King Mohammed VI

The sudden death of King Hassan II of Morocco in July 1999 and the succession of his 35 year-old son, Sidi Mohammed, has attracted the attention of all those interested in the security and development of the Mediterranean region. The main question is whether the policies of the new king will be conducted under the insignia of continuity or whether there will be some major break with the past.

Since his accession to the throne, Mohammed VI (or "M6" as he is affectionately called by his people) has made a number of dramatic, though largely symbolic, steps to signal his adherence to a new vision of the state. He has portrayed himself as very close to Abderrahman Youssufi, the head of the old leftist opposition whom his late father appointed prime minister, leading many to anticipate a less powerful role for the monarchy in the future and more freedom of action and responsibility for the government regularly elected by the people.

The new monarch also made a highly-publicized visit to the country's northern provinces, the first time in over fifty years that a Moroccan king visited the region (Hassan II was known as hating the North). With this trip, M6 wanted to signal his desire for a deep reconciliation between the monarchy and the whole of the Moroccan people and his desire that all participate in the efforts in national development.

Another important signal toward reconciliation was the king's decision to authorize the return from exile of Abraham Serfaty, a long time opponent of the monarchy and personal enemy of Hassan II. Serfaty's return was intended to show the new king's desire to move away form the security-obsessed state of his father into a more free and development-oriented one. In the words of the new chief of the DST (Departement de la Surveillance du Territoire) appointed by M6, Colonel Hamidou Laanigri, "Morocco no longer has problems of national security (suretè), but like most other states has problems of physical security (securitè)."¹ The abrupt dismissal of his father's all-powerful interior minister, Driss Bassri, seemed to confirm this new trend.

In reality, these have only been well-crafted and advertised superficial changes. No new powers have really been handed over to the government of Youssufi. In fact, the same key ministers that Hassan II kept under his direct control (Interior, Foreign Affairs, Justice and Islamic Affairs) are still safely in the hands of his son. Bassri has simply been substituted by a person who is loyal to the new king (actually by two, since M6 appointed Ahmed Midaoui as Interior Minister but also appointed a personal friend of his, Fouad Ali el Himma, to the newly-created position of Secretary of State for the Interior), not by a member of one of the political parties in the government.

Morocco has historically been a highly divided country. A process of unification and homogenization began only in the early twentieth century when the French colonialists tried to forcefully subdue the country, and continued with more success under Hassan II, who used a personal mixture of religion, force and nationalism. As Michael Willis has pointed out, "the new king faces the challenge of keeping together and controlling various disparate groups and factions that seek to dominate each other and perhaps even the monarchy itself."² The main task of Mohammed VI will be to establish control over that institutional structure of political control and influence established over the centuries in Morocco that traditionally goes under the name of Makhzen. "The Makhzen is made up of a patchwork of clientelist networks which although historically centred on and supportive of the person of the monarch, have their own interests which may inevitably be disturbed and even threatened by the arrival of a new monarch."³ It is evident how delicate and difficult it will be for M6 acquire the same degree of control and authority over the Makhzen that was exercised by his father, while at the same time molding the power structure to suit his personal style and culture.

This analysis seems to corroborate the point of view of those who pessimistically (but not unreasonably) think that little will change in Morocco.⁴ This does not mean that there will be no program of changes in the economy of the country, in its laws or in the political personnel. Morocco badly needs economic reforms to defuse the ticking social time-bomb created by unemployment and wretched living conditions for millions of people, as well as laws that improve the level of foreign investment, decrease the influence of bureaucracy, and improve the deficient educational system, etc.⁵

What it does mean is that the main structure of government and the handling of power will remain more or less the same. Power will be exercised much in the same way as before with only minor changes to make its facade more appealing to the outside. The recent banning, after all the talk about freedom improving in the country, of several issues of French and Moroccan journals (under the pretext that they "offended the feelings of the Moroccan people") seems to confirm this pessimistic view.⁶

The discourse pronounced by M6 on the occasion of the "Fete du Throne" on the July 30, 2000, does not add substantially to the expectations of those that hope for real changes. In fact, most of the reforms indicated in the speech (reform of the electoral code, creation of a high court of justice, reordering of some other institutional organisms, etc.) look more instrumental to the king's vision of governing the country than changes intended to institutionalize the democratic process.

