Lebanon Report Arafat Returns to the Lebanese Stage Syria Will Soon Control Lebanese Telecommunications Illegal Wiretaps in Lebanon Are a "Well-Known Secret" Jumblatt Decries "Neo-military Rule in Lebanon" Lebanese Financial Experts Assail Corm's Tax Hike Middle East Report Israel Acquires First Nuclear-Capable Sub Coming Soon to Assad's War Machine: The MiG-29SMT IDF Prepares for Threat of Atomic-Biological-Chemical Warfare Hamas Training Camps Uncovered in Iran Syrian-Palestinian Relations Deteriorate Profile: Qusay Hussein Interview Middle East Television (METV) Station Manager Wes Hylton Intelligence Briefs

MEIB Main Page Executive Director Ziad K. Abdelnour Editor Gary C. Gambill Advisory Board Rachel Ehrenfeld Gil Feiler Murray Kahl Daniel Nassif Daniel Pipes Gary P. Ratner David P. Steinman

Arafat Returns to the Lebanese Stage

According to local Palestinian sources, the Fatah movement headed by Palestinian Authority (PA) President Yasser Arafat has launched a concerted drive to gain political, security and economic control over the refugee camps home to 370,000 Palestinians throughout Lebanon.

Yasser Arafat

This struggle is centered around the Ain al-Hilweh refugee camp near Sidon, which Arafat calls the "political and demographic capital" of Palestinians in Lebanon. Fatah's military presence in the camp, which is home to 50,000 refugees, has been significantly reinforced with the addition of several new military posts, including a heavily-armed checkpoint at the entrance. According to a representative of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), the number of armed Fatah guerrillas in the camp has risen from 1,700 to 2,100 in the last two months.¹ A greatly expanded military presence was also evident in Rashidieh (near Tyre), where Fatah guerrillas are now checking all cars entering the camp.

"Our main concern was to protect the lives of our people in camps and for that we strengthened our presence," said the head of Fatah in Lebanon, Col. Sultan Abu al-Aynayn, in an interview this month with Reuters. "We have reviewed our military, political and social structure completely over the last two months."

Opponents of Arafat accuse him of seizing control of the camps in order to use them as a bargaining chip in negotiations with Israel. Arafat, it is feared, will "concede" the right of the refugees to return from Lebanon in exchange for the establishment of a sovereign Palestinian state. "We support a strong Palestinian position in talks with Israel," said DFLP representative Abu Ihab, "but the timing of the move is worrying." The representative of Hamas in Lebanon, Osama Hamdane, offered a more biting criticism. Arafat is "in search of a card to sell the Israelis at the negotiating table," said Hamdane. "Since they sold out the refugees at the signing of the Oslo Accords, they will not be embarrassed to play this card once again."³

In addition to linking the fate of Palestinians residing in Lebanon to a final settlement with Israel, Arafat's decision is also intended to gain influence over the Israeli-Syrian-Lebanese track of the negotiations and undercut the influence of Palestinian political factions abroad that oppose the peace process.

According to Palestinian sources, several developments over the last year were immediate factors in triggering Arafat's power play in Lebanon. The first was the participation of Lt.-Col. Munir al-Miqdah, Fatah's head of security and information, in a Damascus conference opposed to the PA. Miqdah was abruptly dismissed from Fatah. However, fearing that Miqdah might challenge his authority, Arafat sent Faruq Qaddumi (the head of the PLO political department) to Lebanon earlier this year to coax al-Miqdah back into the fold. Another rift in Fatah occurred when the Abu-'Abd al-Bayruti group stationed in Bustan al-Yahudi broke away and joined Hamas. In both cases, the rift occurred as a means of blackmailing Arafat to allocate more money to the Fatah infrastructure in Lebanon.

The last year has also witnessed numerous movements in the Palestinian Diaspora to create a political authority independent of Arafat, particularly in Lebanon. Moreover, the large number of a number of foreign officials visiting the camps last year indicated an upsurge in international attention toward the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon (particularly by the U.S, France and Canada). The danger that others might position themselves to negotiate on behalf of Palestinians in Lebanon weighed heavily on Arafat's mind.

Arafat ordered Fatah's security apparatus in Lebanon to expand its intelligence network in Lebanon. Surveillance of Hamas and Islamic Jihad members operating inside the camps, as well as in the Biqaa Valley and south Lebanon, was given top priority.

Meanwhile, Arafat appointed Abu-Khalid al-'Arabiyah to coordinate relations with the Fatah leadership in Lebanon and asked him to prepare a report on the allocation of funds needed to bolster support for Arafat inside the camps. In accordance with the provisions of this report, the following steps were or are being taken:

An annual budget, estimated to be around $800,000, was allocated for the camps.

