An Israeli army vehicle on border patrol last month [Reuters/Karamallah Daher]

On October 7, Hezbollah violated the quiet on the Lebanese-Israeli border by abducting three Israeli soldiers. A week later, Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah announced that his men had kidnapped a senior Israeli reserve officer, promising to continue the struggle against Israel along the border. Israel refrained from retaliating, however, illustrating that it still has no real answer to the challenge posed by Hezbollah despite its unilateral withdrawal from south Lebanon in May.

Israel's Dilemmas

An interesting exchange of letters was published this summer in the literary supplement of the Israeli daily Ha'aretz between Gen. Yitzhak Ben-Yisrael, head of the IDF's Administration for Research and Development of Arms and Technical Infrastructure, and Yigal Cna‘an of Ma‘ale Adumim, an Israeli settlement east of Jerusalem. This exchange of letters focused on Ben Yisrael's book, The Philosophy of Intelligence. What aroused Cna‘an's pique regarding Ben Yisrael's book was what he termed "the academization of the operational strata in Israel, mainly of the army, in an attempt to cover with a plethora of intellectual peacock feathers the collapse of the natural and the Jewish ego." Cna‘an ended his diatribe against Ben Yisrael's book with the following: "Ben Yisrael is one of the those responsible for the development of the Nautilus system, a powerful laser system designed to destroy Katyusha rockets, which will cost millions of dollars, and whose aim is to obstruct some determined Hezbollah kid operating a launcher costing less that 100 dollars. And there, too, only willpower will win, not intellect and not money."¹

Cna‘an's arguments were not devoid of political bias, and must be viewed as part of the Israeli right wing's rhetoric, according to which Israeli policy in recent years, including the hasty withdrawal from south Lebanon, was the result of the collapse of the willpower and resolve of Israeli society, and in its wake that of the country's leadership. Nevertheless, these arguments, as well as the specific contrasts of the Nautilus vs. Katyusha and the Hezbollah teenager vs. the well-trained and well-equipped Israeli soldier, do express some of the dilemmas which Israel was facing when its troops were deployed in the security zone in south Lebanon, and which it is now facing along its border with Lebanon (and, for that matter, in the West Bank and Gaza). One concerns the issue of how a modern, sophisticated army such as the IDF can combat guerrilla organizations, irregular forces and even civilian uprisings - challenges which by their very nature do not allow the regular army to exercise its full capabilities. Another dilemma is whether it is possible to conduct a war (or even a limited military operation) in the absence of broad public consensus. Can a "normal" Western society such as the Israel's afford to engage in a costly, protracted military conflict such as that which took place in south Lebanon? It was the Israeli Deputy CGS General Moshe Ya‘alon who argued that Israel's defeat in south Lebanon had first and foremost been a defeat by public opinion at home and not a military defeat suffered by the IDF.²

Against this background, there is a third acute dilemma: Does Israel have the ability to maintain an effective deterrent against irregular forces operating against it? This deterrent capability collapsed on the Palestinian track during the 1987-1993 Intifada, and finally collapsed on the Lebanese track earlier this year. The answer to this question impacts on another issue which will not be discussed in this paper - Israel's ability to maintain its strategic deterrent capability, i.e. to deter its enemies from the use of weapons of mass destruction or an all-out military offensive.

Israel's difficulty in grappling with these dilemmas is what brought about its defeat in south Lebanon. Now Israel finds itself facing the same difficulties with the Palestinians, and perhaps will continue to face them in south Lebanon now that Hezbollah has resumed activities against it.

The Israeli Withdrawal and its Implications

On 24 May 2000, the IDF completed its withdrawal from south Lebanon, bringing to an end Israel's prolonged involvement in that country - "the Lebanese tragedy" as described by Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak.³ Although the withdrawal was defined by IDF commanders as "an achievement and even an extraordinary success," for many in Israel it aroused feelings of discomfort and defeat.⁴

The Israeli withdrawal from south Lebanon was carried out in the shadow of (and largely as the result of) painful blows suffered at the hands of Hezbollah, and without receiving reciprocal concessions either from Hezbollah or the Lebanese and Syrian governments. In this respect, Hezbollah achieved an unprecedented success - ousting Israeli forces from Arab territory without committing to any strategic or diplomatic concessions. Thus, it is no wonder that Hezbollah was quick to present Israel's unilateral withdrawal as a historic turning point in the Arab-Israeli conflict.⁵

However, Hezbollah's accomplishment seemed in some ways to be a hollow victory. After all, it was the organization's long and successful struggle against Israel that allowed it to preserve its political vitality and dynamism, bolstering its image and standing and within concentric Shi‘ite, Lebanese, Arab, and Islamic political spheres. Even within the international community, Hezbollah achieved much sympathy for its "resistance" to the IDF forces deployed in south Lebanon. However, following the completion of the Israeli withdrawal, the organization began losing some of its luster, and was faced with the day-to-day challenges of political life in Lebanon - drab in comparison with its glorious past.⁶

