Middle East Intelligence Bulletin
Jointly published by the United States Committee for a Free Lebanon and the Middle East Forum
  Vol. 5   No. 2 Table of Contents
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February/March 2003 


The MKO and the War on Iraq
by Mahan Abedin
Mahan Abedin is an analyst of Iranian politics, educated at the London School of Economics and Political Science.

Mujahedin-e Khalq site

If the United States carries through with its threat to topple the Iraqi government, Saddam Hussein and members of his inner circle aren't going to be the only residents of the country with a bleak future. Iraq is also home to several thousand fighters of the Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization (MKO), the largest armed Iranian dissident group. While senior leaders of the MKO may seek to slip out of the country in the event of a US attack, the group's military wing, armed with tanks and artillery, is likely to go down fighting. But against whom?

Endgame for the MKO

In June 2002, MKO leader Massoud Rajavi, convened a secret mass meeting at a conference center belonging to Iraqi Military Intelligence in the Al-Karakh district of Baghdad. Speaking to over 6,000 MKO members, Rajavi warned that a US invasion was inevitable and that the MKO would have three options: voluntarily withdrawing from Iraq, preemptively attacking Iran or assisting the Iraqi regime against invading American forces. With a US-led attack against Iraq now imminent, there are indications that the MKO's strategy combines elements of all three.

Although the MKO reportedly developed plans to infiltrate 200-300 MKO operatives out of Iraq (via Jordan),[1] a mass exodus of the organization's personnel is not feasible. However, several high-ranking officials are said to have fled the country, such as the head of MKO army intelligence, Mahnaz Bazazi, and a senior official in the group's civilian intelligence apparatus, Beezhan Rahimi, who arrived in Berlin in October 2002. An MKO delegation recently toured European capitals in search of a safe haven for Rajavi, his wife Maryam, and other senior leaders of the group. Members of parliament in France, Belgium, Holland and Denmark have met with the delegation, but it is unlikely that any European country will officially offer political asylum to MKO leaders, for fear of offending Tehran.[2] Most MKO fighters, as well as its senior leaders, are not likely to escape Iraq before American forces invade.

Informed sources expect that the MKO will launch an attack into Iran shortly before or after the beginning of the war. The MKO leadership is well aware that this force, which may comprise up to 4,000 fighters, will be butchered when it tries to cross the border, but this act of mass "martyrdom" would serve political objectives - in the short term, it would deflect attention from the flight of senior leaders; in the long term, it could be used by the organization's propagandists to vindicate the MKO's controversial decision to establish itself in Iraq during the 1980s and mobilize support among the Iranian Diaspora. The MKO launched a similar suicidal offensive against Iran in July 1988, a few days after Tehran accepted a cease-fire with Baghdad that ended their eight-year war. The offensive, billed as operation "Eternal Light," involved 7,000 fighters; nearly 2,000 were killed and a substantial number were captured and subsequently executed.

According to the London-based Financial Times, Iran recently allowed up to 5,000 armed members of the Tehran-based Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) to cross into northern Iraq. According to a senior Iranian official cited by the paper, the deployment was intended to counter a possible MKO attack.[3]

According to recent Iraqi Kurdish media reports, a large force of MKO fighters has been deployed around the city of Kirkuk and other government-controlled areas in northern Iraq.[4] Whether they are intended to be a first line of defense against an American-led assault from the north or the spearhead for a preemptive assault on Kurdish villages is anyone's guess. Kurdish and Iranian newspapers have also reported that MKO units have deployed in Baath Party facilities in several key Iraqi cities, evidently for the purpose of crushing popular uprisings that may occur during the conflict with the United States.[5] This would not be the first time that the MKO has been deployed against Iraqi dissidents. The mujahedin participated in the bloody suppression of Kurdish insurgents in the immediate aftermath of the 1991 Gulf War and, according to defectors from the group, attacked Sulaymaniyah in May 1993 and handed over 13 captured Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) fighters to Iraqi intelligence. In September 1996, MKO units joined Iraqi military forces in an attack on the PUK.[6]

Mahnaz Samadi

Fighting against the Americans is a much more dangerous proposition, but is said to be favored by several hundred of the more ideologically committed MKO fighters. According to defectors from the group, their likely commander during the war will be Mahnaz Samadi, an MKO officer who gained international attention prior to her deportation from Canada in 2000 and is now back in Iraq. As Iranians, few MKO fighters identify with the pan-Arab ideology of Iraq's Baath Party, but many share the Iraqi regime's espousal of socialism and its obsessive hatred of the United States. Indeed, as the above-mentioned deployments suggest, MKO units may prove to be more reliable defenders of Saddam than the Iraqi military, since they do not have the option of deserting and returning to civilian life.

