A. William Samii is a regional specialist with Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and writes the weekly newsletter RFE/RL Iran Report. Views in this article are his own.

Factionalism is a common explanation for the seemingly contradictory policies of the Iranian government and the conflicting statements of Iranian officials. Indeed, it is not entirely inaccurate to look at domestic Iranian politics as a competition between black-hatted "hard-liners" loyal to Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and white-hatted "reformists" loyal to President Mohammad Khatami on the other. Both sides control specific assets, such as ministries, para-governmental organizations, and pressure groups. But the situation is far more complex, and in the words of one observer, "There are fourteen dozen different positions on each issue, and it is very difficult to say with any certainty which of the insiders support which position."¹

Ministries have over-lapping responsibilities and elements within the ministries often have agendas that differ from those of their superiors or colleagues. The case of the domestic security apparatus - which includes the Law Enforcement Forces (LEF), the Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS), the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC), and the Basij Resistance Forces (the Basij) - illustrates this point.² There is an "impenetrable network of intelligence and security services," according to one informed observer of the Iranian power structure.³ The example of the domestic security apparatus illustrates why it can be so difficult to provide a clear-cut and informative explanation for individual incidents in Iran when one tries to move beyond the reformist/hard-liner typology. It also shows why the government of Iran suffers from accountability and transparency problems and a lack of public confidence.

The Law Enforcement Forces (LEF)

The Law Enforcement Forces (Niruha-yi Entezami-yi Jomhuri-yi Islami) are nominally under the umbrella of the Interior Ministry, but the Supreme Leader selects the head of the LEF. Khatami's first interior minister, Hojatoleslam Abdullah Nuri, was a reformist and consequentially never exercised real authority over the LEF. His successor, Hojatoleslam Abdol-Vahed Musavi-Lari, ostensibly received a mandate to control the LEF in August 1998, but there have been numerous incidents which show that not all LEF personnel share Musavi-Lari's inclinations.

In February 2002, for example, a unit of the LEF called the Public Establishments Office (Edareh-yi Amaken Omumi), which concerns itself with the type of music people hear, the mixing of genders in public places, and various forms of lewd behavior, summoned several Iranian journalists for questioning. Ahmad Bashiri, a lawyer and writer who received a summons, described the experience in an interview with RFE/RL's Persian Service:

I was summoned by a phone call from the Public Establishments Office. When I got there, they showed me the way to the basement. They had some of my interviews and articles on their desks, and they kept repeating that my mere criticism of the Judiciary undermined the Judiciary's position. They wanted me to confess that I was a collaborator with SAVAK, the former regime's intelligence service . . . I was shocked [because] I didn't know why they would bring me to the Public Establishments Office for these matters.⁴

Indeed, Vice President for Legal and Parliamentary Affairs Mohammad Ali Abtahi said that the Public Establishments Office has no business summoning journalists,⁵ while Minister of Islamic Culture and Guidance Hojatoleslam Ahmad Masjid-Jamei described the arrests as problematic.⁶ and wrote a letter to his counterpart in the Interior Ministry, warning that such incidents undermined the cultural atmosphere and national security.⁷

Perhaps the most infamous example of the LEF's pursuit of its own agenda occurred in July 1999. Hard-line sympathizers attacked Tehran University students as they protested the arrest of Hoviat-i Khish proprietor Heshmatollah Tabarzadi, the closure of Salam daily, and parliament's approval of a highly restrictive press law. Elements from the LEF and the Ansar-i Hizbullah pressure group later raided the students' dormitory, resulting in dozens of injuries and at least one death. In the ensuing week of demonstrations and counter-demonstrations throughout the country, there were nearly 2000 arrests. Among the demonstrators' demands was the arrest of then-LEF chief General Hedayat Lotfian.

