of uncertainty has a value of its own. Significantly, Hrawi himself did not learn whether his term would be extended until shortly before Kanaan made the announcement.

Syria's reluctance to make an early decision about Lahoud's tenure also reflects the fact that this matter has significant implications for its relations with the United States. For over a decade, Syrian officials have always held intensive consultations with Washington before designating the Lebanese president. Indeed, most informed observers believe that one of the preconditions for America's tacit endorsement of the Syrian occupation is that this choice be made jointly. With the Bush administration adopting a tougher policy toward Damascus, the Syrians naturally want to keep their options open.

Unable to win ironclad assurances from Damascus, Lahoud has attempted to secure an extension of his tenure by pressuring Hariri into dropping his objections. The president and his allies have repeatedly blocked Hariri's attempts to honor pledges made by Lebanon at an international donor conference last year. In return for over $4 billion in low interest loans, Lebanon agreed to reduce its budget deficit substantially and privatize state-run companies, but Lahoud's allies in the cabinet have vetoed progress on both fronts. Hariri's supporters claim that this is extortion - that Lahoud is willing to plunge the country into an economic abyss unless the prime minister agrees to a term extension.

Tensions between Lahoud and Hariri reached a zenith in late October, when their respective allies in the cabinet reached a deadlock over approval of the 2004 draft budget, forcing Syrian officials to intervene and settle the issue - mostly in Lahoud's favor. This was seen by some local commentators as de facto support for a term extension - since deadlocks requiring Syrian intervention will result in settlements disadvantageous to Hariri, the prime minister's only hope of leading Lebanon out of its economic crisis is by appeasing Lahoud.

However, Hariri has adamantly refused to back down. Indeed, the prime minister is so committed to denying Lahoud this political prize that he has declared a willingness to resign in exchange for a public promise by Lahoud not to seek a term extension. A few months ago, Hariri even pledged to shoot himself if outside pressures forced him to approve a term extension.[2]

Lahoud has pushed relentlessly for Hariri's replacement as prime minister, a post reserved by tradition for the Sunni Muslim community, and has found considerable support from the traditional Sunni political elite - for whom the fact that Hariri is not from a notable Sunni family has long been a source of resentment. In response, Hariri has focused a considerable amount of energy on shoring up his support base. In recent weeks, his political opponents have complained to Syria that he is seeking to "monopolize" leadership of the Sunni community in Lebanon, particularly in Beirut. In particular, they point to his recent appointment of around 350 Sunnis to positions in government schools in Beirut (apparently at the expense of qualified non-Sunnis). The Syrians have also heard complaints that mosques in the capital that receive charitable contributions from the prime minister have been prone to sectarian sermons targeting the president.[3] Hariri's supporters complain that posters accusing the prime minister of being an American agent keep popping up around the capital and hint that state security agencies are involved.

Lahoud traveled to Damascus for a summit with Assad on November 19. On the eve of the meeting, Syrian Vice-president Abdul Halim Khaddam emphatically denied that domestic Lebanese political issues would be discussed, telling reporters, "We do not interfere in Lebanon's domestic affairs."[4] After the summit, however, Lebanese media accounts indicated that Lebanese domestic issues were clearly on the agenda. The pro-Syrian daily Al-Safir reported that agreement had been reached to extend Lahoud's term by three years.[5] While most other papers characterized Syrian assurances in somewhat less absolute terms, the proceedings were clearly not good news for Hariri.

Hariri was not present at Lebanon's annual Independence Day parade on November 22, having embarked the day before on what he called a 5-day "spiritual retreat" to Saudi Arabia. Hariri also declined to send a personal representative to the parade (or to the reception at the presidential palace that followed it). Sources close to Hariri later said that the prime minister skipped the parade because his assigned seat on the reviewing stand was too far away from that of the president. Hariri's aides recently announced that the prime minister will not attend an upcoming dinner banquet thrown by Lahoud for visiting Brazilian President Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula de Silva due to an "unacceptable" protocol decision.[6]

Hariri's appearance at the side of King Fahd during prayers marking the first day of the Fitr feast at Mecca's Grand mosque on November 25 underscored that he has powerful allies outside of Lebanon. Apart from his close ties to the Saudi royal family, which invests heavily in both Syria and Lebanon, Hariri is strongly favored in international financial circles and backed by the United States. Syria has repeatedly threatened to replace Hariri over the past three years, though usually as a means of pressuring him to modify his behavior. Although the possibility of Hariri's ouster appears to be greater now than at any time during the past three years, some Lebanese commentators still have lingering doubts about whether Syria would really be willing to remove someone regarded by international donors as indispensable to Lebanon's economic recovery. Nevertheless, the Lebanese media has been rife with speculation about possible replacements.

