In recent months, once-disunited Christian opposition currents in Lebanon have shown signs of unprecedented political coordination. Fueled in part by a US congressional push for Syria's withdrawal from Lebanon, this trend has caused great concern in Damascus. The fact that resurgences in Lebanese opposition to the occupation tend to coincide with manifestations of outside pressure on Syria is often denounced by Syrian officials as evidence of a grand international conspiracy. In fact, there has been no external incitement (on the contrary, US diplomats in Beirut have repeatedly emphasized that the Bush administration opposes the legislation) - it merely indicates a keen awareness among Lebanese that the outcome of any internal initiative to mobilize opposition to the Syrian occupation will largely be determined by the extent to which the international community tolerates the crackdown on dissent that is sure to follow.

Background

In the twelve years since Syria completed its conquest of Lebanon in October 1990, public figures in the Christian community (apart from the insular Armenian Orthodox) have tended to fall into five loose categories:

1. Secular Nationalists oppose the Syrian occupation, advocate a strong centralized state and an end to political confessionalism (the division of parliamentary seats and high government offices by sect). The main secular nationalist organization is the Free National Current (FNC), headed by exiled former army commander Michel Aoun, which has a strong presence both in Lebanon and abroad. The FNC include many non-Christians in the Diaspora (especially in Australia, Germany and Belgium), though in Lebanon it attracts Muslims mainly at the university level (e.g. FNC student leader Selim Ramlawi).
   
   
2. Christian Nationalists oppose the Syrian occupation, advocate a federal system with Christian autonomy, and accept political confessionalism as a temporary solution. Includes the main faction of the banned Lebanese Forces (LF) militia-turned-party and the smaller Guardians of the Cedars movement.
   
   
3. Accommodationists oppose the Syrian occupation, but have tended to advocate working with whatever government is in place (especially the presidency, which is reserved by law for Maronites) to advance Christian interests. Includes the clergy and many traditional political elites (especially in Mount Lebanon).
   
   
4. Radical Leftists are fairly indifferent to Lebanese sovereignty - their position toward the Syrian occupation is governed largely by its perceived impact on socio-economic conditions and political freedoms. Multiconfessional, though predominantly Christian. The Lebanese Communist Party (LCP) was once very pro-Syrian, the rampant corruption and severe income inequalities generated by the post-war Syrian-backed political order led dissidents in the party to openly challenge the occupation for the first time in 2000 and prompted the LCP leadership to gravitate against the regime. Former MP Najah Wakim, the head of the leftist Democratic Forum, has opposed every government since the early 1970s.
   
   
5. The Pro-Syrian Camp includes former militia leaders, commercial elites and some traditional politicians (mostly in north Lebanon and the Beqaa) who have obtained political influence and profited financially from the Syrian occupation. Includes President Emile Lahoud, Christian cabinet ministers and most members of parliament, as well as leaders of the pro-annexation Syrian Social Nationalist Party (SSNP) and the Lebanese branch of Syria's ruling Baath Party.

The boundaries between these categories are often blurred, as there is considerable overlap. Christian nationalists and accommodationists share essentially the same cultural values, for example, and some secular nationalists espouse leftist ideals. Moreover, Lebanese public figures often shift political positions. Some, such as Phalange (Kata'ib) Party President Karim Pakradouni and the late Elie Hobeiqa, were Christian nationalists for many years before moving squarely into the pro-Syrian camp. Former Foreign Minister Fares Boueiz, once very close to the Syrians, has become an accommodationist in recent years.

Although the first four camps all presently oppose the Syrian occupation of Lebanon, they differ in their broader political goals and have adopted different strategies in pursuing them. As a result, they have seldom acted in unison. The secular and Christian nationalists have, with one minor exception (see below), consistently boycotted heavily flawed parliamentary elections, while accommodationists have participated in the last two rounds. As a result, boycotts have not been strong enough to elicit the electoral reforms demanded by the FNC, while voter turnout has not been high enough for the accommodationists to capture more than a handful of parliamentary seats.