What followed was a whitewash. About two weeks after the riots, several students gave heavily edited confessions on television that foreigners and domestic elements were responsible for the unrest. About a month after the riots, the Supreme National Security Council issued a report that said damage was caused by some LEF personnel, "officers in civilian clothes," "unofficial civilian forces" and some students.⁸ The classified version of this report, however, referred to a secret security unit's involvement in the unrest,⁹ and another report by the Armed Forces Judicial Organization singled out the LEF for blame, which resulted in several indictments.¹⁰ A trial of some 20 LEF personnel, including the Tehran LEF chief, for their parts in the unrest was held in February-July 2000. All but two of them - a lieutenant and a sergeant - were acquitted, but there were many questions in the media about who was really responsible for what occurred, who gave the orders, and who were the individuals in plain clothes who participated in the violence.

The Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS)

Under the leadership of Hojatoleslam Mohammad Mohammadi Reyshahri (1984-1989) and then Hojatoleslam Ali-Akbar Fallahian Khuzestani (1989-1997), Iran's Ministry of Intelligence and Security (Vezarat-i Ettelaat va Amniyat-i Keshvar) was feared for its elimination of Iranian dissidents, both at home and abroad, and was identified with the country's most hard-line elements. President Khatami's first Intelligence Minister, Hojatoleslam Qorban-Ali Dori-Najafabadi, did not have an intelligence background and was considered to be a relatively liberal and pragmatic cleric.

The 1998 murders of dissident Iranian writers and intellectuals (a.k.a. the "serial killings") and the admission that MOIS personnel were behind the killings, however, led to Dori-Najafabadi's resignation. The man chosen as Iran's fourth Intelligence Minister was Hojatoleslam Ali Yunesi, who had served in previous intelligence posts and was a protégé of Reyshahri. Yunesi was favored by Supreme Leader Khamenei, but the new deputy intelligence minister, Ali Rabii, was a supporter of Khatami.

What followed was interesting for several reasons. First, the killings were blamed on a cell within the MOIS itself and, as usual, the killers were said to be acting in the interests of foreigners.¹¹ Second, hard-liners rushed to defend the MOIS. The most controversial incident occurred when Hojatoleslam Ruhollah Husseinian, a protégé and former colleague of Reyshahri, appeared on state television and accused the reformers of killing the dissidents. Third, investigative journalists, especially Akbar Ganji, wrote columns and even books that alluded to the involvement of high officials, such as former president Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani and former MOIS chief Ali Fallahian.

However, hopes for a thorough investigation into the case were dashed when the alleged ringleader, MOIS official Said Emami, allegedly killed himself while in prison by ingesting an exfoliating mixture. The rest of the so-called "Said Emami Gang" was eventually brought to trial, but the court determined that the group acted alone, without any instructions from high-ranking clerics (there had been rumors of religious decrees for the killing of the dissidents). In the verdict handed down in January 2001, three people were sentenced to death, five people were sentenced to life imprisonment, and seven people received prison sentences of up to 10 years. Oddly, one person who confessed to participation in two of the murders was acquitted. But these sentences went to appeal in August 2001, the capital punishments were never carried out, and a final verdict is pending. The victims' families and lawyers, meanwhile, complained repeatedly that they did not have access to many of the cases files.

The Revolutionary Guards

The Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (Pasdaran-i Inqilab-i Islami) was created shortly after Iran's 1979 Islamic revolution, in part because the loyalty of the regular armed forces was in doubt.¹² According to the constitution, the Supreme Leader is commander-in-chief of all the armed forces, including the IRGC. One of its early leaders was Mohsen Rafiqdust, who would go on to head the powerful and wealthy Oppressed and Disabled Foundation (Bonyad-i Mostazafan va Janbazan). And IRGC chief Mohsen Rezai went on to serve on the powerful and conservative Council for the Discernment of Expediency. The Supreme Leader selects the head of the IRGC, and the IRGC makes no pretence of pursuing an apolitical agenda.