Foreign Policy

How, then, is this state of affairs reflected in the field of foreign policy? King Hassan II once said that Morocco was "a tree with its roots in Africa and its branches in Europe." Geographically speaking, Morocco sits on the fringes of Africa, Europe and the Arab World. It is an Arab state, but half its population speaks either Berber or French as a mother tongue. It is African, but is estranged from the Organization for African Unity (OAU). And the fact that its branches are in Europe is compounded by the fact that much of its destiny over the last century has been decided in Paris and Madrid, rather than in Rabat.

Europe

Mohammed VI is bringing new impetus toward closer relations toward Europe. Morocco has renewed its bid for membership in the European Union. During his state visit to France in March, the king called for a new relationship between the EU and its southern neighbors. The country is separated from Europe only by the Strait of Gibraltar, which is a mere 14 miles wide. Its economic and strategic interests are firmly rooted in the states to the north. Over 60% of Morocco's exports go to European markets, most of its tourists come from Europe, as do remittances from its workers abroad and external loans. Morocco is also the biggest recipient of EU development aid. Morocco also became, earlier this year, the second North African state (after Tunisia) to start implementing an EU association accord. It is supposed to pave the way for tariff-free trade between the kingdom and the EU by 2012. King Mohammed VI has stated more than once that he would like to see the accord go much further to the point where free movement of labor accompanies free movement of goods. An important achievement obtained by this diplomatic offensive has been the cancellation by Italy of Morocco's debt, announced after a meeting in Italy between Moroccan Foreign Minister Mohammed Benaissa and his Italian counterpart, Lamberto Dini. The two countries have agreed to convert the debt, worth more than $100 million, into a development fund. Under the deal, Morocco is to invest an amount equal to the debt in social, economic and environmental programs.⁷ The importance of this agreement is that it could become a pilot for others. To further his plans of drawing closer to Europe, M6 announced that his recent visits to Paris and Rome last Spring will be followed by trips to Lisbon and Madrid in the Fall.

The United States

Mohammed VI has also given an increasingly relevant role to his cousin, Moulay Hisham, who has spent a long time in the United States and has built a strong network of contacts there. The success of the king's visit to the U.S. in June and the emphasis given by the Palace (and consequently by the Moroccan media) to the king's meetings with President Clinton and other American officials are clear indications of the great importance that he gives to relations with America. This was the case under Hassan II and it will be even more so under his son.

King Hassan II spent a long part of his time in power trying to foster a Moroccan identity out of the mosaic of tribal and ethnic identities that divided the country. In doing so, he played the card of a strong nationalism founded on the Islamic legitimacy that he inherited as a descendant of the prophet. This strong nationalistic identity is what was behind his firm resolve toward the Western Sahara issue. From the Green March of 1975, through which Morocco appropriated the vast majority of the province, to the war against the Saharauis until today, the "Marocainetè" of the Western Sahara became the primary issue upon which the survival of the monarchy came to rest. This situation poisoned the relations of Morocco with neighboring Algeria, which, because of a similar (albeit competing) strong nationalistic identity, was the main supporter of the POLISARIO front (the movement which advocated the independence of Western Sahara). Also, because of the recognition by most of the African states of the validity of the claims of the POLISARIO, Morocco quit the OAU and distanced itself from African issues as well.