The salaries of "rank A" Fatah officials were increased by 75 percent, effective at the beginning of this year.

Approval was given for the recruitment of 2,500 new Fatah members in Lebanon.

$50,000 was allocated to reward the special forces under the command of Abu al-Aynayn which protect Fatah assets in 'Ain al-Hilweh.

New supplies of weapons were distributed to Fatah members in the Sidon region.

A military committee in the Lebanese camps is to be appointed, which will reportedly include the following: Sami 'Akkawi, a high-ranking security official, Mahir Shabaytah, deputy director in charge of the Sidon area, and two military commanders, Khalid al-Shayib and Muhammad Zaydan.

Arafat also appointed a senior Fatah official, Jamal al-Dayikh, to head efforts to curtail corruption among Fatah officials in Lebanon (which has been a constant drain on its popular appeal for years). However, al-Dayikh was severely injured in a bomb explosion just one day after sending a detailed fax to Arafat exposing violations by a group of Fatah officers in Ain al-Hilweh.

  ¹ "Arafat's Fateh tightens control of Lebanon camps," Jordan Times, 5 August 1999.
  ² "Le Fateh renforce sa présence à Ain el-Héloué," L'Orient-Le Jour, 28 July 1999.
  ³ "Représentant de Hamas au Liban Oussama Hamadane: 'Les agissements suspects de Fateh au Liban sont inquiètants," La Revue du Liban, 7-14 August 1999.

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Syria Will Soon Control Lebanese Telecommunications

According to officials in Beirut and Damascus, Syria will soon control Lebanon's telecommunications system. On August 2, Syrian Telecommunications Ministry director Mokaram Obeid and his Lebanese counterpart, Abdul Muneim Youssef, signed an agreement in Damascus to establish a modern fiber-optic telecommunications system within the next 18 months. Under this agreement, Lebanese telecommunications will be routed through Syria.

The official purpose of the agreement is to "develop and cement cooperation between Syria and Lebanon in the field of telecommunication and the Internet." In practice, this means that Syrian intelligence agents will be able to monitor telephone calls and Internet connections both to and from Lebanon.

Syrian control over Lebanon has grown rapidly since the election of Lebanese President Emile Lahoud last year. Shortly after his election, Lahoud completely reorganized the country's military-security apparatus, appointing well-known allies of Syria to important state security positions. The telecommunications agreement is the latest step toward what Syrian officials call the "strategic integration" of the Lebanese and Syrian economies. Earlier this year, the Lahoud regime agreed to convert Lebanese power plants to rely exclusively on liquefied natural gas (LNG) imported from Syria.

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Illegal Wiretaps in Lebanon Are a "Well-Known Secret"

Syria's move to control Lebanese telecommunications system comes amid allegations that the Lebanese government has illegally tapped the phones of political opponents. During a recent meeting of the parliamentary committee on information and telecommunications, former minister of information Bassem Sabeh and MP Sami el Khatib both alleged that the Lahoud regime has used unauthorized wiretaps in its ongoing corruption probe.

Sabeh said that over twenty MP's, including former prime minister Rafiq Hariri, claim to have been the victim of illegal wiretaps. Under Lebanese law, telephone calls can be monitored only if authorized by Parliament (if national security is threatened) or by judicial bodies to serve the needs of an impending criminal investigation.

Khatib said that while monitoring cellular telecommunications is technologically possible, there is no evidence that the government has done this. Sabeh emphatically disagreed. Extensive surveillance of cellular telephone conversations in Lebanon is a "well-known secret," he said, adding that monitoring stations for this purpose are located in Bir Hassan, Mazraa, Hamra and Riad Solh. Sabeh later added in an interview that he recently "received information indicating that a monitoring station has been established at the telephone exchange in Badaro. This station unifies and coordinates the operations conducted at other stations throughout Lebanon."¹

According to Khatib, the state lacks the resources to monitor everyone's telephone conversations. While current technology makes simultaneous surveillance of thousands of phone lines possible, human specialists must still be on hand to listen in on each conversation. Given the remarkably prolific use of telephones in Lebanon, it can be safely assumed that Big Brother is not listening to everyone . . . yet.

  ¹ "Ecoutes téléphoniques: Comment et pourquoi?" Magazine, 6 August 1999.