Because the secular and Christian nationalists are more adamant in their rejection of the status quo and draw more support from the universities, they have relied primarily on mass demonstrations as a form of political expression, while accommodationists have called on their followers not to take part in street protests, for fear that government crackdowns will disrupt efforts to secure a withdrawal amicably. A dynamic similar to the conflicting electoral strategies results: because of accommodationist appeals, protests may not draw enough people onto the streets to provide safety in numbers, while provoking government crackdowns that stymie accommodationist initiatives.

The Syrian-backed government has long sought to encourage such disjointed strategies among the different opposition camps (e.g. during election campaigns, allowing pro-boycott demonstrations to take place only in districts where accommodationist candidates are favored to win) and even within them. The imprisonment of Lebanese Forces leader Samir Geagea in 1994, for example, not only caused the LF to focus narrowly on winning his release (an objective that the Aounists in particular were not enthusiastic about), but generated an internal split between activists seeking to cut a deal with the authorities to win his release and those who went underground. Over time, this split widened. The first group, led by Fouad Malek, failed to win Geagea's release and became corrupted in the process (Malek is now firmly in the pro-Syrian camp), while the latter became increasingly marginalized. The accommodationist camp has long been weakened by personal rivalries, family feuds and defections to the pro-Syrian camp.

In April 2001, accommodationists, including nine members of parliament, established the Qornet Shehwan Gathering, a loose coalition endorsed by Maronite Christian Patriarch Nasrallah Boutros Sfeir, named after the Metn village where its first meeting took place. While the main common denominator of its membership is the desire to bring about a Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon, the group's charter sought to placate Damascus by calling only for the redeployment of Syrian forces out of central Lebanon in the short term, rather than an immediate, full withdrawal, while expressing support for "the best brotherly ties between the two countries" and declaring Israel the "main source of danger" to Lebanon.¹

The Syria Accountability Act

Until last fall, there was little debate within the American foreign policy establishment over US policy toward Syria and even less discussion of the Syrian occupation of Lebanon. Although congressional leaders occasionally grilled State Department officials about tacit American support for Syrian hegemony in Lebanon during committee hearings, the issue remained entirely absent from the legislative agenda following the stillbirth in 1999 of the Lebanon Independence Restoration Act (LIRA).

However, the September 11 attacks shattered the prevailing assumption in Washington that American interests were convergent with the political status quo in the Arab world, facilitating a fresh reevaluation of US policy in the region. Although the Bush administration remained committed to its predecessor's policy of "constructive engagement" with Syrian President Bashar Assad, there is now open dissent even within the State Department. In October 2001, Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage told reporters that he didn't consider Syria to be "part of the coalition" against terror and issued a veiled threat of sanctions "run[ing] the gamut from isolation . . . all the way up through possibly military action."

In April, a handful of American congressmen introduced a draft bill proposing diplomatic and economic sanctions on Syria if it does not end its sponsorship of terrorist organizations, stop violating UN sanctions on Iraq, discontinue its development of weapons of mass destruction, and completely withdraw its military forces from Lebanon. Fueled by the vigorous lobbying of Lebanese-American groups, such as the US Committee for a Free Lebanon, the Syria Accountability Act (SAA) began rapidly accumulating sponsors in both the Senate and the House of Representatives.

Although the Bush administration declared early on its opposition to the legislation, the very fact that the Syrian occupation was being vigorously debated inside the beltway has been closely followed in Lebanon, where even mundane statements about Syria by third-rank diplomats and congressional staffers often make the front pages.

Just as the demise of Syrian-Israeli peace talks and signs of American dissatisfaction with Syria in the spring of 2000 inspired a wave of unprecedented calls for a Syrian withdrawal in the editorial pages of Lebanese newspapers, the SAA debate has invigorated the Lebanese opposition. Not only has it raised hopes that American appeasement of Damascus is on the decline, but it has generated a sense that US policy is in flux and might shift if the Lebanese opposition demonstrates greater unity.

