Middle East Intelligence Bulletin
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  Vol. 3   No. 3 Table of Contents
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March 2001 


Who Can Control the West Bank?
by Pinhas Inbari

Pinhas Inbari is a veteran journalist and researcher covering Palestinian and Middle Eastern affairs. He is the author of several books, including The Palestinians between Terrorism and Statehood ( Sussex Academic press, Brighton, UK, 1996). He is the general director of The Arnold Neustadter Institute for Peace Implementation in Modi'in, Israel.

Marwan Barghouti
Marwan Barghouti
The Al-Aqsa Intifada which erupted last year has seriously shaken Yasser Arafat's Palestinian Authority (PA) from top to bottom. The rule of the "Tunisians" - members of the Tunis-based PLO leadership who accompanied Arafat's return to the occupied territories in 1994 - is collapsing, perhaps irrevocably. When they arrived on the scene seven years ago, Arafat's loyalists tried to depose the young cadres who led grassroots opposition to Israel during the 1987-1993 Intifada and inherit their leadership of the Palestinian national struggle. But the new Intifada has turned the tables once again.

In the aftermath of Ariel Sharon's election as prime minister, some have speculated that the next Israeli government may return to the old Palestinian policy of the Likud - rejecting the PLO and reestablishing contacts with an indigenous "alternative leadership" in the territories. Attention has focused on two West Bank leaders: Marwan Barghouti, the leader of the "Tanzim", and Jibril Rajoub, the commander of the PA's Preventive Security apparatus, most of whose personnel are also members of the Tanzim.

What is the "Tanzim"?

The word Tanzim means "organization" and is the first half of the formal name of Fatah - Tanzim Fatah. The use of this term in isolation is relatively new, beginning shortly after the creation of the PA, when Arafat began making a distinction between "peaceful" Fatah activities and the military face of the organization which he prepared for clashing with the Israelis at a later stage.

The Tanzim is not the military wing of Fatah, per say, but rather a term of reference. Whereas the militant Islamist Hamas movement maintains a clear organizational separation between its political and military wings, no such distinction is made in Fatah, which lacks a coherent organizational structure. Hence, Tanzim activists have been variously described as cadres of Fatah or "Shabiba" (the youth movement of Fatah), according to the needs of a specific period or circumstances.

The mobilization of armed activities by Fatah outside of, or in addition to, the formal security apparatus of the PA has been undertaken by a variety of different factions that can be loosely referred to as the Tanzim. While the most well-known of such groups is centered around Barghouti in Ramallah, his leadership has been challenged by other Tanzim factions elsewhere in the West Bank (see below).

Marwan Barghouti

Barghouti, 41, began his career as a student leader at Birzeit University, north of Ramallah. He was imprisoned by the Israelis for seven years and then deported to Tunis on the eve of the Intifada in 1987. To his deep disappointment, however, Barghouti was not permitted by Arafat to play a significant role in conducting the Intifada from Tunis. In line with his attempts to wrest control of the Intifada from local activists, the PLO leader preferred to give this responsibility to Abbas Zaki, a veteran Fatah leader then operating out of Amman.

After his return to Ramallah in 1994, Barghouti established the Supreme Committee of the Fatah Movement [Al-Lajnah al-Fathawiyya al-Harakiyya al-Ulya fi al-Daffa al-Gharbiyya] to promote Palestinian civil society, encourage the private sector and transform Fatah into a political party with a leadership elected by its members. Ironically, Barghouti himself opposed the use of the term "Tanzim" during this period precisely because his emphasis was on establishing a peaceful grassroots movement.

In the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC), Barghouti was among those who led the campaign against PA corruption, but he was careful - like most members of the PLC - to exclude Arafat himself. This campaign strained relations between the "Tunisians" and the local leadership to the point that a closure of the Palestinians first elected parliament seemed a real possibility.