The MKO and Saddam's WMD

A striking indication that the MKO remains loyal to Saddam is evidence that MKO bases have been used to conceal Iraqi weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Two defectors from the group recently recounted seeing MKO personnel wearing protective body suits while transporting missiles and heavy artillery in 1998. The two also described the construction about six years ago of what the MKO claimed was a water treatment plant - construction took place only at night, and the structure extended 300-600 ft below ground.[7]

Evidence of the group's complicity in Iraqi WMD concealment dates back to the months preceding the 1991 Gulf War when, according to high-level defector Nooruz Ali Rezvani, Saddam transported chemical weapons to at least five MKO bases.[8] After the war, UN Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM) personnel tried repeatedly to inspect MKO facilities, but were allowed to make only three brief visits. In 1992, UN inspectors simultaneously entered the group's main administrative office in Baghdad and an MKO military base called "Ashraf," 43 miles north of the capital. While inspectors found no evidence that WMD, or related documentation, were hidden in either location, subsequent attempts to inspect MKO bases were thwarted by both the MKO and the Iraqis. "We always used to have problems with the mujahedin camps," said former UNSCOM spokesman Ewen Buchanan, noting that the MKO nearly shot down UN helicopters on several occasions.[9] On one occasion, in 1997, an inspection of the Bagherzadeh camp west of Baghdad was aborted when MKO officials warned that an Iranian air force attack was imminent. When UNSCOM inspectors asked Iraqi officials to provide them with access to the camps, most recently in November 1998, Iraqi officials refused, claiming that they had no jurisdiction over them, and told them to deal directly with the mujahedin. The MKO has long contended that UNSCOM inspected its bases and gave them a clean bill of health, but UNSCOM's final report, completed in December 1998, merely states that the MKO bases appear to be outside the direct control of the Iraqi authorities.

UNSCOM's successor, the UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) has entered at least one MKO site - a base located in Abu Ghraib, 20 miles west of Baghdad, which was inspected in January 2003.

The American Response

How the United States will deal with the MKO is a contentious issue in Washington. The group has been classified by the State Department as a terrorist organization since 1997, and its "political" wing, the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), has been classified as such since 1999. Saddam's support for the MKO has been frequently cited as an example of Iraqi sponsorship of terrorist organizations.

However, the MKO has attracted a large number of supporters within the US congress over the years - around 150, according to full-page ads purchased in American newspapers by NCRI (which, strangely enough, has an office in Washington DC).[10] In the 1991 Persian Gulf War, US-led forces spared MKO bases (and the WMD allegedly stored in them), apparently because of the NCRI's considerable lobbying power in the US. and Europe (the EU declared the MKO a terrorist organization only last year). Whether or not it receives a similar exemption this time around will likely depend on whether there is clear evidence that the MKO is attacking Iraqi dissidents, concealing WMD, or taking hostile measures against US troops. Asked what the American response would be if the MKO confronts American forces, US State Department spokesman Richard Boucher replied curtly, "I wouldn't advise anyone to confront American forces."[11]

Notes

[1] Peyvand, Issue 54, May 2002. (Peyvand is a monthly journal edited by Hadi Shams-Haeri, a former MKO leader)
[2] The Daily Star (Beirut), 18 February 2003.
[3] The Financial Times (London), 19 February 2003. The figure of 5,000 members is likely an overestimate. The total number of full-time military personnel in SCIRI's Al-Badr Brigade does not exceed 3,000 men, though it has several thousand reservists.
[4] Hawlati (Sulaymaniyah), 3 February 2003; Regay Kurdistan (Arbil), 2 February 2003.
[5] Etemaad (Tehran), 22 January 2003; The Guardian (London), 18 February 2003.
[6] The Independent (London), 17 September 1996.
[7] The Sunday Times (London), 16 February 2003.
[8] The Ottawa Citizen, 17 November 2001.
[9] Ibid.
[10] Newsweek, 26 September 2002.
[11] US State Department Briefing, 26 February 2003.


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