Possible Replacements

Omar Karami

Tripoli MP and former prime minister (1990-92). He has long been considered Lahoud's top choice to replace Hariri. Of all the possible replacements, Karami would probably garner the most support within the Sunni community.

Recent efforts by Hariri to increase spending on development projects in Tripoli were seen by some observers as an attempt to challenge Karami's political supremacy in his hometown. Although Karami recently called the current government "an utter failure" and said that "it must be changed,"[7] he is said to be reluctant to assume the post if his tenure would be strictly limited to a transitional period to ensure Lahoud's term extension.

Rashid al-Solh

Former Prime Minister (1974-75, 1992). Solh is said by some to be the most likely replacement for Hariri because he evidently has no preconditions for assuming the post in a caretaker capacity (he did this in 1992). He was seated directly behind Lahoud and Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri at the Independence Day parade.

Tammam Salam

Former Beirut MP, son of the late former Prime Minister Saeb Salam. Like Solh, Salam lost his parliamentary seat at the hands of Hariri's steamroller slate in 2000. Has good relations with Saudi Arabia.

Prince Al-Walid bin Talal

Al-Walid, a Saudi prince whose mother is Lebanese, has been angling for Hariri's job since mid-2002. He reportedly negotiated the purchase of a 49% stake in the Lebanese satellite television station LBCI in a deal expected to be signed in early December. Asked in a recent interview if he was interested in becoming Lebanon's next prime minister, he gave the same reply he has always given: "We will cross that bridge when we come to it."[8]

Selim al-Hoss

Former prime minister (1976- 80, 1987-90, 1998-2000). Hoss was humiliated in 2000, when he failed to retain his seat in parliament and stepped down as prime minister to allow for Hariri's return. However, in interviews earlier this month, Hoss rejected a constitutional amendment extending Lahoud's term as "impermissible"[9] and said that ousting Hariri during the last year of Lahoud's term would be "ineffective and reckless."[10]

Najib Mikati

Transportation and Public Works Minister in the current cabinet. Mikati has a close personal and business relationship with the Assad family going back many years. A two-hour meeting in Damascus between Mikati and Assad on November 23 led to speculation in the Lebanese media that he is one of the front-runners on Syria's list of possible replacements.

Adnan Addoum

Prosecutor-General since 1995. His relations with Hariri are very poor. Addoum does not have very much support within the Sunni community, but has been mentioned in the press as a possible caretaker prime minister.

Abdel-Rahim Mrad

Minister without portfolio in the current cabinet. Although opposed to Hariri, considered a moderate opponent. On November 16, Mrad explicitly called for a "new cabinet" and said that there were plenty of candidates capable of filling Hariri's shoes.[11]

Notes

  [1] Al-Hayat (London), 2 October 1995. See also "Syria wants Lebanese legislators to extend Hrawi's term for three years by a show of hands," Mideast Mirror, 2 October 1995.
  [2] The Daily Star (Beirut), 22 August 2003.
  [3] The Daily Star (Beirut), 18 November 2003.
  [4] Al-Nahar (Beirut), 18 November 2003.
  [5] Al-Safir (Beirut), 20 November 2003.
  [6] According to Hariri's aides, these slights have been going on for months. In May, Hariri was invited to attend talks between Lahoud and visiting Iranian President Mohammed Khatami, but was forced to sit in a waiting room for half an hour after his arrival at the presidential palace.
  [7] Al-Nahar (Beirut), 25 November 2003.
  [8] Al-Nahar (Beirut), 10 November 2003.
  [9] Al-Anbaa (Kuwait), 19 November 2003.
  [10] Al-Nahar (Beirut), 19 November 2003.
  [11] The Daily Star (Beirut), 18 November 2003.