Examples of the IRGC's hard-line tendencies are plentiful. In spring 1998, IRGC chief Major General Yahya Rahim-Safavi gave a speech in which he threatened to cut reformists' necks and tongues.¹³ It also is believed that elements within the IRGC were responsible for the attempt to assassinate reformist ideologue Said Hajjarian in March 2000, and suspicion only increased when the government attempted to impose a news blackout and investigative journalists were pressured to abandon their investigations.¹⁴ Soon thereafter, the IRGC issued a statement that warned, "if necessary, our enemies, be they small or large, will feel the reverberating impact of the hammer of the Islamic revolution on their skulls and the impact will be so strong that they will never be able to engage in hatching plots or committing crimes."¹⁵ There were rumors of an IRGC plan to stage a coup.¹⁶

But by far the most overt example of the IRGC's inclinations appeared in July 1999, when 24 IRGC commanders sent a letter to President Khatami about the student unrest. "We have been forced to shut our eyes, remain silent and watch the wilting of a flower which blossomed as a result of 14 centuries of Shi'ite and Muslim suffering," the signatories complained. "How long should we have revolutionary patience while the system is being destroyed? . . . We can see the footprints of the enemy in the aforementioned incidents and we can hear its drunken cackle. You should understand this today because tomorrow is too late . . . our patience has run out. We cannot tolerate this situation any longer if it is not dealt with."¹⁷

Nevertheless, younger guardsmen sometimes exhibit reservations. IRGC personnel allegedly refused to suppress civil unrest in Qazvin in August 1994. Moreover, post-1997 election press reports indicate that IRGC personnel voted for Khatami in even greater proportions than did the general population. According to an observer of the Iranian military, "The IRGC has traditionally recruited from the same social base as the universities: poor families with solid revolutionary credentials (i.e., participation in the revolution, Iran-Iraq War service, and the like)."¹⁸ Because the universities are highly supportive of President Khatami, according to this observer, it is reasonable to expect that IRGC personnel would share these sentiments, and the IRGC's increasing reliance on conscripts may have reinforced this tendency.

Like the other security institutions, the IRGC is broken down into different branches and units. These can be linked with individuals outside of their formal command structure, or their leaders can pursue different agendas. The Qods Corps is an elite unit in the IRGC, tasked with exporting the revolution and dealing with dissidents at home and abroad. There is also an IRGC intelligence unit that cooperates with the MOIS. There are IRGC installations in Iran's major cities, and the unit that has responsibility for maintaining order in the cities is the Quick Reaction Group (Niru-yi Vakonesh-i Siri). The Basij Resistance Forces (Niru-yi Moqavemat-i Basij) has similar responsibilities and it often serves as crowd control. In an effort to confront narcotics traffickers coming from Afghanistan, the IRGC created Village Basij units in 2000 by arming and providing rudimentary training to locals. Initially they were to act in a defensive role, but eventually they were mounting offensive operations.

Conclusion

The institutional complexity and pervasive factionalism of the above-mentioned domestic security agencies underscore the need to introduce greater transparency and accountability in the Iranian state. The security institutions are, de jure and de facto, under the control of hard-liners, who can use coercion to achieve their objectives and confront their political opponents. Punishment of malefactors who go too far in employing force is rare.

Moreover, this factionalism cannot easily be understood through a systems or organizational approach. Individuals in and out of government are connected through kinship, marriage, and place of origin. An individual's service branch during the Iran-Iraq war (e.g. IRGC, Basij, Army ground forces) and education, whether in a seminary or a military academy, also affect the connections he is likely to have. Then there are relationships that exist mainly because of shared interests. In many cases, therefore, individuals are in a position because of their connections, rather than their qualifications or competence, and this affects how the organization operates and what is eventually interpreted as its factional tendency.

Non-governmental organizations, such as the pressure groups or political parties, also have connections with state security organizations. The hard-line Ansar-i Hizbullah, for example, is believed to have played an active role in the July 1999 violence, and its "operation would be impossible to carry out without high-level backing."¹⁹ It is connected with Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati, the head of the Guardians Council, and its gets funding from the Oppressed and Disabled Foundation, while its membership is drawn from war veterans and the Basij. Then there is the Mahdaviyat group, which was accused of trying to assassinate several government officials and had ties to the IRGC.²⁰ Mahdaviyat apparently was based on the extremist Hojjatieh Society. Hojjatieh was dissolved in 1983, but many of its members were absorbed into the hard-line Islamic Coalition Association, which still is active in Iranian politics.

