Middle East Intelligence Bulletin
Jointly published by the United States Committee for a Free Lebanon and the Middle East Forum
  Vol. 2   No. 11 Table of Contents
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December 2000 


The Weakening of Syrian Political Patronage in Lebanon
by Gary C. Gambill

The rapid growth of Lebanese public disaffection toward the Syrian occupation and political infighting in Damascus appear to be steadily eroding the Assad regime's iron clad network of political patronage in Lebanon. Several years ago, one prominent pro-Syrian minister declared that he would lie down in front of Syrian tanks, if need be, to prevent a withdrawal. Today, few of the Syrian regime's political proteges in Lebanon would make such a claim.

Public expressions of dissent against the Syrian occupation have multiplied in the last nine months due to the combined impact of the failure of the Syrian-Israeli peace process, the withdrawal of Israeli forces from south Lebanon and the death of the late Syrian dictator Hafez Assad. On September 20, the intense public debate over the issue conducted by newspaper columnists, academics and human rights activists entered the political mainstream with an explicit call by the Council of Maronite Archbishops for a Syrian withdrawal. Since then, political elites of all sectarian, ideological and familial affiliations have vied amongst themselves to capitalize on public antipathy toward the occupation.

Syrian-backed members of the political establishment have been faced with an acute dilemma: how to survive politically in the aftermath of a Syrian military withdrawal that many consider to be inevitable (if not imminent) in the years ahead. Three core strategies have emerged, illustrated by the different stands taken by Druze MP Walid Jumblatt, Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri, and President Emile Lahoud.

Jumblatt Crosses the Point of No Return

Walid Jumblatt
Walid Jumblatt
Druze leader Walid Jumblatt, a consummate political opportunist, has reacted to the new political climate in Lebanon by gradually disassociating himself from Damascus, while forging new political alliances with Christian opposition leaders and bolstering his popularity among the population as a whole. In the event that Syria disengages from Lebanon, Jumblatt will be well-poised to maintain a significant degree of political influence.

The Druze leader began calling for a "correction" of Syrian-Lebanese ties and condemning Syrian interference in the political process during the runup to the August-September parliamentary elections. Meanwhile, he negotiated electoral alliances with the Christian Kata'ib Party and National Bloc and agreed to a "political charter" with former president Amin Gemayel, who returned to Lebanon in late July. The gamble paid off--Jumblatt and his allies scored a landslide victory in the Shouf and Alay districts of Mount Lebanon. Jumblatt increased his political influence considerably, obtaining cabinet positions for three of his allies.

Syrian officials apparently expected Jumblatt to return to the fold after the elections. They were wrong. Empowered by the popular mandate he achieved at the ballot box, Jumblatt has decided that observing Syrian "red lines" is a political liability.

Early last month, when Christian MP's began criticizing the Syrian occupation in a televised parliamentary debate over confirmation of the new government headed by Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri, Jumblatt cautiously reiterated his objections to Syrian interference in Lebanese affairs. "I do understand the importance of stationing some Syrian troops (in Lebanon) for strategic purposes and the requirements of Syrian national security in the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict," Jumblatt told the parliament, "but I do hope the Syrian leadership will review some of the points which have nothing to do with strategic requirements." He criticized as "vague" Hariri's claim that the Syrian occupation as "necessary, legitimate and temporary", adding that "if the presence is necessary, let us decide its timetable."1

Jumblatt's relatively muted criticism of the Syrian occupation was immediately condemned by one of the Assad regime's closest collaborators in Lebanon. "You have exceeded all limits," MP Assem Qanso, a member of the Lebanese branch of Syria's ruling Ba'ath party, told Jumblatt when he subsequently addressed the parliament. "The Israeli war is coming," said Qanso, adding that "uncovered and covered [Israeli] agents . . . will not be protected from the rifles of the resistance fighters by any red lines or by seeking refuge in embassies," a remark widely interpreted as an assassination threat in the local press. "We tell Walid Junblatt the Israeli war is at our door. Does he want to meet his ally [former Israeli prime minister] Shimon Peres?"2

The reaction from official quarters in Damascus was extremely hostile. Syrian officials told the press that Jumblatt and other members of his Progressive Socialist Party (PSP) were "no longer welcome at an official level" in Damascus. Meanwhile, Jumblatt's main political rival in the Druze community, Talal Arslan, embarked on a highly-publicized trip to meet Assad.

Interestingly, Damascus ignored the stream of much harsher condemnations of the Syrian presence from Christian MP's such as Albert Mukhaiber, Boutros Harb and Pierre Gemayel. Muslim dissent is much less tolerated by the Syrians because it contradicts their propaganda. According to the official narrative carefully crafted by Syrian officials and parroted by their Lebanese counterparts, opposition to the Syrian occupation has always been centered around right-wing Christian extremists (promoted, of course, by Israel).