King Mohammed VI, having acceded to the throne at the end of the century, does not see the need for such a strong emphasis on nationalism. His generation is one that looks toward the West for a model, concentrates on economic and materialistic values and sees Moroccan nationalism as too parochial. But, this vision has to confront an opposition: the last decade has seen the emergence of a new vision propagated by Islamist movements.⁸ The emergence of these movements has constituted the most radical opposition to the monarchy for the last 15 years. Far from having completely disappeared, the main effect of Islamism has been that of causing what has been called the reemergence of an Islamic sensitivity among the populace.⁹ This calls for some caution on the part of the new king in setting a too close and apparent relation toward Europe. Thus, M6 has to find a way to bridge two competing visions of the country's national identity: one, based on an integralist vision of the Islamic religion, is antagonistic toward the West and its values and advocates better relations between Muslim countries; the other emphasizes the need to join the trend of globalization and modernize the country and its economic system, advocates strong relations with Europe and its markets, and supports democratization and a secular vision of society.

The Maghreb (North Africa)

The first steps undertaken by the new monarch seem to indicate that he would like to base his foreign policy on the Maghrebi identity of his people. To accommodate this popular sentiment, the king began a series of rapprochements towards his neighbors, especially Algeria. In Algeria, President Bouteflika continues to play the nationalistic card in order to secure the consensus of the military, which still has an inimical vision of relations with Morocco. Despite frequent, and at times violent, accusations by Algeria that Morocco supports elements of Algerian Islamist terrorist groups, M6 has never raised the tone of his replies and has tried to understate the importance of such polemics.¹⁰

While not repudiating Morocco's claims on the Western Sahara, Mohammed VI has tried to foster a solution of the issue that would bypass a referendum (which, in the final analysis neither country really wants) and find a solution that would suit both countries, possibly within the framework of the Maghrebi Union (UMA).¹¹

Neither Mohammed VI nor Bouteflika have an interest in increasing tensions that would only favor the most radical elements of the military to the detriment of the civilian governments. Nevertheless, a solution for the Western Sahara case still seems to be far away. It remains to be seen whether renewed American mediation within the framework of the UN will be able to break the deadlock. At the last Arab Summit in Cairo in May, M6 was seen talking warmly with the Algerian president. This fact has raised hopes that a warming up of the personal relations between the two leaders may eventually lead to an improvement in relations between their countries.

It is apparent that M6 never loses a chance to stress his commitment to the Maghrebi Union. For instance, he made the following appeal at a gala dinner he hosted in Tangiers in honor of visiting president Mouaouia Ould Sid Ahmed Taya of Mauritania:

"The dynamic of our fruitful bilateral cooperation cannot be dissociated from our firm political will to carry on the integration of the Grand Maghreb, consolidate the structures and institutions of the Arab Maghreb Union and set up mechanisms to promote the integration and complementarity process among the economies of our Maghreban nations . . . Morocco and Mauritania, that played a key and influential role in the creation of the Arab Maghreb Union have never spared, and will never spare, any effort to consolidate the Maghreban joint action . . . because UMA is an inevitable and strategic option."¹²

It is within this framework that one can make sense of Morocco's pressure on its European partners for a softer approach toward Libya and for the latter's inclusion in various projects for the Mediterranean region. According to most observers, relations between Libya and Morocco have never been warmer. In addition, there is no reason to think why M6 should not maintain the same close relations with Tunisia as his father had.

Sub-Saharan Africa

The King has also turned renewed attention toward sub-Saharan Africa. He announced the annulment of the debt that some of the Pays le moins avances (PMA) owed to Morocco and ordered the exemption from customs duties of all the products imported by the Kingdom from these countries. A bit more quietly, he withdrew the support that Morocco had historically given to Jonas Savimbi's UNITA in Angola. He has also announced his intention to officially visit some sub-Saharan countries next year. All of this seems to express the willingness of the young king to regain what once was Morocco's influential position within Africa, before it withdrew from the OAU and cut relations with many African states in protest over their recognition of the Saharan Republic (SADR). It is probably in this African diplomatic offensive that King Mohammed will exert his best efforts in the coming year.

