Hariri was all smiles at a news conference following the elections (Reuters/Jamal Saidi )

The enormous electoral success of candidates aligned with former prime minister Rafiq Hariri in Lebanon's parliamentary elections appears to have set the stage for his return to office next month. Allies of the billionaire tycoon, who served as prime minister from 1992 to 1998, control a majority of seats in the incoming 128-seat legislature (Hariri had a 14-member bloc of solid allies and perhaps a dozen additional supporters in the departing parliament).

According to the 1989 Taif Accord which established the Lebanese Second Republic, the current government must step down when the new parliament convenes on October 17, after which the president "nominates the designated prime minister in consultation with the speaker of the Chamber of Deputies in light of binding parliamentary consultations, the results of which he shall be notified officially." In principle, this means that the president is obliged to appoint whomever is proposed by a majority of the parliament.

In practice, however, new prime ministers have been selected by Damascus and received rubber-stamp approval by parliament, which is carefully vetted to exclude candidates opposed to Syrian authority in Lebanon. Since President Emile Lahoud was handpicked in 1998 by Bashar Assad (who had been given control of the "Lebanon file" prior to his ascension) and is considered to represent the wishes of the Syrian regime, his voice in the matter far exceeds his constitutional authority. Not surprisingly, several MP's have already stated that they will defer to Lahoud (i.e. Syria) on the matter.

In a revealing moment of candor last week, Lebanese Interior Minister Michel Murr acknowledged Syria's role in choosing the prime minister and expressed confidence that it would not be Hariri. "Even the support of 70 Parliament members will not be enough to get Hariri to the prime ministry slot, because everyone knows how a prime minister is manufactured in Lebanon," said Murr after the first round of voting on August 27. "The basic element in this process is a consensus between Syria and the president about the new prime minister. It seems that many are not fully aware of the depth of the strategic relationship that exists between President Emile Lahoud and President Bashar Assad."¹

To be sure, Syria at one time opposed Hariri's return to office. Indeed, the division of Beirut into three separate electoral districts was designed by the head of Syrian military intelligence in Lebanon, Gen. Ghazi Kanaan, to prevent Hariri from achieving a clean sweep of the parliamentary elections in the capital. This opposition to Hariri was primarily the result of the former premier's strenuous objection to Syria's choice of Lahoud as president and, more generally, his objection to a strengthened presidency.

In recent months, however, Damascus stopped barring Hariri's return to office (though it did not actively promote it). Since the election, moreover, Syria has signaled its intention to bring the estranged tycoon back to office. Earlier this month, a lead editorial in al-Ba'ath, the official daily newspaper of Syria's ruling party, noted that "the interests of the majority" should be respected and that the Lebanese president "will not delay in implementing the constitutional traditions to which Lebanese legislatures are accustomed."²

Several factors led Syria to drop its opposition to Hariri's return. The first is the erosion in public support for the supposedly "technocratic" administration of Lebanese Prime Minister Selim al-Hoss due to his inability to deal effectively with the economic crisis or make progress in administrative reform. Widespread disaffection with the Hoss government was readily perceptible well before the elections, but the overwhelming victory of Hariri and his allies underscores its magnitude.

A second consideration is the perception among many Sunni Muslims in Lebanon that their community lacks a political "strongman" of the same caliber as those of the Shi'ites (Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah, Amal leader Nabih Berri), Christians (President Lahoud, Interior Minister Murr) and Druze (MP Walid Jumblatt). Appeasing Lebanese Sunni political elites has always been a critical objective of the Syrian regime, which fears that they will find common cause with its own disaffected Sunni majority.

A third, related factor weighing heavily in Hariri's favor is his enormous financial resources and media empire in Lebanon, which gives him the ability to subject anyone else chosen for the position to a continuous barrage of negative publicity--something he has demonstrated quite clearly during the two year tenure of his successor.

Fourth, Syria's economic dependence on Lebanon dictates that the next prime minister be able to deal effectively with the country's economic crisis. Despite his reckless spending policies that left the country heavily in debt, the Syrians believe that Hariri can still inspire international confidence in the Lebanese economy. He has spent much of the last two years aggressively promoting himself throughout the Arab world and on the international stage.

Syria's quest to attract international investment also makes Hariri an attractive prospect. It is noteworthy that Hariri is a partner in an Arab consortium which recently invested $100 million in Syria. Syria's effort to solidify warm relations with Saudi Arabia is a related factor working in favor of Hariri, who made his fortune in the construction business in the kingdom and is very close to the royal family.

Moreover, the risks of bringing Hariri back into the government have been considerably reduced due to changes in the constellation of political power in Lebanon over the last two years. If Hariri returns to office, he will not be able to exercise the same degree of influence as he did during his previous tenure. For one thing, Syria has clearly given solid backing to President Lahoud over the last two years (it is for this reason that Hariri has generally avoided attacking Lahoud personally). Although Lahoud's power would probably be curtailed somewhat, he will still wield far more influence vis a vis the prime minister than his predecessor, Elias Hrawi. In addition, Syria has strengthened the power of Lebanese military and security officers during Hariri's absence and increased the political influence of Interior Minister Michel Murr.

Apart from Hariri, the only other candidate said to be under consideration in Damascus is Transport Minister Najib Miqati. Miqati, a Harvard-educated businessman who has been closely involved with Bashar Assad in the past and is regarded as someone who can "get things done," but has little experience in government.

  ¹ The New York Times, 3 September 2000.
  ² Al-Ba'ath (Damascus), 5 September 2000.