Middle East Intelligence Bulletin
Jointly published by the United States Committee for a Free Lebanon and the Middle East Forum
  Vol. 3   No. 10 Table of Contents
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October 2001 


As War Rages, Afghans Plan for the Future
by A. William Samii

A. William Samii is a regional specialist with Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and writes the weekly newsletter Iran Report. Views in this article are his own.

Mohammad Zahir Shah
A "responsible government" must be established in Afghanistan, former Iranian president Ayatollah Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani declared during the Friday Prayers in Tehran on October 26. A government imposed from outside will fail, he warned his congregation, because it will not be accepted by the people and, as a result, the various Mujahedin groups will quickly resume their quarrels. The quarrelsome nature and competitiveness of the various Afghan opposition groups is evident in the number of "peace and unity" meetings they have held in October, as well as the number of "peace and unity" meetings that have been postponed.

Much of the initial Western impetus for a future Afghan government has focused on Mohammad Zahir Shah, the Rome-based former Afghan monarch who was deposed in 1973 by his cousin, Sardar Mohammad Daoud. Tehran and Moscow, meanwhile, have focused on ousted President Burhanudin Rabbani and the Northern Alliance (a.k.a. the United National Islamic Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan, UNIFSA), a loose coalition of Afghan groups under Rabbani's leadership that was created in June 1997.1

The White House has stated that it is not interested in nation-building once the Taliban are ousted. Nevertheless, State Department officials, as well as a delegation from the US Congress, have met with Zahir Shah and his representatives in Rome several times since September 11. Italian Foreign Minister Renato Ruggiero and French Foreign Minister Hubert Vedrine have also met with the aging monarch.

Zahir Shah's plan for Afghanistan, jointly announced by him and the Northern Alliance on October 1, is based on the creation of a "Supreme Council for the National Unity of Afghanistan." This Council would consist of 120 representatives: 50 chosen by Zahir Shah, 50 chosen by the Northern Alliance and the remaining 20 chosen by consensus from among Afghan leaders. After all 120 representatives to this body are selected, they would hold a traditional Loya Jirga gathering to elect an interim or transitional government.

But this process has encountered difficulties. As of October 15, the Northern Alliance's representatives had not come to Rome to present their list of 50 nominees for the Council. A week later it was reported that representatives of the Northern Alliance, Zahir Shah, and other anti-Taliban groups would met in Istanbul to decide who would participate in the Loya Jirga and where and when to hold it.2 Then the Turkish government said that it would hold a meeting of Afghan opposition factions linked to Zahir Shah and the Northern Alliance, but a date or location for their meeting has not been set.3

Some observers view Zahir Shah as a potential unifier of the Afghans because, since his exile began in 1973, he has held himself aloof from the country's various political factions. Moreover, his Pashtun ethnicity makes him part of the country's majority, unlike many of the Northern Alliance political figures, who are seen as minority representatives. President Rabbani, for example, is an ethnic Tajik and General Abdul Rashid Dustum is an ethnic Uzbek. In addition, some older Afghans may idealize the monarchy in light of the difficulties they have faced in the last quarter century.

Nevertheless, other Afghans are skeptical about Zahir Shah's potential. Commander Shaoor Yasini, who led 1,300 Mujahedin during the war against the Soviets, says that although he welcomes the ex-king's role, Zahir Shah's efforts could fail if Afghans believe that he represents only foreign interests. Yasini said: "If the Afghan people restore Zahir Shah to the throne themselves, that will be alright. People will accept him. But at the moment we don't know who is trying to restore Shah and who is with Zahir Shah. If he is brought back by the Afghan people that will be okay but if he is restored by other countries, especially neighboring countries, then their hands will be in that government and the Afghan people will not like that. It will create problems."4

Burhanuddin Rabbani
The Northern Alliance has been doing much of the "heavy lifting" in dealing with the Taliban since 1997, and after the air war against the Taliban began on October 7, the coalition picked up many new members.5 Northern Alliance commanders, however, are underwhelmed by the effectiveness of the bombing campaign. One commander accused the US of plotting to prevent their advance on Kabul.6 Dissatisfaction with the US persisted even after soldiers from the US Army's 75th Ranger Regiment were parachuted into Afghanistan on the night of October 19-20. The following day, Rabbani complained that "the US and the international community promised us help on many occasions. So far we have not received anything and we hope the help will come soon."

American hesitation about a rapid Northern Alliance victory may be based on concerns about the future. The four main factions in the Northern Alliance are loosely based on four ethnic groups - Uzbek, Tajik, Hazara, and Herati. Los Angeles Times journalist Ahmed Rashid has suggested that, as they seize major cities, these groups could set up separate administrations, much like the patchwork of warlord enclaves that emerged after the collapse of the Communist regime. According to one report, US officials prefer to see the creation of a Pashtun-based provisional government in southern Afghanistan.7

The Northern Alliance should not be counted out, however, because it is a central part of another plan for Afghanistan's future. In this plan, the Northern Alliance would seize Kabul before winter, then President Rabbani would transfer his power to a provisional government.8 UN special envoy for Afghanistan Lakhdar Brahimi would administer the country while serving as the UN's "proconsul" or "viceroy," and there also would be an international security force. Indeed, the Iranian foreign ministry official who handles Afghanistan policy called for a Northern Alliance take-over followed by a transfer of power to the UN.9 The existence of such a plan may explain the recent visits to Tehran by a stream of European officials.