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Jumblatt Decries "Neo-military Rule in Lebanon"

Jumblatt: "There is a military ruling the government"

Druze leader Walid Jumblatt accused Lebanese President Emile Lahoud of "ruling through the intelligence services and a bunch of officers." In Lebanon, he said, "there is a military ruling the government . . . I do not think it is in the interest of anybody to have neo-military rule."¹

"Army expenditure is the highest, at 13 or 14 percent," said Jumblatt in a separate interview. "The Army, the Internal Security Forces and the Intelligence services form a huge party of 300,000 or 400,000 people, in a country where democratic practice is, to say the least, weak."²

Jumblatt's assessment is frequently voiced by others in Lebanon. Ghassan Tueni, the editor of Lebanon's An-Nahar newspaper, said recently that Lahoud's style of government is similar to that of Fouad Shehab, the only other military chief-of-staff to serve as president of Lebanon (1958-1964). "Presidents with a military background 'naturally' tend to establish military regimes, because they trust their comrades, but view the civilians with suspicion," said Tueni. "Fouad Shehab contemptuously placed 'les civils' at the bottom of the social, cultural and moral pyramid--until he realized that perhaps the opposite was true: the only attempt to stage a military coup occurred during his military rule, and when the regime became even more militarized after the ill-fated coup, a 'parliamentary revolution' prevented him from getting reelected."³

Jumblatt, whose pro-Syrian Progressive Socialist Party (PSP) militia was a major participant in the Lebanese civil war, has become the unofficial spokesman of political elites in Lebanon who have been sidelined since Lahoud took office last year. According to most observers, power is slowly shifting from the pro-Syrian warlords who dominated previous government to the heads of security and intelligence services appointed by Lahoud. "If Lahoud is just counting on mingling the military with civilian affairs, and if he wants to rule out the old political class. . . this will lead to troubles inside Lebanon," said Jumblatt.

After years of subservience to Syria, Jumblatt was handsomely rewarded after Syrian military forces captured Beirut in October 1990. Damascus saw to it that electoral districts were gerrymandered (in violation of the Taif Accord) to ensure his reelection to parliament in 1992 and 1996 and that Jumblatt received cabinet-level positions in successive Lebanese governments.

After Syria's decision last year to abandon Jumblatt and other civil war collaborators in favor of a "new political equation" centered around Lahoud, a former army chief-of-staff, these perks suddenly disappeared. Jumblatt is not a member of the current cabinet. Indeed, Lahoud and Prime Minister Salim al-Hoss won't even consult him on serious matters of governance. Lahoud recently expropriated the historic Beiteddine palace in the Druze heartland that Jumblatt's forces captured during the civil war. Adding insult to injury, the Lebanese president made the palace his summer residence and removed a majestic statue of Jumblatt's father, Kamal, that had been erected at the site.

Nine senior officials of the previous government headed by former prime minister Rafiq Hariri have been arrested on corruption charges since Lahoud came to power. Lahoud "is using what is left of the so called justice (system) to harass people," said Jumblatt. While neither Jumblatt nor Hariri has been officially charged thus far, the current political climate does not rule out this possibility.

Syria has always played off its local allies against one another so that its control over Lebanon never hinges upon the fate of one particular coaltion

Jumblatt and other members of the ancien regime are faced by an acute catch-22: Their only hope of stopping this anti-corruption steamroller is to destroy Lahoud's credibility. But, if they target Lahoud's most damaging credibility gap--his total subservience to Syria--they will undercut the only source of patronage capable of realizing their own political aspirations. Jumblatt's attempt to resolve this dilemma is not very convincing--he attacks Lahoud's "neo-military" rule, the excesses of his security apparatus and other secondary manifestations of the Syrian occupation, then adds (for safe measure) that "it is a mistake to rule out the Syrians."

Jumblatt fails to recognize that Syria has always played off its local allies against one another so that its control over Lebanon never hinges upon the fate of one particular coalition. Rather than calling into question Syria's role as kingmaker in Lebanon, Jumblatt meets with Syrian officials at every opportunity in an effort to undermine their confidence in Lahoud. It is perhaps a sign of his growing desperation that he recently invited the Lebanese-American community to "pressure the US administration against supporting a military rule in Lebanon."

  ¹ "Jumblatt Sees Lebanon Reliving Errors," Reuters, 8 August 1999.
  ² "Walid Joumblatt: Druze Blues," ShuFiMaFi, 13 August 1999.
  ³ An-Nahar, 9 August 1999.

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Lebanese Financial Experts Assail Corm's Tax Hike

"If we want to reach a balance between expenditure and revenue," said Lebanese Finance Minister George Corm earlier this year, "then the government must increase the tax burden." Corm's tax increases have since come under severe criticism by a number of prominent Lebanese financial experts. While countries around the world are reducing the level of taxes to attract investment, say the critics, the Lebanese government is heading in the other direction.

George Corm

"The minister of finance's taxes have caused revenues to drop and growth in gross domestic product to fall even further," said Bassil Fuleihan during a recent seminar on taxes held by the Certified Accountants Syndicate (CAS) in Lebanon. "Corm's budget is not producing the desired results because the new taxes did not take the poor state of the economy into consideration," he added. "The government should raise taxes [only] when there is economic growth in order to collect better revenues." In light of current economic conditions, the government's attempt to raise revenues by increasing taxes is obsolete. Higher taxes, as a general rule, will tend to frighten away foreign direct investments in Lebanon.