The Metn By-Election

Following the death of Albert Moukheiber (one of the few staunch opponents of the Syrian occupation elected to parliament in 2000) in April, a by-election was scheduled for June 2 to fill the vacant Orthodox Christian seat in the district of Metn. Traditionally, such by-elections have been a technicality - when a Lebanese parliamentarian dies in office, his next of kin almost always runs uncontested. This time, however, the Metn district's pro-Syrian political boss, former Interior Minister Michel Murr, was looking to avenge the loss of this seat in 2000, while the Qornet Shehwan Gathering was looking to test its electoral strength.

After a period of shifting alliances in which several candidates threw their hats into the ring, the campaign developed into a contest between two political aspirants. The opposition candidate, oddly enough, was Murr's brother, Gabriel, the owner of Murr Television (MTV), a leading mainstream Christian media outlet. Michel Murr (whose son Elias inherited his father's post as interior minister) passed the torch to his daughter, Myrna Abu Sharaf (who, for obvious reasons, used her maiden name on the ballot).

The campaign quickly evolved into a test of strength between the pro-Syrian camp and all of the Christian opposition currents (apart from Carlos Edde's National Bloc and some accommodationists who backed Moukheiber's nephew, Ghassan, who refused to withdraw his candidacy). The FNC, which had boycotted the last three rounds of parliamentary elections, decided to throw its weight behind Gabriel Murr, believing that public disaffection with the Syrian presence was salient enough to make possible an opposition victory. Likewise, the pro-Geagea faction of the LF decided to participate in the national electoral process for the first time. Gabriel Murr also received the backing of former Communist Party Secretary-General George Hawi, an immensely popular figure among leftists, which dealt a particularly damaging blow to Myrna because she had adopted a populist campaign program.

Michel Murr's electoral machine employed all of the tactics that have been used in the past to orchestrate parliamentary elections in Lebanon. Security forces illegally entered polling stations and journalists were arbitrarily expelled, while the interior minister declared that the use of curtains in the voting booths was "optional" (so that the aforementioned security forces could monitor those whose votes had been bought).

As with previous elections in Metn, large numbers of Syrians naturalized under a controversial 1994 law were bussed to the polls from eastern Lebanon by Michel Murr. Although Murr's people directed them to the right ballot box once inside the polling stations, the vast majority were unable to identify which candidates were running when accosted by reporters broadcasting their arrival on live television.

Surprisingly, unofficial results published by the media the next day showed Gabriel Murr winning the election by a three vote margin (34,894 to 34,891). "Gabriel Murr victory is turning point for opposition," ran a headline in the daily Al-Nahar. However, government leaks indicated that the electoral commission was planning to annul all of the votes cast in one village because a single voter had neglected to put his name on the ballot and the headlines the day after were very different. Al-Nahar declared, "Shock result change threatens political escalation," while the headline of the French-language daily L'Orient-Le Jour read, "The law shamelessly mocked." Even the pro-Syrian daily Al-Safir warned (somewhat ambiguously) that "the Metn by-election could lead to dangerous options." As hundreds of demonstrators protested the move, mainstream Christian politicians, and more than a few Muslim ones, warned that discontent could spill into the streets if Gabriel Murr was robbed of victory.

After a delay of two days, a subdued Elias Murr held a late press conference on June 4 and announced that Gabriel Murr had won the election. "I chose to follow my conscience despite all the accusations against me," he explained solemnly. According to reliable sources, senior Lebanese military commanders had refused to deploy army units against protestors, suggesting a decision by Damascus to let the results stand. For the Syrians, the only thing worse than a legitimate opposition victory would be a legitimate opposition victory followed by a blatantly illegal annulment of the results.

The International Maronite Congress

A third development which inspired greater unity in the opposition was the reaction in Lebanon to the International Maronite Congress held in Los Angeles in June. The event drew scores of prominent Maronite Christian opposition figures from Lebanon and around the world. While many previous political gatherings have been organized by Lebanese expatriates, this was the first Diaspora gathering with a pronounced anti-Syrian agenda to attract a sizeable number of accommodationist Maronite political and religious figures from within Lebanon (and two camera crews from Lebanese television stations).