In response to feelings within the Israeli public that Hezbollah had defeated the IDF, Israeli military commanders tried to present the army as having gained the upper hand prior to the pullout, pointing to their tactical success in warding off Hezbollah offensives against IDF and South Lebanese Army (SLA) positions and the decline in IDF casualties during the last two years. The fact that the SLA, and with it the entire security zone, did not collapse in the course of those years was heralded as evidence of Hezbollah's failure and Israel's success. The magnitude of this victory, according to Israeli commanders, was even more impressive when one considers the operational constraints within which the IDF had to operate - mainly the concerns of Israeli politicians about minimizing Israeli casualties and their long-standing fear that Israel might once again sink into the Lebanese quagmire.⁷ Given these constraints, the "balance of terror" that was created between the IDF and Hezbollah made it almost impossible for the IDF to strike the organization. Since the early 1990s, the IDF has refrained from attacking the organization's leaders and its headquarters, mainly because of the group's painful retaliatory actions against Israeli and Jewish targets outside Israel in reaction to the killing of Hezbollah leader Abas Musawi in March 1992. In the aftermath of Operation Accountability in 1993 and Operation Grapes of Wrath in 1996, the IDF increasingly refrained from attacking infrastructural and civilian targets in Lebanon in order to avoid harming Lebanese bystanders (as had happened at Qana in April 1996) and deny Hezbollah a pretext for launching Katyusha rockets against the residents of northern Israel.⁸

Against this background, there was little surprise in Israel that when Hezbollah decided to resume its struggle against Israel in October. It must be borne in mind that, while Hezbollah is a Lebanese Shi‘ite organization with considerable popular support, its dependency on Syria and affinity with Iran cannot be doubted, and the opinions of these two countries are therefore taken into account when the organization considers its political future and stance toward Israel.

After the withdrawal, Hezbollah refused to dismantle its military apparatus, continued to claim that attacks against Israel constitute legitimate "resistance" and defined a new pretext for resuming the struggle against Israel at a time and place of its choosing. This pretext focuses on the allegation that Israel's withdrawal is "incomplete," since it retained control over the Shebaa Farms area now claimed by the Lebanese government. The issue of Lebanese prisoners being held by Israel, particularly Sheikh Abdul-Karim Obeid and Mustafa al-Dirani, has also remained a bone of contention for the organization. While Hezbollah refrained from attacks against IDF forces prior to the operation last month, its forces continued to deploy like a regular army along the border with Israel, establishing observation posts and armed patrols along the border.⁹

Israeli Policy after the Withdrawal: Dilemmas and Solutions

Following its withdrawal from south Lebanon, Israel tried to formulate a new policy comprising three elements: First, an effort to rehabilitate its deterrent capability in order to prevent Hezbollah from renewing its attacks against Israel; second, an effort to recreate a broad consensus within the Israeli public regarding the question of how Israel should conduct itself in south Lebanon in the event of the renewal of hostilities along the Israeli-Lebanese border; and third, an effort to find innovative, mainly technological, solutions to limit the damage caused by Hezbollah attacks, so as to avoid an undesirable and uncontrollable escalation of hostilities along the border.

The Rehabilitation of Israeli Deterrent Capability

Israel has invested considerable efforts in attempting to rehabilitate the effective deterrent capability which had always been a hallmark of Israeli military doctrine in south Lebanon. Indeed, the Israeli withdrawal was accompanied by unequivocal, and even unprecedented, threats of retaliation in response to renewed Hezbollah attacks. In fact, IDF Chief-of-Staff Gen. Sha'ul Mofaz and Prime Minister Barak explicitly threatened to attack Syrian targets in Lebanon in the event renewed violence. This bears witness to the fact that Israel wished to provide for security in the north by substituting the strategic deterrent capability it maintains against Syria for the tactical deterrent capability against irregular forces that completely fell apart in recent years. It was hoped that the effectiveness of deterrence against Syria (proof of which lies in the fact that the Golan Heights have been quiet for nearly a quarter of a century) could be extended to encompass south Lebanon. However, these Israeli threats neither deterred Hezbollah from resuming military operations, nor the Syrians from encouraging and supporting these operations.¹⁰

It is also clear that since Hezbollah has directed its recent attacks against Israeli military targets along the border and has not yet mounted an offensive against civilian targets deep inside Israel, it will be difficult for Israel to strike a painful blow against infrastructure targets in Lebanon, or even against Syrian targets there, which might drag the entire region into an all-out confrontation. In addition, the Israeli public's willingness to support a protracted conflict with Hezbollah now that IDF forces have withdrawn from Lebanese territory should not be taken for granted (see below). It must be borne in mind that Hezbollah has acquired its own strategic deterrent capability against Israel by means of long-range Katyusha rockets which can hit targets from the northern border area of Israel almost down to Haifa Bay.¹¹

Reformulation of Israeli Public Consensus

As will be recalled, the resolve of the Israeli public was revealed as the Achilles Heel which, according to General Moshe Ya‘alon, led to the collapse of Israeli policy in south Lebanon. From this point of view, Prime Minister Ehud Barak may have been right in claiming that, with the withdrawal of the IDF from south Lebanon, a new consensus would be established that would allow the public at large to rally behind the IDF should there be a renewed large-scale confrontation on the northern border.¹²

Nevertheless, past experience suggests that in the event of such a confrontation, it will merely be a matter of time before voices are once again raised in Israel, claiming that the only effective way of preventing bloodshed is to accede to Syrian demands on the Golan Heights, following the same logic as those who claimed that an Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon would achieve by political means what the IDF could not achieve by military means. After all, the Israeli public has undergone a deep process of change from a fully mobilized society prepared to make every sacrifice in the name of national goals, into a consumerist Western society.