The new tax increases also came under fire during a meeting of the Union of Professional Associations earlier this month. Many of the participants, which included physicians, pharmacists, lawyers, engineers and journalists, charged that the tax hikes would wipe out Lebanon's middle class.

"The new tax on professionals goes up to 21 percent, which is higher than the corporate tax," said Ghattas Khoury, head of the Doctors' Association.

Lebanese professionals are "the foundation of the economy" and "the cornerstone for the reemergence of the country's middle class," said Samir Doumit, the head of Beirut's Order of Engineers. Professionals must contend both with difficult economic conditions and a tax burden that is "more than double from last year," he added. The tax increases will "encourage those people to leave," added Antoine Qlimos, head of Beirut's Lawyers' Association.

Proposed Alternatives

Improve Collection

Many experts have insisted that efforts should first be made to improve collection at the current 10-percent tax ceiling before implementing any tax hikes. "If the government could improve tax collection on the 10-percent ceiling it could generate $533 million instead of the current $250 million," said Lebanese industrialist Marco Ayoub during the recent CAS meeting.

In Lebanon, however, where government officials often "overlook" the failure of influential constituents and political supporters to pay taxes, this may not be as easy as it sounds.

Privatization

This seems elementary--selling public utility companies will inject capital into the treasury--but Corm and other government ministers do not seem to have really grasped the meaning of the term. The government promised earlier this year to privatize public utilities, then proceeded to announce its intention to establish a public cellular telephone company. Because privatization of public utilities will inevitably result in the dismissal of excess personnel, many in the government lack the political will to take such potentially unpopular measures.

"We hold $270 million in private money which could be used in vital investment projects," said Francois Bassil, the chairman of Byblos Bank. "Privatizing electricity and telephone in a rational manner will help the government reduce part of the debt."

Sell off the Central Bank's gold reserves

"A drastic situation requires drastic measures, and the only way to solve the issue of the public debt is to sell off the Central Bank's gold reserves and to deposit the money generated from the sale in international banks as collateral to obtain long-term foreign currency loans at low interest rates," said Francois Bassil, the chairman of Byblos Bank. "People save their money in piggy banks for rainy days. We have reached our worst days and the government should act now." He emphasized that the sale should be done in several phases because "selling the entire gold reserves [at once] would reduce its value."

Bassil pointed out that the price of gold slid to 20-year-lows--around $250 an ounce-- after the Bank of England announced its intention to sell 25 tons of gold reserves a few months ago. This reduced the value of the 9.2 tons of gold held by the Lebanese Central Bank from $3.8 billion to $2.4 billion. "I don't see why we should sit on the reserves while the price of gold is falling,"said Bassil.

Lebanese Prime Minister Salim Hoss recently told Parliament that the government did not plan to sell gold reserves now or in the future. Only the government and Parliament are currently authorized to make decisions concerning the gold reserves. Freddie Baz, a chief strategist at Banque Audi, said that decisions in managing the country's gold reserves should really be in the hands of Riad Salameh, the governor of the Central Bank. "I strongly recommend that Salameh add gold to his power in addition to the management of local and foreign currency reserves," he said. "Let Salameh decide what to do with the gold. He can either sell it, keep it or even buy more gold."

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Israel Acquires First Nuclear-Capable Sub

Israel's new submarine arriving in port

The arrival at Haifa Naval Base last month of the Dolphin, the first of Israel's three new German-built submarines, is being heralded as the dawn of a new era for the Israeli navy. "The Dolphin is the first of three submarines," said Prime Minister Ehud Barak at the arrival ceremony. "Afterwards will come Levyatan and the Tekuma, and they will change the entire face of the navy and the long arm of Israel." Israel Defense Force (IDF) chief of staff, Lt. Gen. Shaul Mofaz, called the Dolphin the "submarine of the millennium."¹

The Dolphin and its two sisters ships (due to arrive over the next year) were constructed in Germany by Howaldtswerke-Deutsche Werft AG (HDW) and Thyssen Nordseewerke (TNSW) and will replace three 23-year old Gal-class submarines currently in use by the Israeli navy. The new ships are said to be among the most advanced diesal-electric submarines in the world. The 1,550-ton submarines have a top speed of 20 knots and can dive to a maximum depth of only 200 meters, but are extremely quiet and maneuverable. They have a maximum range of 3,000 miles, allowing them to move undetected into areas as far away as the Persian Gulf. Moreover, each sub and its 35-member crew can stay underwater for up to a month without resupply. They are armed with advanced Harpoon sea-to-sea missiles. Defense analysts consider the Israeli subs to be far superior to those in Arab navies.²

The arrival of the Dolphin essentially transforms the Israeli navy from an auxiliary service operating primarily in support of land and air forces to an instrument of strategic deterrence.