Patriarch Sfeir officially endorsed the meeting and sent his personal representative, Bishop Youssef Beshara, and six other clergymen. Prominent members of the Qornet Shehwan Gathering attended, including National Liberal Party (NLP) Chairman Dory Chamoun, Jbeil MP Fares Soueid, Kesrouan MP Mansour Bone and Kesrouan MP Farid Khazen. Although he is not a Maronite, Gibran Tueni, the editor of Lebanon's largest newspaper, Al-Nahar, also attended the event. In an eloquent speech delivered on the second day of the meeting, Tueni called upon Lebanese emigrants to follow the model of Irish-Americans, who played an important role in "the liberation movement that struggled at home to win freedom from Britain."

Unlike the previous International Maronite Congress in 1994, a tame event by comparison that focused primarily on social and spiritual matters, the gathering in Los Angeles passed a final resolution which squarely challenged Syrian authority in Lebanon. In particular, the resolution called for the Lebanese government to "assume responsibility for all security and the control of its borders" (a direct challenge to Hezbollah's control of south Lebanon), "nullify the controversial and unconstitutional elements of the naturalization act that gave Lebanese citizenship to thousands of ineligible people" (a reference to a 1994 law that granted citizenship to around 200,000 Syrians), and release all political prisoners.

The most controversial articles in the resolution stated that the Congress "supports those elements of the Syria Accountability Act that pertain to the withdrawal of Syria from Lebanon" and "supports the efforts of the USA to combat terrorism all over the world." Unlike resolutions issued by groups in Lebanon, there was no obligatory reference to "brotherly relations" between Lebanon and Syria.

Reaction

Not surprisingly, pro-Syrian political figures in Lebanon denounced the conference as an extremist, sectarian affair - a standard criticism levied whenever any Christian group criticizes the Syrian occupation. Druze leader Walid Jumblatt, who had recently returned to the Syrian fold and cut his ties with the opposition, declared that the resolutions "fan anew the flames of sectarian dissension that put the country again on a dangerous crossroads and jolt its national unity."

In Damascus, Syrian President Bashar Assad was fuming. Not only had accommodationist Christian leaders consorted openly and warmly with Christian nationalist figures abroad, but they did so for all the world (all of Lebanon, at any rate) to see. The young Syrian dictator felt that he had made significant concessions to the accommodationists since coming to power. In June 2001, he ordered a limited redeployment of Syrian military forces from Beirut to outlying areas, so as to reduce visible manifestations of the occupation. In March 2002, he made the first official visit to Lebanon by a Syrian president in over half a century - reversing his predecessor's refusal to accord Lebanon even the symbolic trappings of diplomatic recognition. And most importantly, he had declined to permit his allies in the Lebanese security and judicial branches to overturn the opposition electoral victory in Metn.

These overtures, in his eyes, were repaid by outspoken rejection of Syrian authority. To add insult to injury, two of the MPs who attended the conference, Soueid and Bone, violated a Syrian "red line" by stopping in Paris on the way back to consult with Aoun (who did not attend the conference, or send an official FNC representative, because of its Christian focus), while a third, MP Nasib Lahoud (who did not attend the conference), flew out to meet the exiled general less than a week later.

On July 1, as Syrian allies in Lebanon continued to issue statements condemning Christian "sectarianism," the Lebanese daily Al-Liwaa published an interview with Assad that unwittingly revealed his strategy in confronting the new opposition front. The Syrian leader declared that "healthy" relations between Syria and Lebanon (a common euphemism for a Syrian military pullout) cannot prevail until sectarian divisions subside, adding quickly that President Lahoud is the right man to "halt sectarianism."

