Middle East Intelligence Bulletin
Jointly published by the United States Committee for a Free Lebanon and the Middle East Forum
  Vol. 6   No. 1 Table of Contents
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January 2004 


Implications of Iraq's Election Controversy

Shiite demonstration

Earlier this month, at the urging of Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani, tens of thousands of Iraqi Shiites took to the streets in the southern city of Basra and an estimated 100,000 marched in Baghdad to protest Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) plans for regional caucuses to select a transitional Iraqi national assembly by mid-2004. The demonstrations, the largest to take place in post-Saddam Iraq, were a striking reminder that the majority Shiite population not only possesses the demographic strength to dominate a freely-elected government in Iraq, but is more united than any of Iraq's ethnic groups.

The CPA's reluctance to hold direct elections in the near term does not, as one critic of the US-led occupation of Iraq recently alleged, stem from the Bush administration's inability to "stomach the idea that democracy in Iraq will mean Shiites assuming power."[1] American officials have long accepted the fact that democracy in Iraq will inevitably lead to Shiite political supremacy, but they have endeavored to ensure that institutional checks and balances and a measure of intercommunal consensus about Iraq's political future have been firmly established before this day arrives.

The continuing insurgency against coalition forces is partly inspired by minority Sunni Arab fears of Shiite domination. Under the present conditions, large numbers of Sunnis would boycott near-term elections for a transitional assembly (either by choice, or out fear of retaliation by armed elements in their midst), the results of which would then reinforce feelings of exclusion from the political process. Even if most Sunnis do come to the polls, it is doubtful that the results will be widely accepted in the absence of UN supervision of the voting. Although an electoral assessment team from the United Nations visited Iraq in mid-2003 and concluded that it was possible to set up mechanisms for direct elections within six months, UN officials say that the deteriorating security situation has made this assessment outdated. Iraq's fledgling army and police forces currently lack the strength to adequately fight crime and combat insurgents; they certainly would be unable to provide sufficient security at polling stations throughout the country in the near term, while the presence of American soldiers at voting booths would undermine the perceived legitimacy of the electoral process.

Under the present plan, the CPA will first supervise the establishment of a 15-member organizing committee in each of Iraq's 18 governorates, or provinces. Each committee will consist of five members appointed by the governing council and ten members selected by local and provincial councils set up by the CPA in mid-2003. Each organizing committee will set up a "Governorate Selection Caucus," which will select representatives from among its own membership to the Transitional National Assembly in Baghdad. The number of representatives from each governorate is based on its percentage of Iraq's population, determined by the number of ration cards distributed by Saddam Hussein's government in the 1990s. One the assembly is seated, it will select and executive branch from among its members and stay on as a legislature throughout the transitional administration period. Nine months after the transitional administration is in place, there will be general elections for a constitutional convention. During the next six months, the convention will draft a constitution, which will then be circulated for public debate and revised if necessary. The final draft will then be presented to the public and a popular referendum held to ratify or reject it. Nationwide elections to choose a post-transitional government would follow shortly thereafter.

While the distribution of seats in the transitional assembly would reflect Iraq's sectarian and ethnic demography, the process would make it easier for Shiite politicians to enter the political system without Sistani's endorsement and therefore weaken his influence. But it would also ensure that the Sunni Arab community is represented by leaders who have enough credibility to secure their constituents' acceptance of the new political order. Until that happens, Shiite aspirations for political power commensurate with their demographic strength cannot be fully realized.

Nevertheless, Sistani's aides have warned that proceeding with the plan would lead the ayatollah to issue a fatwa declaring the transitional government to be illegitimate, a ruling that could open the way to violent confrontation between coalition forces and the Shiite population. Such public threats by the reclusive ayatollah (who has not left his residence in the holy city of Najaf in 12 years and respectfully declines to meet personally with Paul Bremer, the US administrator for Iraq) would have been unthinkable just months ago, but Sistani has increasingly abandoned the traditionally quietist role of Iraqi Shiite clergy.

In light of the historical experience of Iraq's Shiite community during the last 80 years, Shiite concerns that they will be cheated out of their rightful majority role in Iraqi governance are well-grounded. But Sistani's threats stem less from mistrust of the coalition authorities than from the desire to recapture support from the followers of young firebrand cleric Muqtda al-Sadr, who had criticized Sistani's initially accommodating stance toward the occupation.

Sistani first openly challenged the CPA in the Fall of 2003, when he demanded that Iraq's constitutional convention be elected, rather than appointed. After the CPA relented and Sistani got his way, Sadr and his deputies returned to the fold and began delivering sermons and public statements of support for the ayatollah. Sistani's demand for a directly elected transitional governemnt is reportedly negotiable - his main interest is that the CPA be seen as acknowledging his authority by making at least nominal concessions. On January 16, the White House announced that discussions were underway to "refine or improve" the plan so as to make it more acceptable to Sistani, possibly by allowing the election of transitional assembly delegates in Shiite provinces or instituting some form of UN oversight of the caucus system.

While an acceptable compromise will almost certainly be found, even symbolic CPA concessions are likely to encourage the Shiite clergy to assume a more salient political role in the future. This trend, bearing some resemblence to the Iranian clergy's gradual abandonment of political quietism in the 1970s, may increase tensions with non-Shiite minorities in Iraq.

Notes

  [1] Dilip Hiro, "One Iraqi, One Vote?" The New York Times, 27 January 2004.


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