This line put him in a direct clash with Arafat and his Tunis-based loyalists, such as Sakhar Habash, who was appointed the supreme leader of Fatah in the PA in early 1997. Arafat, who suspected that efforts by local leaders to promote Palestinian civil society were motivated by an intent to achieve peace with Israel at the expense of Palestinians in the Diaspora, often told Barghouti that "there will be no civil Fatah until the establishment of Palestinian state."

Barghouti's efforts to transform Fatah into an independent political party also clashed with the aspirations of another prominent Fatah leader, Jibril Rajoub, who strove to enlist young Fatah activists into his newly-born Preventive Security service. While Barghouti wanted the young Intifada cadres to become civil society activists, Rajoub wanted to totally militarize them.

The dispute did not find expression in verbal debates only - Rajoub tried to disturb meetings of Barghouti's Supreme Committee of Fatah Movement, demanding that his military personnel be regarded as eligible candidates for Fatah regional elections. "We are all Fatah, including the Preventive Security," Rajoub often insisted. Gatherings that were intended to promote the civil society agenda were frequently attended by Rajoub's men.

Barghouti and Rajoub Join Forces against the Tunisians

Rajoub succeeded in foiling Barghouti's program, but by the end of 1996 he began to realize that both of them faced a common adversary - the "Tunisian Fatah". Over the last few years, an informal alliance has emerged between Rajoub and Barghouti, who know each other well and once shared the same prison cell in Beer Sheva. Barghouti backed down from his promotion of civil society, while Rajoub stopped harassing Barghouti's followers. Fatah cadres in the West Bank were no longer forced to choose loyalties and came to be regarded as loyal to both Barghouti and Rajoub.

Jibril Rajoub
Jibril Rajoub
The "Tunisians" reacted to this development in two main spearheads. On the political level, they established a shadow Fatah structure led from Gaza by Habash. On the military level, they established competing, overlapping security organs to neutralize Rajoub's Preventive Security, most notably the General Intelligence apparatus, led by Amin al-Hindi and his deputy in the West Bank, Tawfiq Tirawi.

The first open clash between Rajoub and Arafat occurred in late September 1996. Rajoub, uninvited, entered a meeting of the security branches at the office of Gen. Hajj Ismail, the commander of the Palestinian forces in the West Bank, in Jericho and told the attendees: "You are all corrupt and Arafat's suckers." Tirawi and Ismail reported this to Arafat and a decision was made to oust Rajoub. In early October, Arafat ordered a senior member in Barghouti's Supreme Committee, Hussein al-Sheikh, to go from Ramallah to Jericho to replace Rajoub. Rajoub made it clear to Sheikh that he could come to Jericho only as corpse. Sheikh wisely backed down, telling Arafat that an "Israeli checkpoint" prevented him from going to Jericho to replace Rajoub.

The tensions between them reached a serious junction in August 1998, when Tirawi's people came near a gathering of Rajoub's people in Jenin and were shot at. Around the same time, Rajoub's men forcibly dispersed a gathering organized by Hakam Bal'awi, a prominent "Tunisian" boss, in Tul Karem. Because of those occurrences, Habash demanded that the Central Committee of Fatah depose Rajoub, who came to the meeting to tell Habash: "you do not deserve my shoes' laces." Once again, the Arafat's men backed down from the confrontation.

After this event, Rajoub did not challenge Arafat in the open, but began securing for himself an independent power base. Towards this end, he developed special relations with the CIA, from which he obtained independent resources to finance his security apparatus. Hindi, who previously oversaw PLO-CIA relations during the 1980's, has naturally opposed this effort. Tirawi's wrestle with Rajoub is in many ways about who is leading the contacts with the CIA.

