Aaron Mannes is the publisher of the web site TerrorBlog and author of Profiles in Terror, forthcoming in May 2004 (Rowman & Littlefield-JINSA Press). From 1998 to 2001, he was the Director of Research at the Middle East Media Research Institute.

Israel's assassination of Hamas leader Ahmed Yassin on March 22 and his chief deputy, Abdelaziz Rantisi, on April 22 struck a major blow against the most lethal of Palestinian terrorist groups, but it could also have unintended consequences that profoundly affect the Arab-Israeli conflict and American interests in the region. With the "targeted killings" of Yassin and Rantisi, and the assassination of Ismail Abu Shanab in August, Hamas has now lost its three top officials in Gaza in the span of just eight months. This sudden power vacuum in the Gaza branch of Hamas gives more clout to the organization's Damascus-based leadership and provides the Lebanese Shiite Hezbollah movement with an historic opportunity to expand its already extensive involvement in the Al-Aqsa Intifada, both of which will benefit Iran and Syria.

Background

The implications of Yassin's death cannot be properly understood without first examining his role within Hamas, which has frequently been misconstrued by the Western media. Yassin was not merely the principal founder of Hamas - he had been the most prominent Muslim cleric in Gaza since the 1970s, when he moved there and established Al-Mujama Al-Islami (the Islamic Center), a charitable network of religious, educational and social welfare institutions funded by wealthy donors in the Arab Gulf states. Al-Mujama formed the civic nucleus of Hamas, established by Yassin and his followers after the outbreak of the Palestinian intifada in 1987.

Following Yassin's arrest in 1989, de facto leadership of Hamas devolved to roughly a dozen of his disciples, most of whom subsequently relocated abroad. While the civic infrastructure of Hamas remained centered in Gaza under the leadership of Rantisi, the movement's political committee, headed by Khaled Mashaal and Mousa Abu Marzouk, and military command moved to Amman. By the mid-1990s, the external branch of Hamas had assumed virtually exclusive control over the group's terrorist operations. This partly reflected logistical considerations. Due to the difficulty of infiltrating Israel from Gaza, Hamas was forced to rely primarily on terrorist cells in the West Bank - and it was much easier to funnel money, men, and material into the West Bank from Jordan than it was from Gaza.

The dominance of the external branch was reinforced by its success in obtaining Iranian and Syrian sponsorship. After Abu Marzouk led a Hamas delegation to Tehran in October 1992, Iran began providing the organization with a modest financial subsidy and training its operatives at Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) camps.[1] Syria, a close strategic ally of Iran, permitted Hamas to train at Hezbollah and PFLP-GC camps in the Beqaa Valley and openly recruit in the Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon. Hamas relocated its military command to Damascus in 1995; the political committee followed four years later.

Divorced from the organization's core constituency in Gaza, exiled Hamas leaders made decisions intended mainly to serve the interests of their sponsors, often to the detriment of Palestinian interests. For example, in 1995 and 1996 they ordered waves of anti-Israeli suicide bombings that prompted the Palestinian Authority (PA) to retaliate against the organization's civic infrastructure in Gaza and restrict its ability to receive funds from donors in the Arab Gulf states. This further accentuated the power of the external branch, as the Damascus office became the movement's primary financial conduit.

Following his release from prison and return to Gaza in 1997, Yassin attempted to reassert control over the movement and rebuild the social infrastructure that underpins its popular appeal. In mid-1998, the aging cleric received rapturous acclaim during a tour of the Arab world - and generous donations from the Arab Gulf. In Iran, he held high-level meetings with Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and key figures in the intelligence community, greatly solidifying his authority.

However, while Yassin's reputation, charisma, and status as the founder of the movement allowed Hamas to regain some of its independence,[2] he was not able to fully enforce his writ over the external branch. When he raised the possibility of a temporary ceasefire with Israel in order to buy time for rebuilding, the political leadership in Damascus flatly refused and even issued a rare public rebuke of Yassin.[3]

Just as his eight-year imprisonment weakened the Gaza-based leadership of Hamas in favor of the external leadership, Yassin's assassination will clearly shift the balance of power in favor of Mashaal and Abu Marzouk - only this time the shift will more decisive and longer lasting. This, in turn, will give Iran and Syria an unprecedented degree of influence over the organization. The evolution of Islamic Jihad into a pliant Iranian proxy following Israel's 1995 assassination of its secretary-general and founder, Fathi Shiqaqi, may foreshadow Hamas' future in the years to come.