Far and away the most important feature of the new subs, however, is that they can be outfitted to launch small cruise missiles carrying nuclear weapons. This would give Israel a second-strike capability--if the country was attacked with nuclear weapons, cruise missiles aboard the Dolphin would remain intact and ready for retaliation. The arrival of the Dolphin essentially transforms the Israeli navy from an auxiliary service operating primarily in support of land and air forces to an instrument of strategic deterrence.

Assistant Defense Minister Yisrael Tal, well-known in Israel as the "father" of the Merkava tank, has long been one of the most prominent voices in the IDF pushing for this transformation. "Israel must turn the sea into a part of its defense depth," wrote Tal, a retired major-general, in a book published earlier this year. "The designation of the Navy must change - no longer an assistance branch, but a branch of strategic deterrence." When the Navy's armament plans met opposition from the top brass in the late 1980's, Tal chaired a committee which examined the issue and submitted an unequivocal recommendation to then defense minister Yitzhak Rabin for the purchase of advanced submarines.³

The contract with Germany was briefly canceled due to its hefty price tag ($300 million per submarine), but was reinstated after Iraq demonstrated Israel's vulnerability to missile strikes by firing 39 Scud missiles at Tel Aviv during the 1991 Gulf War. Two thirds of the $900 million bill is now being paid by Germany (Israeli military sources said that Germany decided to do this as compensation for the role of German companies in developing Iraqi chemical weapons).

Over the last eighteen months the Israeli navy has also purchased new Sa'ar V missile corvettes and upgraded its Sa'ar 4.5 NIRIT-class fast attack craft.⁴

  ¹ "State-of-the-Art Submarines Added to Israel's Naval Arsenal," Jewish Telegraphic Agency, 28 July 1999.
  ² Although Egypt has recently upgraded its R-class Romeos and purchased two former Royal Dutch Navy Zwaardvis-class submarines, both are outclassed by the high-tech equipment of Israel's new ships.
  ³ "The Defense Ministry's Elder Statesman," Ha'aretz, 3 August 1999 .
  ⁴ "Navy Force: Vital Future," Janes Defense Weekly, 3 February 1999.

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Coming Soon to Assad's War Machine: The MiG-29SMT

Local sources have confirmed that Damascus has concluded a $2 billion arms contract with Russia to upgrade and augment Syrian land and air forces. The agreement marks the first significant arms shipment to Syria by Moscow since the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991. The United Arab Emirates and Iran have reportedly underwritten the deal for the financially destitute Syrian government (Moscow had insisted that Syria pay cash on delivery for the weapons and that its $12 billion debt to Russia be affirmed and rescheduled). The U.S. reportedly tried to block the agreement, but so far Moscow has shown no signs of backing down and risks losing $90 million in U.S. aid.

Syria's motivation for purchasing weapons which it can ill-afford at a time when it is allegedly on the brink of peace with Israel is the subject of much debate in Washington and Tel Aviv. Included in the deal are advanced Su-27 and MiG-29SMT fighter aircraft, as well as T-80 tanks. All three weapons systems are considerably more advanced than anything currently in the Syrian arsenal. In an effort to provide a framework for informed discussion of the strategic implications of this agreement, MEIB will profile each of these three weapons systems in this and two upcoming issues.

The MiG-29SMT

The MiG-29SMT

The MiG-29SMT offers significant improvements over the MiG-29 (currently the most advanced aircraft in the Syrian air force.¹). Whereas the MiG-29 lacks ground attack capabilities, the SMT is a multi-purpose fighter that can be armed with virtually any type of air-to-air and air-to-surface weapons. Other improvements include:

Armaments: The weapons load of the aircraft has increased from 3,000 kg to 4,500 kg.

Durability:The assigned life of the aircraft has increased from 2,500 to 4,000 hours. Expected annual on-condition maintenance expenditures are decreased by 15-20%.

Range:The SMT is fitted with two additional fuel tanks in the upper section of the fuselage, increasing its basic flight range from 1,850 to 2,200 km. When fitted with three external fuel tanks, the flight range extends up to 3,500 km. The aircraft can be further equipped with an in-flight refueling system, which boosts the flight range up to 6,500 km.

Combat Survivability:The new exterior coating of the SMT reduces its radar contrast, decreasing the range of its detection and lockon by hostile radars. The SMT may carry optional electronic countermeasures (ECM) equipment, further enhancing its air combat survivability.