Meanwhile, Musa Arafat, a cousin of the PA chairman and commander of Military Intelligence, took it upon himself to deter Barghouti. On three separate occasions, Musa Arafat's people have opened fire on Barghouti. In the last incident, during a demonstration in Ramallah to protest the Wye River agreement in October 1998, a bullet aimed at Barghouti killed a Tanzim activist, Wissam Tarifi, the son of Jamil Tarifi, the PA minister for civil affairs. On another occasion, Barghouti was seriously beaten up by Arafat's people in Ramallah.

As mentioned above, one of first actions Arafat took immediately after he entered the PA territories was to subordinate Barghouti to Habash, who was appointed head of the Fatah movement both in Gaza and the West Bank. Barghouti did not accept it, but all Fatah budgets were transferred to Habash. In the West Bank, another "Tunisian" boss, Hakam Bal'awi, was nominated above Barghouti - but to no avail. None of the local cadres paid attention to Bal'awi.

On the eve of the eruption of the Al-Aqsa Intifada, Arafat orchestrated the "election" of Sheikh as the leader of the Tanzim in the West Bank instead of Barghouti. Interestingly, upon his election, Sheikh challenged Barghouti from Tirawi's office. Barghouti did not resign, however, and his supporters rejected this distortion of internal procedures, declaring that "as always the grassroots (not Arafat) will determine the leadership."1 There are now two Tanzim leaders in the West Bank claiming to head the Supreme Committee. Nevertheless, Barghouti is the recognized leader, defying Arafat's choice.

Barghouti - from Reformist to Militia Leader

On February 4, 1998, during the difficult negotiations between the PA and the Israeli administration of Benjamin Netanyahu on the redeployment of IDF forces in the West Bank, Barghouti met with a delegation of American Jewish rabbis in his Fatah office in al-Birah. "We have no motivation to go out for new Intifada," he said. "We already paid the price for the former one. There is only one matter that can take us again out to the streets - the continuation of constructing settlements. We can accept the current situation for 100 years, even without another further redeployment, but will not accept new settlements. We support the separation from Israel, but we are interested in keeping good relations with the Israelis."

He was proud of his many friends in Israel, and disclosed that he conducted meetings with Likud Youth also. He characterized his relations with the PA as the following: supporting its political demands from Israel while campaigning for internal reforms, institution building and fighting corruption. The last issue was very important to him to the point of putting forward a no-confidence motion against the PA in the PLC. He complained that the political tension due to the difficulties between Netanyahu and Arafat were hindering the internal reforms so much needed for the Palestinians.

Tanzim
Tanzim fighters leading a funeral procession in Ramallah last October [AP]
Barghouti has now completely abandoned this view. He is fighting the Israelis, killing civilians and challenging the way the PA is conducting the negotiations with Israel. His civil agenda has been forgotten and he has is recognized now not as leader of the Fatah "movement", but rather of the "Tanzim" - that is to say he has endorsed Arafat's terminology. When the al-Aqsa Intifada erupted, Barghouti went so far as to call his network of cadres a "militia", a term that is more reminiscent of the PLO's historical experience of exile in Lebanon than of his own background inside the territories.

What happened? First, Barghouti recognized that the time was not ripe for domestic political reforms. Second, he recognized the limits of his real power. Although his image as leader of the Tanzim is entrenched in foreign media reports, he is well aware of the fact that this does not reflect the reality on the ground. He is not strong enough to create real changes and reforms.

As Tanzim leader in Ramallah, Barghouti has been on the front lines of the violent clashes with Israeli forces and has been linked to the deaths of Israeli civilians. By doing this, he has added his name to Israel's list of wanted terrorists, effectively disqualifying himself from participating in future negotiations.

On the economic level, Barghouti organized the boycott of Israeli products sold in the West Bank. This has met with harsh Israeli retaliation - halting the transfer of taxes collected from Palestinian laborers in Israel and customs duties collected from goods passing to the PA-ruled areas through Israeli ports. This, together with the repeated border closures, have caused the most severe financial crisis faced by the PA since its founding. Furthermore, the images of the brutal confiscation of goods from the stores by gunmen to burn them in public was another reason for the private sector to draw away from investing in the militarized economy of the PA.