The "Iranization" of Hamas will not be as direct as that of Islamic Jihad, which lacked a popular constituency and therefore had no qualms about becoming the surrogate of a non-Arab government. Iranian control over Hamas will be exercised through an intermediary that most Palestinians deeply revere - Hezbollah.

Hamas and Hezbollah

Hezbollah has long been a central intermediary in Iranian and Syrian sponsorship of Palestinian terrorism. This is partly due to pragmatic considerations - Hezbollah training camps in Lebanon are closer to the Israeli-Palestinian theater than IRGC camps in Iran and Hezbollah commanders have direct operational experience fighting Israel that the IRGC lacks. In addition, it is much easier for Hezbollah to smuggle weapons and explosives to the Palestinian territories from Lebanon than it for Iran or Syria to do so directly (and it allows them to more plausibly deny involvement).

Ideological considerations also made Hezbollah a valuable intermediary. Since many Palestinian militants reflexively distrust non-Arabs, dealing with Hezbollah was more palatable to them than dealing directly with Iran. Palestinian Islamists also distrusted the Syrian regime because of its secular ideology, brutal repression of Islamic fundamentalists at home, and close ties to radical leftist Palestinian groups. The distrust was mutual - the Assad regime has always been reluctant to let Hamas operate freely in Syria for fear that it would build ties with Syrian Islamists.

Following the outbreak of the al-Aqsa Intifada in September 2000, Hezbollah stepped up its training of Palestinian operatives; dramatically increased its smuggling of weapons, explosives, and technical know-how (e.g. training films on how to construct explosives) to the territories; and used its Al-Manar satellite television station to support the uprising. Hezbollah also sponsored Hamas' efforts to construct Qassem rockets, complementing its own arsenal of rockets that can threaten Israel's population centers.[4]

However, Hezbollah's assistance did not come without strings attached. Hamas officials were shocked to discover that many operatives who returned to the territories after training in Lebanon were taking orders directly from Hezbollah. The defection of operatives to Hezbollah was so rampant that one Hamas commander openly complained about it in an April 2001 interview with Time magazine.[5]

Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah has not been content to merely assist the intifada - his ambition has been to lead it. Toward this end, Hezbollah virtually subsumed the armed wing of Arafat's Fatah movement. With Arafat sidelined and Fatah coffers empty, Hezbollah stepped into the void and became, in the words of one Israeli security source, "an employment service" for Fatah militants.[6] The breakdown in the internal communications of the various Palestinian factions facilitated this infiltration. "The curfews and closures on Palestinian cities and the focus on building the anti-terrorism barrier make it hard for terror cells from different cities to cooperate," notes Israeli journalist Amit Cohen. "This has created an absurd situation; only someone in Lebanon can see the whole picture and connect the suicide bomber in Jenin with the explosive vest in Nablus."[7] The proliferation over the last year of terror attacks by "cocktail" cells comprising members of different Palestinian groups on the same payroll is a striking indication of how far Hezbollah's financing and management of the Palestinian intifada has progressed.

While Hezbollah managed to recruit plenty of Hamas operatives in the West Bank (i.e. operatives under the command of the external leadership), the Hamas terrorist infrastructure in Gaza proved more resistant to Hezbollah penetration due to the movement's stronger institutional presence there and to Yassin's personal distrust of the Iranians. "Hezbollah activity in the Gaza Strip has been of low intensity, compared to its efforts in the West Bank," notes Ze'ev Schiff, the military affairs editor for the Israeli daily Ha'aretz.[8] However, this began to change in the months prior to Yassin's death, in part because the movement faced a severe financial crisis. Hezbollah was recently found to have financed the digging of tunnels for smuggling weapons into Gaza from Sinai. However, its biggest breakthrough came just a week before Yassin's death.

