In the aftermath of Israel's air strike against a Syrian radar station in Lebanon last month (see "Sharon Ends Moratorium on Striking Syrian Forces in Lebanon" in the April issue of MEIB), Syrian officials repeatedly declared that Israel was attempting to "change the rules of the game."¹ By retaliating directly against Syria, Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon had sent a clear signal to Damascus that it would no longer be spared the costs of sponsoring paramilitary attacks against Israel.

During the course of the following month, however, Syria attempted to smuggle a shipment of Katyusha rockets and other heavy weaponry into the Palestinian self-rule areas, approved another Hezbollah attack on Israeli forces and most probably was responsible for the bombing of a restaurant in the Golan Heights frequented by Israeli soldiers. After all three of these provocations went unanswered, Syrian Defense Minister Mustafa Tlass confidently declared that "the enemy realizes perfectly that any attack against us will be confronted with a forceful and costly retaliation."

Of course, the consequences of Syrian overconfidence on stability in the region are well-known. Overconfidence leads to miscalculations, and miscalculations lead to war. Moreover, Israel's failure to respond may strengthen the position of Syria's hardline security chiefs.

The PFLP-GC Weapons Shipment

On May 7, an Israeli Defense Force (IDF) spokesperson announced that naval vessels on a routine patrol detected a medium-sized ship "sailing suspiciously" off the Israeli coast and captured it after detecting the presence of weapons on board. The contents of the Santorini were revealed to include the following:

20 RPG-7 launchers
9 Sights for RPG-7
100 PG-7 rockets
50 OG-7 rockets
150 Propellant for RPG-7
120 Anti-tank grenades RKG
4 SA-7 Strella anti-aircraft missiles
2 60mm mortar
98 60mm mortar bomb
50 107mm Katyusha rockets
62 TMA-5 mines
8 TMA-3 mines
24 Various hand grenades
30 Hungarian Kalashnikov assault rifles
116 Magazines for Kalashnikovs
Around 13,000 7.62mm rounds for Kalashnikovs²

In a press briefing later that day, Israeli Admiral Yedidia Ya'ari said that the source of the arms shipment was the Damascus-based Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC) and that the Lebanese-registered ship had departed from northern Lebanon, which is heavily occupied by the Syrian military. The Israeli daily Ha'aretz reported that crew members on board the Santorini said under interrogation that they had successfully delivered two previous shipments of arms to the Gaza strip (a third attempt was aborted).³ PFLP-GC Secretary-General Ahmed Jibril later acknowledged responsibility for the operation and said that his group had managed to smuggle similar shipments of arms to Gaza on three previous occasions.⁴

However, there is no evidence that previous shipments of rockets and missiles have been delivered. Palestinian militants have not employed anti-aircraft missiles or Katyusha rockets against Israeli forces.

Israeli officials have said that the crew members did not know who the intended recipients were - they had been instructed to rendezvous with an Egyptian fishing boat. According to the plan, the Egyptian vessel would transfer the weapons to a Palestinian fishing boat, which would deliver the weapons to Gaza. It has been speculated that the Palestinian Authority (PA) was involved to some extent at least - the PA recently requested that the Israelis expand the stretch of water in which Palestinian boats are permitted to fish.

Strangely, Israeli officials explicitly avoided the issue of Syrian responsibility for the shipment. A commentator in the Lebanese Daily Star expressed astonishment at this conspicuous omission:

A weapons shipment that leaves northern Lebanon and is organized by Ahmad Jibril's Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command must, somewhere, have Syria's fingerprints on it. Yet Sharon avoided playing up possible Syrian involvement, even though one can speculate that the shipment was Bashar Assad's response to the bombing of a Syrian radar station three weeks ago.⁵

Bombing in the Golan

On May 14, a bomb exploded at a restaurant frequented by Israeli soldiers in the Druze village of Masadeh in the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights. According to Israeli investigators, the explosives were hidden in vegetable crates left outside the building by three Arabs, who told the owner of the restaurant that the boxes would be collected later in the day. At about 4:00 PM, the explosives were detonated via a cell phone. Although the building was damaged, no one was injured as there were no customers in the restaurant.

Syrian officials conspicuously did not deny responsibility for the blast. Asked whether the explosion was a prelude to more attacks in the Golan, Syrian Foreign Minister Farouq al-Shara'a said: "I can't say it's the beginning or the end, but the rules of the game are not for Israel to impose."⁶

The Renewal of Hezbollah Attacks

On the same day as the Golan Heights bombing, Syria authorized Hezbollah to launch another attack against Israeli forces after a month-long hiatus. Hezbollah guerrillas fired two anti-tank missiles at an Israeli army outpost in the Shebaa Farms area. Whether the attack was timed to influence the UN Security Council's meeting on May 16 to discuss south Lebanon, or to commemorate Israel's independence day remains unclear. Immediately afterwards, Israeli forces fired several shells at the source of the attack, just east of the Lebanese village of Kfar Shouba, resulting in no casualties.

On May 16, the Israeli aircraft flew deep into Lebanon, breaking the sound barrier over Marjayoun, Tyre, Sidon, and Beirut, shaking windows and trailing white plumes of smoke across the skies. Meanwhile, Israeli Defense Minister Benyamin Ben-Eliezer threatened to retaliate against Syrian targets. "I am not going to open fire at Hezbollah, who shoots and then hides behind women and children, and I will not shoot at civilian targets in Lebanon," said Ben Eliezer. "I will hit at the one responsible for everything that happens in Lebanon," he added, alluding to Syria's occupation of the country.⁷

Assad was clearly shaken by the Israeli warning. Within hours, he cut short a summit meeting with Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak at the Red Sea resort of Sharm El Shiekh and rushed back to Damascus (the official explanation suggested that Mubarak and Assad were so fully in agreement on all relevant issues that they finished ahead of schedule). Upon his return, Assad dispatched Foreign Minister Farouq al-Shara'a to Lebanon to deliver a message to President Emile Lahoud.

This was rather odd. Shara'a had not once stepped foot in Lebanon since Assad assumed power in Damascus last June (Syrian foreign ministers rarely travel to Lebanon, since this might be seen as legitimizing Lebanese sovereignty; Syria has refused to open an embassy in Beirut for the same reason). One informed Lebanese source speculated that Assad was reluctant to pass this urgent message through the regular channel - Maj. Gen. Ghazi Kanaan, the commander of Syrian military intelligence in Lebanon.

It is plausible that Kanaan authorized the Hezbollah attack without Assad's approval. This would suggest that Syrian intelligence in Lebanon, which operates with considerable autonomy from the central government in Damascus, may have overruled a decision by Assad to halt armed activity against Israel. If so, Israel's failure to back up its threats of retaliation may have vindicated Syrian hardliners who advocate confrontation with Israel, while weakening Assad's already shaky authority over the security establishment. When the expected Israeli retaliation failed to materialize, an unnamed Syrian official told Al-Hayat that the Hezbollah attack had been a "test" of whether the old rules of the game (under which Syrian forces are exempt from Israeli retaliation) still applied.⁸

Notes

  ¹ Al-Wasat (London), 30 April 2001.
  ² IDF Press Release, 7 May 2001.
  ³ Ha'aretz (Tel Aviv), 9 May 2001.
  ⁴ Al-Hayat (London), 10 May 2001.
  ⁵ The Daily Star (Beirut), 12 May 2001.
  ⁶ The Daily Star (Beirut), 19 May 2001.
  ⁷ Ha'aretz (Tel Aviv), 17 May 2001.
  ⁸ Al-Hayat (London), 17 May 2001.