Efforts to introduce greater transparency and accountability in the Iranian state will not get far if state institutions continue to function in the factionalized manner indicated above, and Iranians will not have confidence in a government that seems to operate regardless of what elected officials do. Moreover, the Iranian affinity for conspiracy theories will continue in the absence of any logical way to understand the government and national affairs. Aggravating this situation even more are the limitations imposed on the press. Aggressive investigative reporting can get a newspaper closed or a reporter jailed, and although courageous journalists continue their work, the media's watchdog function is hampered.

Notes

  ¹ Kenneth Pollack of the Council for Foreign Relations, cited in Joe Klein, "Shadow Land," New Yorker, 18 February 2002.
  ² The MOIS and IRGC are active in the Iranian foreign policy process, both in formulating policy and then in executing it. Iran's Ministry of Foreign Affairs is active in this process too. The competition between these branches of the government would explain why the IRGC and MOIS are backing specific Afghan factions militarily, while the MFA is trying to work with the interim administration in Kabul. The international aspect of Iranian security activities is not addressed in this article, but this is an arena in which factional competitiveness reduces consistency in state actions.
  ³ Wilfried Buchta, Who Rules Iran: The Structure of Power in the Islamic Republic (Washington Institute of Near East Policy and the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2000), p. 164.
  ⁴ Charles Recknagel and Azam Gorgin, "Reformists Targeted By Unknown Agents In New Hard-Line Crackdown," RFE/RL Weekday Magazine, 22 February 2002.
  ⁵ Noruz, 13 February 2002. Among the journalists who faced questioning are Jameh-yi Salem editor Firuz Garan, Guzarish-i Film Editor-in-Chief Nushabeh Amiri, Guzarish-i Film journalist Hushang Assadi, and Ali Dehbashi, the editor of the suspended publications Kilk and Bukhara.
  ⁶ Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA), 17 February 2002.
  ⁷ IRNA, 15 February 2002.
  ⁸ Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting Television, 14 August 1999.
  ⁹ RFE/RL Iran Report, vol. 2, no. 36, 13 September 1999.
  ¹⁰ RFE/RL Iran Report, vol. 2, no. 48, 6 December 1999.
  ¹¹ IRNA, 5 January 1999.
  ¹² On the IRGC, see Kenneth Katzman, The Warriors of Islam: Iran's Revolutionary Guard (Boulder, 1993).
  ¹³ Payam-e Imruz, 15 May 1998.
  ¹⁴ Al-Sharq al-Awsat (London), 22 March 2000.
  ¹⁵ IRIB television, 16 April 2000.
  ¹⁶ An un-named reformist provided the recording of the April 14, 2000 meeting at which a coup was planned; Reuters, April 26, 2000. The IRGC denied the reports of a coup.
  ¹⁷ The letter, dated July 12, 1999, was published in Jomhuri-yi Islami (July 19, 1999) and Kayhan (July 19, 1999). The Islamic Culture and Guidance Ministry sent written warnings to the relevant managing editors for publishing classified documents, IRNA reported on July 21, 1999, but nothing more happened, whereas Salam was shut down for doing the same thing.
  ¹⁸ Michael Eisenstadt, "The Armed Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran: An Assessment," Middle East Review of International Affairs Journal, vol. 5, no. 1, March 2001.
  ¹⁹ Michael Rubin, Into The Shadows: Radical Vigilantes in Khatami's Iran (Washington Institute of Near East Policy, 2001), p. 51.
  ²⁰ Salam, 17 April 1999. Allegations that the would-be assassins were connected with the IRGC were rejected in Kayhan, 20 April 1999. Another daily said that they were independent operators, Qods, 17 April 1999.