Avionics: The SMT includes an improved fire control radar system with an N019MP radar featuring ground mapping mode, optical-electronic aiming system (laser radar and helmet-mounted targeting display), navigation complex, a jam-resistant communication and guidance system, much better data-exchange capabilities (for tactical communication with a ground or air-based guidance center and with other aircraft) and other improvements.²

  ¹ Current strength of the Syrian Air Force: 90 Su-22, 20 Su-24, 160 MiG-21, 90 MiG-23, 44 MiG-23BN, 30 MiG-25, and 20 MiG-29. See "Syria: Weapons of Mass Destruction Capabilities and Programs," Center for Nonproliferation Studies, 1999 [Online at http://cns.miis.edu/research/wmdme/syria.htm].
  ² For more detailed information on the Mig-29SMT, see "Russia Sets New Standard for the MiG-29SMT," International Defense Review, 1 June 1999.

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IDF Prepares for Threat of Atomic-Biological-Chemical Warfare

According to sources in Israel, the IDF has begun an extensive training program to prepare its units for Atomic-Biological-Chemical (ABC) warfare. Until recently, the Israeli military planners did not consider weapons of mass destruction to be a realistic national security threat. This assessment has been modified over the last few years in light of upgraded capabilities achieved by Syria, Iraq and other Middle East countries.

The new measures reflect the assumption that in future conflicts the IDF will confront enemy forces that possess and are prepared to use chemical-biological (CB) weapons against both civilians and soldiers. "In previous wars, it was clear there was a complete separation between the home front and the battlefield," said a senior army officer last month. "The introduction of long-range ground-to-ground missiles with nonconventional warheads forces us to adopt a new way of thinking."¹

One IDF unit devoted entirely to ABC warfare is the Granite engineering corps company based in the Negev. This unit is specifically trained to identify the landing coordinates of an incoming missile, detect any CB agents present at the site and then decontaminate the area.

The highly mobile force uses armored personnel carriers equipped with a device called Sigal, which is used to locate and monitor toxic chemicals. In case the toxin can be conclusively identified at the site, the team takes samples of the substance to send back to a laboratory for precise identification. The unit also measures the concentration of the substance, wind direction and other factors to determine the danger posed to nearby areas.

The purification team then comes in to neutralize or remove toxins using M12 trucks equipped with large pumps. Two chemicals are commonly used to neutralize both biological and chemical weapons: STB, an acid, and DS2, a strong alkaline. Whereas chemical agents can be quickly neutralized, purification of biological agents can take weeks.

  ¹Amos Harel, "Non-conventional Warfare Becomes Conventional," Ha'aretz, 20 July 1999.

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Hamas Training Camps Uncovered in Iran

According to Israeli intelligence sources, Iranian Revolutionary Guard (Pasdaran) units are reportedly begun training Hamas terrorists in a camp near Teheran. The connection was uncovered last month by Israel's Shin Bet internal intelligence service after three Hamas members were arrested after returning to the West Bank and Gaza strip from abroad. Under interrogation, the Hamas activists confessed that they had received guerrilla warfare training in Iran and were planning future operations against Israel. The three suspects are still being held and will soon stand trial in an Israeli military court.¹

Israeli intelligence sources said that the recruits typically undergo two years of training in Iran in communications and sabotage. Afterwards, they are sent to a third country to build a cover story for their time abroad before returning to the occupied territories.²

The discovery of the camps comes amid reports that Iran has begun transferring $4.81 million each month to Hamas officials in Damascus.³ Earlier this year, Palestinian security forces arrested 40 members of Ezzedine al-Qassam, the underground military wing of Hamas, and reportedly uncovered documents indicating that the men had received funding from unspecified "parties" in Iran. "We have documents that they have already received $35 million to carry out sabotage operations against Israelis in the Gaza Strip," said Major-General Ghazi al-Jabali.⁴

Until the early 1990's, Iran and Hamas had relatively cool relations, largely because of doctrinal differences (Hamas is a Sunni Islamic group, while the Iran is predominantly Shi'ite). Iranian policy toward Hamas shifted in 1991, however, when the Madrid conference opened a new chapter in the Arab-Israeli peace process--Iran invited Islamist groups, including Hamas, to attend a "counter-conference" in Teheran. A common desire to thwart the peace process brought the two closer and closer together. In October 1992, a delegation led by Dr. Musa Abu Marzuk and other senior Hamas officials visited Teheran and met with Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who reportedly promised to provide the group with $30 million annually. Shortly afterwards, Hamas opened an "embassy" in Teheran and Iran recognized Hamas as the "sole legitimate representative" of the Palestinians.

