George Tenet

Amid the resumption of high-level peace talks between Israel and the Palestinians earlier this month, the role of the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in assessing and mediating security matters between Israel and the Palestinian Authority (PA) is considered more integral than ever to the future of the peace process. While having the CIA as a neutral arbiter to enforce these agreements may in the end make good policy, CIA Director George Tenet's increasingly public role has opened him and his agency to harsh criticism within intelligence and political circles in Washington.

The CIA has a long history of involvement with both Israel and the PLO. The agency's ties with the Israeli Mossad date as far back as 1951. Both agencies began monitoring the PLO in 1964 and worked clandestinely to recruit Palestinian agents to spy for their respective causes. The CIA's connection with Yasser Arafat and the PLO dates back to the early 1970's, when Arafat used the CIA as a diplomatic back channel, knowing it had been blessed by the White House. The first sustained secret contacts between the CIA and PLO were established in Morocco in 1976 and later developed by Richard Ames, an advocate of Arab causes within the CIA. Moreover, the CIA was instrumental in protecting moderate PLO figures, including Yasser Arafat, and helped broker a deal in the early 1980�s that enabled the PLO to evacuate Lebanon for Tunis. While CIA contacts were downgraded in the 1980�s, following terrorist strikes during the Reagan and Bush administrations, they were revived and expanded by the Clinton administration shortly after the Israelis and Palestinians signed the Oslo Accords in 1993.

The CIA established an officer in Tel Aviv to facilitate security cooperation between the two sides. This rather unusual mission was expanded and formalized during peace negotiations in 1998 at the Wye Plantation in Maryland at the behest of US national security advisor Sandy Berger and Dennis Ross, the senior American negotiator in the Middle East. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu welcomed a formalized CIA role because he distrusted the Palestinian security services. Arafat embraced the idea as well, not only because of his mistrust of the Israelis, but also due to his general inclination to welcome third party involvement in the peace process. The October 1998 Wye memorandum, which required Israel to exchange territory for tougher action by the PA to prevent terror strikes against Israelis, outlined a central role for the agency (without mentioning it by name) in monitoring both sides' compliance with the agreement.

Over the last two years, agents under the command of the Tel Aviv CIA station chief have actively monitored Arafat's security efforts, overseen Israeli and Palestinian troop deployments, verified reductions in the size of the Palestinian police force, kept track of Palestinian efforts to arrest suspected terrorists, and sought to ensure that alleged terrorists aren't hired as security officers. The agency has also been officially charged with monitoring Israeli efforts to control provocative settlers in the West Bank and Gaza and preventing acts of terrorism, crime and hostilities directed against Palestinians. In addition, CIA officials stationed in Tel Aviv meet regularly with Israeli and PA representatives to resolve disputes, help manage border checkpoints, and review other security matters.

These tasks have involved close CIA coordination with Palestinian General Intelligence (Mukhabbarat al-Amma) and the Preventive Security Service (PSS), and with various Israeli intelligence departments (Mossad, Shin Bet, Aman). Until recently, formal biweekly meetings were held to review steps taken by the PA to eliminate terrorist cells and support structures that plan, finance, and supply terrorist groups.

Despite the strong political, economic and emotional ties between the US and Israel, the CIA has gained considerable trust on the Palestinian side, due to the relatively close personal friendship between Tenet and Arafat and American efforts to strengthen PLO intelligence in key areas, such as infiltrating terrorist groups, clandestine communication, interrogation methods, computer technology and intelligence processing. PA officials also see the CIA as an asset, both in dealing with the Israelis and in maintaining control over their own population (leaders of the militant Islamist group Hamas often complain of being "up against the world's largest intelligence organization"). In addition to teaching their Palestinian counterparts sophisticated intelligence-gathering techniques, the CIA has also provided financing of Palestinian intelligence headquarters in Jericho and Ramallah. The CIA's relationship with Arafat's security services is valued by many Palestinians as a tacit recognition of Palestinian sovereignty.

The CIA's role in the Middle East involves not only training PA forces, it also includes monitoring interrogations (not participating in them) and sharing intelligence on Islamist groups. Palestinian human rights advocates have objected to the CIA's involvement, complaining that the agency is tacitly supporting the PA's use of torture, prolonged detention without trial and other human rights abuses. So far, there is no evidence of CIA participation in any interrogation.

Is the CIA's Mission at Stake?

The CIA's overt middle-man approach has brought criticism from some US intelligence experts, who say that its public involvement "muddies the water," placing CIA's mission at odds with the traditional role of covert intelligence gathering. There is the potential that accurate data and information may be suppressed to bolster policy at the risk of the CIA's mission, which is to gather, assess and analyze information and present it in a non-biased manner. Political considerations could interfere with its core purpose of gathering and analyzing intelligence and providing information to US policy makers.

The CIA's balancing act contributes to America's ability to deal with the Israelis and Palestinians at an even keel, a role that Tel Aviv Station Chief Jeff O'Connor must follow if peace is to be attained and US credibility maintained. The CIA is not making policy but merely carrying it out. Its operatives act as liaisons, performing fact-finding missions, then passing important security information along to both sides. This is consistent with its history of fighting terrorism and helping allies in the region to live peacefully together. The CIA's role in peace process is a sound tool of foreign policy.

Conclusion

Does facilitating security cooperation between Israel and the PA make sense in the wake of over two months of violent confrontations between the two sides? Since the CIA has earned a high degree of credibility and a record of neutrality between Palestinians and Israelis over the years and can provide critical information to both sides in an atmosphere of trust and assurance, it's role is as important as ever. The CIA's involvement is needed as future negotiating parties discuss how peace agreements will be structured and enforced. Its presence will certainly not go away, while its neutrality will be counted on by both parties who feel that disputes would be presented to and decisions rendered fairly by an unbiased arbiter who can act as open intermediary.

While the Clinton administration days are waning and Tenet's days at the CIA may be numbered, the CIA can continue to help the two sides communicate and improve their prospects for peace. As The Clinton administration eased itself into the history books amid a fresh round of talks between Israeli and Palestinian security officials, Tenet was again at the forefront of security discussions.