On March 14, two Palestinian terrorists - one from Hamas and one from the Al-Aksa Brigades - slipped from Gaza into the Israeli port of Ashdod and detonated two bombs near the port's tankers of ammonium and bromine in an attempt to release a lethal cloud of gas capable of killing thousands of Israeli civilians. The tankers did not burst, but twelve Israelis were killed. The terror attack had Hezbollah's fingerprints all over it. According to Israeli press reports, the bombers used a kind of sophisticated plastic explosives that Hezbollah had provided to Palestinian groups in the past (but were twice as large). At the time of the attack, Israel's security agency detected a transfer of $3,300 from Hezbollah to militants believed to be linked to one of the bombers.[9]

Over the past two years, Israel has uncovered several networks of Israeli Arab spies recruited by Hezbollah to photograph fuel depots, skyscrapers, and other sites that could be bombed to inflict an unprecedented, catastrophic number of Israeli casualties. As a result, security officials have long warned about the potential for so-called "mega attacks." The Ashdod bombing came so close to realizing Hezbollah's dream of an "Israeli 9/11" that Prime Minister Ariel Sharon resolved to make Yassin pay the ultimate price for approving it.

Hezbollah's Power Play

In the wake of the assassination, the external leadership of Hamas lost no time in solidifying their alignment with Hezbollah. Nasrallah publicly assured Mashaal that Hezbollah was at Hamas' service and invited him to address a crowd of thousands of Hezbollah supporters at a memorial service for Yassin. A few days later Mashaal and Nasrallah reportedly signed an agreement increasing Hezbollah's financial aid and operational assistance to Hamas.[10]

Meanwhile, Yassin's second-in-command in Gaza, Abdelaziz Rantisi, quickly invited Hezbollah "to play a guiding role that Yassin had long resisted granting them," notes Alex Fishman, the senior security correspondent for the Israeli daily Yediot Aharonot.[11] Although details of his initiative are sketchy, the prospect of an unprecedented alliance between Hezbollah and the Gaza branch of Hamas was probably the decisive factor behind Israel's assassination of Rantisi on April 17.

The new head of Hamas in Gaza, Mahmoud Zahar, also does not possess Yassin's authority, reputation, and connections to wealthy Arab Gulf donors. Moreover, unlike Yassin, who maintained a public presence, Zahar and other Hamas leaders in Gaza have been forced to stay underground in order to avoid assassination. Constantly on the run, it will be difficult for them to assert control over Hamas. Although Zahar's intentions are not yet clear, without an independent source of funds the Gaza wing of Hamas will be forced to rely on the funding distributed through the Damascus leadership and will likely follow through with Rantisi's plan to bring the movement into Hezbollah's orbit.

Implications

Hezbollah's absorption of Hamas, and the Palestinian cause more generally, will have enormous implications. As Israelis discuss pulling out from Gaza, Hezbollah's success infiltrating the Palestinian groups means that regardless of whether Hamas or Fatah takes control of Gaza, the de facto power there will be Hezbollah. With its deep pockets, secure external base, and vast experience, Hezbollah will bring new and more deadly efficiencies to the al-Aqsa Intifada. Israel could be confronted with a well-coordinated terror campaign on three fronts and internally from Israeli Arab terror cells.

Although Hezbollah is guided by its own ideological commitments, it has always been careful to direct its activities in support of its international patrons - if for no other reason than to demonstrate its worth to them and justify their continued sponsorship. Insofar as Yassin's assassination allows Hezbollah to bolster its international capabilities, it also gives Iran and Syria a more powerful terrorist deterrent against nations that attempt to thwart their regional ambitions. Now, in the wake of the US-led invasion of Iraq, Iran and Syria are seeking to take advantage of the regional realignment to establish themselves as the dominant regional power.[12] De facto control over Hamas, with its extensive terror and social welfare networks, expands Iran and Syria's ability to confront Israel and extends their influence region-wide.