Reports of Hamas training camps in Iran began to surface during the mid-1990s, but it had been widely assumed after the 1997 election of President Mohammad Khatami that Iranian logistical support for the group had been phased out. Notwithstanding Khatami's alleged support for the peace process, Iran's clerical establishment is continuing its support for Hamas through the Revolutionary Guard, which operates independently of the Iranian military and is under the direct control of Khamenei.

  ¹ "Hamas Terrorists Are Being Trained in Iranian Camp," Ha'aretz, 22 July 1999.
  ² "Hamas Vows to Renew Attacks against Israel," The Jerusalem Post, 23 July 1999.
  ³ "Iran Funds Terror Group to Sabotage Peace Process," The Sunday Telegraph, 15 August 1999.
  ⁴ "Palestinian Police Link Hamas Men To Iran," Reuters, 4 February 1999.

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Syrian-Palestinian Relations Deteriorate

According to local press reports, relations between the Syrian government and Palestinian Authority (PA) President Yasser Arafat have deteriorated to the lowest level in years.

Mustafa Tlass

During a visit to Lebanon earlier this month, Syrian Defense Minister Mustafa Tlass hurled a barrage of particularly graphic invectives at Arafat. "Son of 60,000 whores . . . you should have told the White House that Jerusalem is the capital of the future Palestinian state. Instead you stayed as quiet as a mouse and did not dare say even a single word in favor of Palestine or Jerusalem," said Tlass. "Look at him when he's on the stage," he continued, "he moves from concession to concession, like a stripper, except that [the stripper] becomes more beautiful with every layer she removes, while Arafat becomes uglier."

Palestinian demonstrators in Gaza condemned the Syrian defense minister

Tlass' remarks sparked massive pro-Arafat demonstrations in Gaza. "Tlass should know that we will not forgive him and he will be killed for these insults," said a masked Fatah activist who addressed the crowd. In Lebanon, a group calling itself the Independent National Palestinian Youth distributed anti-Syrian leaflets at the Ain al-Hilweh refugee camp.

While Tlass is well-known for making extremely offensive comments in public,¹ there is clearly an underlying tension in Syrian-Palestinian relations. There has been a relentless (though somewhat more tactful) stream of anti-Arafat diatribes in the official Syrian press. Moreover, President Hafez Assad recently rebuffed efforts by Egypt to convene a mini-summit that would include Syria, Jordan and the PA, insisting that he will not attend if Arafat is present.

To some extent, this tension can be traced back to Arafat's decision to sign the 1993 Oslo Accords with Israel without consulting the Syrians (or any other Arab state, for that matter). But with Syria itself apparently on the verge of renewing negotiations with Israel, Assad's anger toward Arafat cannot be explained merely as resentment for being left off the peace train.²

One clue as to the underlying tensions between the two leaders was the July 28 visit to the Gaza strip by Sumer Assad, the nephew of the Syrian president. Sumer's father, former Syrian Vice President Rifa'at Assad, launched a coup attempt against his brother during the 1980's. There is apparently some concern in Damascus that Sumer may be entertaining a similar power play after Assad's son and heir apparent, Bashar, takes the helm.

There is certainly every reason to believe that Arafat would be very happy with either Rifa'at or Sumer in charge of the Syrian government. After meeting and dining with the Palestinian leader, Sumer made it a point to publicly pay tribute to the "friendship" between his father and Arafat.

  ¹ In February, Tlass outraged U.S. officials by referring to rioters who ransacked the U.S. embassy in Damascus as "brave youth whose actions dealt a slap to the United States."
  ² Some have noted that Arafat and Assad simply do not have compatible temperaments. In a recent article in Al-Sharq al-Awsat, Syrian commentator Ghassan al-Imam stated that Assad "is a meticulous, organized, cautious and serene person . . . he is serious and keeps his word." Arafat, he said, "is less cautious and more prone to political U-turns." These differences, he added, make "a healthy relationship impossible to establish."

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Profile: Qusay Hussein

Qusay Hussein and his father

According to reliable sources, Saddam Hussein has designated his second-oldest son Qusay as his successor "in the event of an emergency." Qusay has also given the authority to supervise the army, the elite Republican Guards, and the intelligence agencies.¹

Later in the month, according to Iraqi sources in Amman, Qusay reportedly replaced Izzat Ibrahim as deputy commander of the Iraqi army and head of military operations in the Northern Military Region.²

The reports appear to confirm recent speculation that 31-year-old Qusay has superseded his older brother, Uday, as Saddam's number two. Uday is a prominent personality in Baghdad nightclubs and has a well-deserved reputation for violence and cruelty that ultimately resulted in a 1996 assassination attempt, leaving him partially crippled. The word on the street is that Saddam decided around this time that his much-hated elder son was unfit (both physically and mentally) to be the future ruler of Iraq. Uday may not have fully accepted this verdict--his newspaper, Babel,condemned the reports of Qusay's appointment as having originating from "ignorant enemies" (Iraqi officials, however, have conspicuously not denied the reports).