In reaction to the Syrian threats, Jumblatt announced that he was canceling two public debates due to the climate of "political and intellectual terrorism that is being established in the country" and warned of " the danger of confiscating the modicum of freedoms left and of the consequences of responding to political statements with the language of threats and to the force of opinion with the logic of force."3 Typically, Jumblatt chose to hedge his bets behind the scenes. Aides of the Druze leader attempted to control the damage by stressing to the media that the Druze chieftain had not called for the withdrawal of Syrian forces from Lebanon, per say, but for their redeployment as stipulated by the Taif Accord that ended the 1975-1990 civil war. They also emphasized the many "sacrifices" that Jumblatt made on behalf of Damascus over the years.

It appears that the relationship between Damascus and Jumblatt has hit the rocks for the foreseeable future. According to one report, Hariri tried to mediate between the two, asking Assad to permit Jumblatt to visit Damascus and explain his position, but the Syrian president was "very upset and shocked" with Jumblatt and refused the request.4

However, Jumblatt has gained considerable popular support among the Druze and Christian community. In reaction to the Syrian campaign to discredit Jumblatt, thousands of Druze supporters converged in Mukhtara to show support for him, while the Maronite League warmly praised the Druze leader and pledged to "set aside" the legacy of his expulsion of Lebanese Christians from the Shouf during the civil war. The multi-sectarian Free National Current (FNC) of former prime minister Michel Aoun has also expressed solidarity with Jumblatt, despite the latter's active support for Syria's ouster of Aoun in October 1990.

The Machinations of Nabih Berri

Nabih Berri
Nabih Berri
The second strategy is exemplified by the maneuverings of Lebanese Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri, the leader of the Shi'ite Amal movement, who has distanced himself from calls for a Syrian withdrawal, while attempting to position himself as an interlocutor between Damascus and the traditional Christian political establishment . The political expediency of this strategy (if successful) is twofold: To the Christians, Berri's claim is that he can "deliver" a Syrian withdrawal; to the Syrians, his claim is that he will "deliver" Christian support for a continued "special relationship" with Damascus.

In recent months, Berri conducted a behind-the-scenes dialogue with the Maronite church, an initiative supported by Syrian officials as a way of appeasing the Christian establishment. On November 24, after a meeting with Patriarch Nasrallah Sfeir, Berri stunned the country by declaring that Syrian forces would complete a redeployment to the Beqaa Valley "in the near future" and that Lebanese and Syrian officials would meet soon to "define the areas of deployment." Berri also declared that he would obtain a list of Lebanese detainees held by Syria, a long-standing demand of Lebanese human rights groups, and work to secure their release.5

More surprising, perhaps, than Berri's stunning declarations were the categorical denials quickly issued by Syrian officials in response to the initiative. A senior Syrian official told Al-Sharq al-Awsat that no redeployment was underway and that there were no plans for Lebanese and Syrian officials to even discuss such a redeployment. The official emphasized that anyone in Lebanon "who claims to speak for Syria is speaking [only] for himself" and that Syria is perfectly capable of making its views known directly. The official also disputed Berri's attempt to portray himself as actively working on the file of Lebanese detainees, saying that this was "an issue for the justice ministers of the two countries to discuss."6

At first glance, it appeared that Berri had simply spoken of Syria's impending plans without authorization. However, Berri was reportedly in close contact with Syrian intelligence in the days leading up to his November 24 announcement. According to two different political sources who spoke to MEIB on condition of anonymity, Berri met with Maj. Gen. Ghazi Kanaan, the head of Syrian intelligence in Lebanon, on the day before his announcement, and then again just hours after making the announcement. This suggests that Berri may be conspiring with Kanaan to undermine the relationship between Syrian President Bashar Assad and his Lebanese counterpart (see below).

Emile Lahoud Plays It Safe

Lacking an autonomous power base among fellow Maronite Christians and little support from the population as a whole, Lebanese President Emile Lahoud has adopted a very clear policy of unconditional support for the Syrian occupation. Lahoud has reiterated time and time again that the issue of the Syrian occupation should be discussed only in the context of negotiations between the two governments, reserving for himself the role of sole intermediary between the Syrian regime and Lebanon.

In light of the rising tide of discontent in the country, Lahoud is trying to make sure that any changes in Syrian policy are perceived by the Lebanese public to be the result of official inter-governmental contacts, rather than third party initiatives. Naturally, Lahoud was infuriated by the initiative undertaken by Berri, who attempted to bypass the Lebanese president and claim credit for "delivering" a Syrian redeployment and the release of Lebanese detainees in conjunction with Kanaan, who opposed Assad's appointment of Lahoud as president in 1998.

In order to bolster the Lebanese president's prestige, Assad decided to free around 50 Lebanese detainees this month and allow Lahoud to claim credit for overseeing the negotiations leading to their release (the details of which were still sketchy as MEIB went to press).

Notes

  1 Al-Nahar (Beirut), 7 November 2000.
  2 Al-Nahar (Beirut), 7 November 2000.
  3 Al-Safir (Beirut), 8 November 2000.
  4 Al-Watan al-Arabi, 1 December 2000.
  5 Radio Lebanon (Beirut), 24 November 2000.
  6 Al-Sharq al-Awsat (London), 28 November 2000.


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