Arafat and King Mohammed VI in Agadir, Morocco last month [AP/Jalil Bounhar]

The Middle East

Another front where Mohammed VI may play a role is in helping the peace process in the Middle East. The presence of the Israeli President Ezer Weizmann and Prime Minister Ehud Barak at King Hassan's funeral underlined the importance that the Israelis attach to Morocco. Although geographically speaking Morocco is the Arab state most removed from the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, under Hassan II the country played an important mediating role. Even though Hassan never recognized Israel and always supported Palestinian claims on Jerusalem, self rule etc., he never cut his connections with the Jewish state. The king's friendship with King Abdallah of Jordan, the fact that there is in Morocco a significant and influential Jewish minority (as well as a strong Moroccan-Jewish minority in Israel) may motivate Mohammed VI to play a more active role in mediating between the parties and supporting more actively American efforts to this end.

Conclusion

In speech delivered on April 28, 2000 to celebrate Moroccan diplomacy day, King Mohammed VI sent a message in which he delineates his vision of Morocco's foreign policy.¹³ From this message two things clearly emerge from the shades of rhetoric. First, the Moroccan elite is worried about missing the trend of economic development that they see as tied to globalization. According to what the king stated in his message, delivered to Moroccan diplomats, one of the strategic goals of Moroccan foreign policy lies in improving the country's adaptation to international changes in order to achieve greater integration in the world economy, consolidate the country's development, and reach a better Moroccan-Euro-Mediterranean partnership. Morocco must draw the best advantages from globalization while shielding the country's development against the negative impacts of this integration. The ambassadors, the king added, must convey Morocco's image as a stronghold of "democracy, modernity, human dignity, moderation and Islamic tolerance" and must tirelessly endeavor to "attract productive investments." With this, M6 looks to appeal to and appease pro-western elites who give priority to the development of the economy and emphasize cooperation with Europe and developed Western countries.

On the other hand, he announced his willingness to play a decisive role in the Maghreb and a sincere desire to find a a solution to the Western Sahara dispute. He stated that "it is not anymore the time when our diplomacy was stuck to the geography and history of the Western Sahara," implying that it is time to move ahead. If the king succeeds in reaching good results in both of these directions, Morocco will have gained a lot in terms of stability, development and liberalization. The whole region will see a period of revived progress toward integration and a new vision of a more cohesive Maghrebi identity that could propel major economic and social progress.

  ¹ Jeune Afrique, No 2038, 1-7 February 2000, p.28.
  ² Michael J.Willis, "After Hassan: A New Monarch in Morocco", Mediterranean Politics, Vol. 4, No 3, Autumn 1999, p.116.
  ³ Ibid. p.116.
  ⁴ Zakya Daoud and Abderrahim Kader, "Activisme du Monarque, Immobilisme du Governement: Le Maroc Change-t-il Vraiment?", Le Monde Diplomatique, February 2000, p.14.
  ⁵ Jeune Afrique, No 2064, 1-7 August 2000.
  ⁶ "Weeklies 'Le Journal' and 'Assahifa' Banned", Africaews.com, 19 April 2000.
  ⁷ Corriere della Sera, 12 Aprile 2000, p.7.
  ⁸ See Benjamin Stora, "Nous Nous Dirigeons Vers Un Maghreb Des Regions," Le Monde, 20 December 1999.
  ⁹ See Mohamed Tozy, Monarchie et Islam Politique Au Maroc (Paris: Presses de Sciences Po, 1999).
  ¹⁰ "Morocco says It Does Not Seek Escalation With Algeria," report of press conference in Laayoune by Moroccan Foreign Minister Benaissa, Arabicnews.com, 9 November 1999.
  ¹¹ Le Matin, 20 February 2000. See also the interview given by the Abbes al Fassi, secretary general of the Istiqlal Party in Al Ahram (Cairo), 23 November 1999.
  ¹² "Morocco Mauritania Renew Commitment to Maghreban Union", Arabicnews.com, 27 April 2000.
  ¹³ Maro Hebdo International, No. 417, 5-11 May 2000.