Qusay, on the other hand, is mild-mannered and rarely seen in public. He is fluent in English and said to be a skilled administrator. Long considered to be the most trusted member of Saddam's inner circle, Qusay has been appointed to head highly sensitive projects in the past. For years, he has commanded the special security force charged with protecting his father and other top officials. After the defection of Hussein Kamel in 1995, Qusay and Saddam's private secretary, Abed Hamid Mahmoud, were put in charge of efforts to conceal prohibited Iraqi missile programs and weapons of mass destruction.

After a June 1996 coup attempt by Republican Guard officers, Saddam appointed Qusay to direct a special committee, comprised of the heads of the Mukhabarat, General Security (al-Amn al-Amm) and Military Intelligence, which was given unlimited powers to arrest and interrogate suspects implicated in the coup. An estimated 800 suspects were detained and tortured on Qusay's orders.³

Shortly after her appointment, U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright publicly stated that the U.S. would oppose the lifting of economic sanction against Iraq as long as Saddam is in power. Whether this policy will apply to his son is anyone's guess.

  ¹ Al-Sharq al-Awsat, 3 August 1999.
  ² Al-Hayat, 10 August 1999.
  ³ For a detailed account of the failed coup attempt, see Andrew Cockburn, Out of the Ashes: The Resurrection of Saddam Hussein. New York: HarperCollins, 1999. pp. 219-230.

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Middle East Television (METV) Station Manager Wes Hylton

Middle East Television (METV), an affiliate of the Christian Broadcasting Network (CBN), is located in Marjayoun, the largest town in the Israeli-occupied security zone in south Lebanon. Lebanese security forces recently arrested Paul Younis, a member of the station's production staff, at an army checkpoint on charges of "collaborating with the enemy"and issued arrest warrants for several other news, editing, programming, and translation staff.

Earlier this month, MEIB editor Gary C Gambill interviewed METV station manager Wes Hylton to discuss this and other issues. The following are excerpts from this interview:

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Members of U.S. Spy Network Reportedly on Trial in Lebanon (15 July 1999)
Iranian Military Reportedly Plotting Coup (16 July 1999)
Bashar Assad May Head Syrian Negotiations with Israel (27 July 1999)
U.S. Officials on Alert for Terrorist Attack (28 July 1999)
Motorist in Cyprus Blows Cover of Israeli Agents (29 July 1999)
Bin Laden Preparing to Leave Afghanistan (30 July 1999)
Iraqi Justice Minister Visits Saudi Arabia (1 August 1999)
Pakistani Islamist Leader Threatens "War against Americans" (3 August 1999)
Israel, U.S. Pour Additional $46.6 Million into Air Defense Laser (4 August 1999)
Saudis May Be Trying to Purchase Nukes (4 August 1999)
Arafat Threatens Jihad against Israel (6 August 1999)
Bodansky: Bin Laden Believed to Have up to 20 Tactical Nukes (6 August 1999)
Bashar Assad Meets with Lebanese President (8 August 1999)
SLA Abandons Position in South Lebanon (9 August 1999)
Lebanese Army Officer Accused of Spying for Mossad (9 August 1999)
IDF Uncovers Hezbollah Informant Network (10 August 1999)
Cyprus Releases Israeli Spies (12 August 1999)

Members of U.S. Spy Network Reportedly on Trial in Lebanon
15 July 1999

Iranian Military Reportedly Plotting Coup
16 July 1999

Bashar Assad

Bashar Assad May Head Syrian Negotiations with Israel
27 July 1999

U.S. Officials on Alert for Terrorist Attack
28 July 1999

Motorist in Cyprus Blows Cover of Israeli Agents
29 July 1999

Bin Laden Preparing to Leave Afghanistan
30 July 1999

Iraqi Justice Minister Visits Saudi Arabia
1 August 1999

Pakistani Islamist Leader Threatens "War against Americans"
3 August 1999

Israel, U.S. Pour Additional $46.6 Million into Air Defense Laser
4 August 1999

Saudis May Be Trying to Purchase Nukes
4 August 1999

Arafat Threatens Jihad against Israel
6 August 1999

Bodansky: Bin Laden Believed to Have up to 20 Tactical Nukes
6 August 1999

Bashar Assad Meets with Lebanese President
8 August 1999

SLA Abandons Position in South Lebanon
9 August 1999

Lebanese Army Officer Accused of Spying for Mossad
9 August 1999

IDF Uncovers Hezbollah Informant Network
10 August 1999

Cyprus Releases Israeli Spies
12 August 1999

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