Preventive Capability

A Katyusha rocket and launcher [AP/Ahmed Azakir]

Israel is continuing its efforts to find technological solutions to the operational dilemmas it now faces in south Lebanon. These include, for example, development of the Nautilus system, designed to intercept Katyusha rockets, and plans to establish one of the world's most sophisticated border fences along the Israeli-Lebanese border.¹³ However, it must also be borne in mind that Israel has time and time again introduced sophisticated solutions against the tactics used by Hezbollah (e.g. setting up protective nets to prevent the penetration of anti-tank missiles into IDF positions) only to find Hezbollah engineering its own ways of dealing with these impediments. Israel's clear advantage on the technological front has not proven to be the miracle cure that many have claimed.

In the absence of effective deterrence or preventive solutions to the challenge posed by the Hezbollah, Israel has sought to ensure quiet on its northern border through diplomatic means, relying mainly on UNIFIL forces and the Lebanese army to keep the peace. It is highly ironic that the United Nations, which for many years was regarded by Israelis as a hostile, biased and ineffective actor, is now seen as a protector. In light of the problematic fabric of relations between Israel and UNIFIL (which was often accused of not taking action to prevent terrorist activity against Israelis), this is an unprecedented volte face.

Israel initially needed UNIFIL because of the absence of a Lebanese partner with whom it could coordinate, at least technically, the withdrawal from south Lebanon. Moreover, the UN explicitly recognized the withdrawal as a full implementation of Security Council Resolution 425, undercutting any international legitimacy for future Hezbollah attacks.¹⁴

Israel also hoped that UNIFIL, reinforced by thousands of soldiers, would serve as an effective force in dealing with unrest along the border. However, it became clear that the UNIFIL presence did not present a significant impediment to Hezbollah once it decided to renew its war against Israel. Indeed, not only is UNIFIL unwilling to seriously inhibit Hezbollah activities, it will most likely serve as an obstacle to retaliatory action by Israel. Some have claimed that the UN's recognition that Israel had completed its withdrawal might lend legitimacy in the eyes of the world to sharp Israeli retaliation against attacks from south Lebanon. However, it is clear that reference here is to qualified legitimacy, conditional on the scope of Israeli reaction.¹⁵

Israeli expectations that the deployment of the Lebanese army and security forces along the border in south Lebanon would take place and facilitate stability were realized to a certain degree. However, the Syrian-controlled government in Beirut was ultimately powerless to act when Hezbollah decided (and received permission from Damascus) to reignite the conflict with Israel.

Thus, despite Israel's withdrawal from south Lebanon and internationally-recognized compliance with UN Security Council Resolution 425, its goal of ensuring stability in south Lebanon remains as elusive as ever. Israel's traditional security doctrine, which had for years been based on deterrence and prevention, has lost its relevance in the context of Lebanon, where it is impossible for the time being to reach peace or cease-fire agreements along the lines of those achieved with Egypt, Jordan and even Syria. The respite that Israel has been accorded by the death of Hafez Assad, and perhaps by internal developments in Lebanon, proved to be fleeting and, once again, it finds itself confronted with the same dilemmas for which it has no real solution.

Notes

  ¹ Ha'aretz, 7 June, 5 July, 16 August 2000.
  ² Ha'aretz, 14 July 2000.
  ³ Ma‘ariv, 25 May 2000.
  ⁴ Ha'aretz, 28 July 2000.
  ⁵ Interview with Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah, Al-Jazira TV (Doha), 27 May 2000; See also the organization's web site, http://www.moqawama.org
  ⁶ See Al-Hayat (London), 26 June 2000; Al-Nahar (Beirut), 22 August 2000.
  ⁷ See Bamachane (Tel Aviv), 23 October 1998; Yedi‘ot Aharonot, 22 October 1999.
  ⁸ See Yedi‘ot Aharonot, 8 June 2000; Ha'aretz, 14 July 2000.
  ⁹ Interview with Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah, Al-Jazira TV (Doha), 27 May 2000; See also Al-Safir (Beirut), 25 June 2000; Ha'aretz, 14 July 2000; Yedi‘ot Aharonot, 8 September 2000.
  ¹⁰ See Ha'aretz, 10 September 2000. See also Israeli TV, Channel 1, 26 May 2000.
  ¹¹ Ha'aretz, 26 May, 14 July 2000.
  ¹² Interview with Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak, Ha'aretz, Ha'aretz, 19 may 2000.
  ¹³ Ha'aretz, 26 May, 14 July, 10 September 2000.
  ¹⁴ The New York Times, 18 July 2000.
  ¹⁵ Ma‘ariv, 26 May 2000; Israeli TV, Channel 1, 15 September 2000.