The next day, to the surprise of most and consternation of many Lebanese, American ambassador to Lebanon Vincent Battle publicly accused the participants at the congress of adopting a sectarian tone and said its proceedings were "extremely dangerous" to Lebanese national unity.²

Despite the fact that Sfeir and most members of the Qornet Shehwan Gathering emphasized that they did not approve of the conference's endorsement of the Syria Accountability Act, the chorus of condemnation became louder and more exaggerated. On July 19, Tripoli Mufti Taha Sabounji, called the resolutions "a threat to the aspirations of the Arab region and its stability that would consequentially eliminate sovereignty and independence."³ Two days later, the head of the SSNP, Gibran Araiji (whose initial reaction the day after the conference was that it merely had a "sectarian tone") declared that "the Los Angeles conference was nothing more than a fatal blow that removed Maronites from the realm of rationalism to their old ideas, which have built a number of tombs."⁴

The Syrians also launched a rather bizarre effort to incite sectarian fears among the Christian community. In mid-July, the Sunni Council of Muftis was pressured into issuing a statement threatening to retract its 1983 decree recognizing Lebanon as the "final homeland" for all its citizens if pressures for a Syrian withdrawal persisted.⁵ In a televised interview in mid-August, Health Minister Suleiman Franjieh (a Christian) warned that if Syrian troops left Lebanon, the majority Muslim population would turn against the Christians and reject the equal division of parliamentary seats stipulated by the Taif Accord. The remark drew ridicule from Aoun. "Muslims are not cannibals" he said in an address via satellite to the annual FNC dinner in Qleiaat on August 16. "We're willing to take the risk that they eat us once Syria withdraws from Lebanon."

If the objective of such rhetoric was to force the accommodationists to distance themselves from the secular nationalist opposition, it failed. Many members of the Qornet Shehwan Gathering attended an FNC event in Antelias on August 7 to commemorate the one year anniversary of the August 2001 crackdown against the FNC and the Lebanese Forces, while two (former President Amine Gemayel and Dory Chamoun) gave speeches.

Implications

In response to the emergence of a unified Christian opposition front, leading pro-Syrian Christian MPs held two meetings in late July and decided to formally establish their own political bloc, which was unveiled as the Consultative Gathering in August. As the English-language Daily Star observed, "the newly formalized grouping exists solely to compete with the Qornet Shehwan Gathering for the loyalties of Christian voters."⁶

The resurgence of a unified Christian opposition front inevitably led to a government crackdown on dissent in September, including the closure of Murr Television, a move by the government to annull Murr's by-election victory (which has not yet still unresolved), and judicial probes against several Christian politicians. However, rather than dividing the Qornet Shehwan Gathering, the closure has strengthened its unity.

Significantly, the suppression of public freedoms produced a massive outpouring of denunciations by mainstream Muslim politicians. A proposal by Elias Murr in early October to create a single nationwide constituency for the 2004 parliamentary elections (a transparent attempt to weaken the Qornet Shehwan Gathering by forcing candidates to join 128-member electoral slates) met with a decidedly unenthusiastic response across the sectarian spectrum. This underscores that, notwithstanding Syrian attempts to portray Christian opposition to the occupation as a manifestation of extreme sectarianism or traitorous alliances with foreign powers, the emergence of a coherent Christian opposition bloc is viewed by Lebanese Muslims as a positive development.

Notes

  ¹ The Daily Star (Beirut), 1 May 2001.
  ² The Daily Star (Beirut), 3 July 2002.
  ³ The Daily Star (Beirut), 20 July 2002.
  ⁴ The Daily Star (Beirut), 22 July 2002.
  ⁵ Although the head of the Council, Muhammad Rashid Qabbani, is not particularly pro-Syrian, his predecessor (Hassan Khalid) was assassinated by the Syrians in May 1989 after ignoring their warnings not to meet with Michel Aoun. Qabbani himself has invoked punishment by Damascus for failing to defend the occupation sufficiently. Last year, a Syrian-backed Islamic fundamentalist leader accused him of "conspiring" with Christians against Syria (see The Daily Star 26 March 2001 and 27 March 2001).
  ⁶ The Daily Star (Beirut), 31 August 2002.