The Northern Alliance and Zahir Shah are not the only interested parties. Former Mujahedin commander Pir Seyyed Ahmad Gailani organized a late October meeting in Peshawar, Pakistan, of 700-1,500 Afghan elders, Mujahedin, and religious leaders. When Gailani addressed this gathering, he claimed that he had met with Zahir Shah and had his support.10 Yet nobody representing Zahir Shah attended the meeting, Zahir Shah's grandson said that the monarch had "not officially sanctioned any meeting," and an important Afghan ally of Zahir Shah said that Gailani was "using the king" to pursue his own ends.11 For that matter, nobody representing the Northern Alliance was in attendance. Some observers consider this to be, in reality, a Pashtun-dominated Southern Alliance.12

This gathering's final statement called for a Loya Jirga and the involvement of the United Nations and the Organization of the Islamic Conference.13 It also called on Zahir Shah to "play an effective role" in putting an end to the crisis. Judging the actual results of such a gathering will not be easy. The former Pakistan foreign secretary said, "I think there may be a reversion to the old tribal structures, but I am not sure . . . Some new forces have emerged."14

Coinciding with this meeting was the infiltration into Afghanistan of former commanders Abdul Haq and Hamid Karzai. They were to persuade local Pashtuns to abandon the Taliban and start a rebellion, thereby creating a southern front. But this effort fell apart when the Taliban captured and executed Abdul Haq and some of his companions.

Afghan refugees in many countries have organized politically. Afghan intellectual and writer Latif Pedram described one of the newest such groupings in an October 13 interview with Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty's Persian Service, saying that it would promote a secular government but would not be part of the Northern Alliance. Pedram claimed that representatives of this group had met with Zahir Shah in Rome. There are other political groups in Peshawar, traditional tribal groups, and even a Writers Union of Free Afghanistan (WUFA). The Tehran-based former Afghan prime minister, Gulbudin Hekmatyar, who now leads the Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan, also hopes to have a part in Afghanistan's future government. Hekmatyar has a limited following, however, and appears to be little more than a political opportunist.15

The forthcoming elimination of the Taliban and the prospect of a new government in Kabul suggest a bright tomorrow for Afghanistan. Yet the current war-time situation in southwest Asia is very dynamic. There are rapidly changing and fluid alliances between regional actors, and they and extra-regional actors must operate with an eye on each other and an even closer eye on their domestic constituencies and interests. Making long-term predictions in such an active environment can be difficult. What an analytical snapshot of the situation in late October does show is that all these different influences and pressures could seriously delay the arrival of that bright day, when the Afghan people have a "responsible government."

Notes

  1 The Northern Alliance is made up of 13 organizations, according to the Central Intelligence Agency's World Factbook 2001. These include the Harakat-i-Islami Afghanistan (Islamic Movement of Afghanistan), Hizb-i-Islami (Islamic Party), Hizb-i Wahdat-i Islami (Islamic Unity Party), Jamaat-i-Islami Afghanistan (Islamic Afghan Society), Jumbish-i-Milli (National Front), and Mahaz-i-Milli-i-Islami (National Islamic Front). After the Taliban took control of most of Afghanistan in September 1996, Tehran announced that the Hizb-i Wahdat-i Islami-yi was reunited and under the leadership of President Rabbani.
  2 Washington Post, 23 October 2001.
  3 Reuters, 24 October 2001.
  4 Askold Krushelnycky, " Former King, Northern Alliance Agree on Council," RFE/RL Weekday Magazine, 2 October 2001.
  5 Department of Defense specialists said during a 12 October briefing that forces that used to be under the command of Ahmad Shah Masood number around 15,000, the Hizb-i Wahdat has from 5,000-15,000 troops, and Ismail Khan has between several hundred and several thousand troops. Moreover, there have been many defectors from the Taliban armed forces since the air war began on 7 October.
  6 Daily Telegraph, 18 October 2001.
  7 See Alan Cullison and Robert S. Greenberger, "Airstrikes Are Criticized by Northern Alliance, As U.S. Looks for Broader Post-Taliban Plans," Wall Street Journal, 15 October 2001.
  8 Le Figaro, 25 October 2001.
  9 Siavash Yaghubi, cited by The Economist, 25 October 2001.
  10 New York Times, 25 October 2001.
  11 Mustapha Zahir, the king's grandson, and Gul Agha Shirazi, a supporter of the king, quoted in Washington Post, 25 October 2001.
  12 Reuters, 25 October 2001.
  13 The News (Islamabad), 26 October 2001.
  14 Financial Times, 25 October 2001.
  15 The prospect of Hekmatyar having any role in Afghanistan's future is alarming. During the war against the Soviets in the 1980s, he formed relationships with Osama bin Laden and Sheikh Omar Abdul Rahman, the Egyptian cleric who was imprisoned in 1995 for his part in a conspiracy to destroy several New York City landmarks. See May Anne Weaver, "Blowback," The Atlantic Monthly, May 1996.


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