While Hamas' primary role in Syrian-Iranian plans will undoubtedly be against Israel, it could also prove useful in their broader struggle against the United States and its allies. Having grown out of the Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas has links with branches of that organization throughout the Middle East, particularly Jordan and Egypt, and could help create a foothold for Shiite Hezbollah and Iran among religious Sunnis. In Jordan, Hamas is closely linked to the Islamic Action Front, an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood. Strategically located and closely allied with Israel and the United States, Jordan also has a majority Palestinian population, borders Syria and thus could be very vulnerable to coordinated pressure from Hezbollah and the Palestinians. As Iran and Syria seek to undermine the United States in Iraq, the Hamas "brand name" could also prove to be a powerful asset in recruiting Sunni jihadists to fight the coalition, complementing Hezbollah's efforts to turn Shiites against the occupation (both groups have opened several offices in Iraq).

In the event of a direct confrontation between the United States and Syria or Iran, it is conceivable that Hamas could join with Hezbollah to directly target Americans. Condemnations of the United States have long been commonplace in the rhetoric of Hamas. After Yassin's assassination, Hamas released a statement declaring that the Bush administration "must bear responsibility" for his death. Although Rantisi was quick to pledge that Hamas would not target Americans (and Zahar added that it lacks the capacity to do so),[13] the debate is academic - Hamas already crossed the Rubicon in late 2003 by training a Canadian-Palestinian, Jamal Akkal, to carry out attacks against Israeli and Jewish targets in the United States.

Another Hamas asset that could augment Hezbollah's network is its extensive fundraising network, which has raised tens of millions of dollars around the world. Abu Marzouk lived in the United States for twenty years and founded a web of organizations, centered around the Holy Land Relief Foundation, to raise money and advocate for the Palestinian Islamist cause. While much of this network was disrupted after 9/11, parts of it remain intact. One of these organizations, the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR), remains active as a "civil rights organization" and could provide effective public advocacy for Iran and Hezbollah and help rebuild fundraising networks.[14]

Conclusion

Like a missing puzzle piece, Hamas fits neatly into Iranian and Syrian plans to play a dominant role in the Middle East. By filling the power vacuum created in Hamas by Sheikh Yassin's assassination, Hezbollah has an opportunity to consolidate the Palestinian factions and present a united front against Israel - creating a balance of terror with the region's pre-eminent military power. Hamas' regional links can be put to use helping Iran and Syria undermine the United States and its allies, particularly in Iraq and Jordan. Finally, Hamas supporters may link with Hezbollah's international terror network, expanding their ability to intimidate around the globe.

Notes

  [1] See Gary Gambill, Sponsoring Terrorism: Syria and Hamas, Middle East Intelligence Bulletin, October 2002. Figures about Hamas finances vary widely, but there is little question that Iran provides substantial financial support for Hamas.
  [2] See Yassin Raises US $400 Million, Worries Palestinian Government, ArabicNews.com, 27 May 1998.
  [3] Hamas Divided Against Itself, Middle East Intelligence Bulletin, June 1999.
  [4] The Jerusalem Post, 7 August 2003.
  [5] How Hamas-Hezbollah Rivalry Is Terrorizing Israel, Time, 23 April 2001.
  [6] Ma'ariv, 5 March 2004.
  [7] Ma'ariv, 5 March 2004.
  [8] Ze'ev Schiff, "Background / Hezbollah had a role in Ashdod bombing," Ha'aretz (English edition), 28 March 2004.
  [9] "Hezbollah using Palestinian militants to fight Israel," The Associated Press, 11 April 2004; "The limits of the fence," Mideast Mirror, 15 March 2004.
  [10] Middle East Newsline, 31 March 2004.
  [11] Alex Fishman, "Hamas, With It's Leaders Liquidated -Looks to Tehran For Guidance on Terror," Forward, 22 April 2004.
  [12] Ilan Berman, Trilateral Maneuvers, National Review Online, 19 March 2004.
  [13] The Los Angeles Times, 25 March 2004.
  [14] The founder and Executive Director of the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR), Nihad Awad was also the public relations director for the Islamic Association for Palestine - which was led by Abu Marzouq when he lived in the United States. For an in-depth description of the links between Hamas and CAIR see Steven Emerson, American Jihad: The Terrorists Living Among Us, (Free Press, 2002) pp. 197-203.