Does Barghouti Control the West Bank?

Barghouti is by far the most famous Tanzim leader known to the West. He is charismatic, and makes full use of the fact that the international TV studio is located in Ramallah. But is he really in control of the West Bank? Apparently not. There are several Tanzim groups and Barghouti is in control of the Ramallah-based one, but even in Ramallah not all local militias recognize his authority.

A more violent faction of Tanzim, loyal to Arafat, operates in the Am'ari refugee camp, south of Ramallah. Strangely, members of the Am'ari Tanzim have not participated in recent clashes with the IDF, largely because they do not recognize Barghouti's leadership. The Am'ari Tanzim was responsible for shooting at the home of Jamil Tarifi, whose son was killed by Musa Arafat forces, to deter him from pursuing revenge.

In Nablus, there is a totally different set of alliances in which Barghouti has little influence. Immediately after his return to the West Bank, Barghouti and his Ramallah supporters tried to convene a gathering in Nablus, but were stoned by angry members of the local Tanzim. Barghouti has not been back to Nablus since.

In the southern town of Hebron, Barghouti has no authority at all. Most Fatah cadres in Hebron are loyal to Abbas Zaki. Even Barghouti's main ally in Hebron, Jamal Shobaki, has not been willing to risk alienating Zaki.

In Jerusalem, a prominent Fatah leader, Hatem abd al-Qader, indirectly challenged Barghouti's positions in a recent interview. "We and the Israelis are destined to live together in the same piece of land. Hence, peace is inevitable," said Abd al-Qader, the head of the Jerusalem delegation in the PLC and a member of the Fatah Supreme Committee. He objected to the use of military forces against Israel and called for a return to the peaceful methods conducted during the original Intifada. "We cannot bit the Israelis militarily, what we need is to regain world sympathy to our cause."2

Conclusion

It is clear that the Al-Aqsa Intifada has created a political vacuum in the West Bank. The collapse of the PA's authority has been counteracted by a variety of Tanzim factions and other local groups, but a serious contender for central control of the area has not yet emerged. Can Rajoub fill this vacuum?

Immediately after Sharon's victory in the Israeli elections, a report was published that Rajoub, during talks in Washington, asked the US to facilitate a contact between himself and the new prime minister-elect.3 Rajoub was somewhat late to deny the report. Unlike Barghouti, Rajoub was very careful not to cross red lines with Israel, and his Preventive Security is far better rooted, maintaining a presence in most sensitive locations in the West Bank. Rajoub also has his own financial resources and is considered more reliable by the US. Moreover, many of Barghouti's cadres have overlapping loyalties to Rajoub's support network.

Rajoub does not speak much to the media, but in a December 1998 interview he expressed several positions that do not conform to the PA's policy. He was against the deployment of international forces in the West Bank, insisting that the conflict is "a bilateral problem between us and Israel," and opposed the unilateral declaration of Palestinian state. "Most of the Israelis support a Palestinian state, why distance them?"4

Moreover, whereas Barghouti has, in the eyes of the Israeli public, stained his hands with Israeli blood, Rajoub has not been linked to any attacks on Israelis and his good relations with Israel remain largely intact.

While Rajoub must strengthen his position vis à vis Arafat's people, as well as with Hamas, it is becoming more and more evident that if there is anyone capable of overcoming the state of anarchy and lawlessness in the West Bank, it is Rajoub. When this day comes, he will likely find Barghouti lining up in support of him, not vice versa.

Notes

  1 Israeli journalist Arnon Regular described in detail how Arafat managed to cause Barghouti's replacement with al-Sheikh. See Kol Hair (Jerusalem), 8 September 2000.
  2 Kyodo News, 22 February 2001.
  3 Al-Quds (East Jerusalem), 1 March 2001.
  4 Kyodo News, 24 December 1998.


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