Middle East Intelligence Bulletin
Jointly published by the United States Committee for a Free Lebanon and the Middle East Forum
  Vol. 2   No. 6 Table of Contents
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1 July 2000 


Bashar's Two Major Challenges
by Gary C. Gambill

Bashar Assad
Bashar Assad

The ascension of Bashar Assad, 34, to the helm of the Syrian regime after the death of his father last month appeared to be surprisingly smooth. Moves to formally consolidate Bashar's authority began within hours of the announcement that President Hafez Assad had died of heart attack on June 10, when the Syrian parliament voted to amend the constitution to lower the minimum age requirement for the presidency from 40 to 34. Later that day, the leadership of the ruling Ba'ath Party formally declared Bashar commander of the armed forces and unanimously nominated him as the next president of Syria, to be confirmed in a national referendum on July 10. A week later, he was named secretary-general of the Ba'ath party at its ninth congress.

     More surprising than the unanimous internal recognition of Bashar's authority by Syrian state and party institutions was the overwhelming degree of external recognition of Bashar's bid for power by Western officials. While the Syrians observed at least the letter, if not the spirit, of a constitutional transfer of power (Vice-President Abdul Halim Khaddam is nominally the acting president of Syria until a national referendum is held), American Secretary of State Madeleine Albright broke standard diplomatic protocol just two days after Assad's death by announcing that Bashar "should take on the mantle" (an implicit acknowledgement, perhaps, that endorsements aren't likely to influence the outcome of Syria's "electoral" process).1 Nevertheless, her comments embarrassed Arab leaders such as Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, who had issued the cautious statement that Egypt would "respect the view of the Syrian people in their choice of president" when asked by reporters about Bashar's succession (he soon backtracked and, following Albright's lead, explicitly endorsed Bashar by name).2

     Mubarak had good reason to be cautious about picking Bashar as the winning horse in Damascus--he may not have the political skill to deal effectively with two complex fault lines that could potentially erupt and destabilize his regime. The first is centered around the clash of interests between Syria's military, political, and economic elites, who have derived enormous wealth from the state-run economy, and the majority of the population, which now has the lowest per capita income in the Middle East by some estimates. The second fault line lies precariously between Syria's Alawite minority, which has monopolized political power in the country, and the Sunni Muslim majority.

Elite Interests and Reform

     The powerful government and Ba'ath party apparatus which the late Syrian president bequeathed to his son was not forged by Assad alone during his thirty years in power. A core group of military officers and political figures accompanied Assad to power, attained high-level positions in his regime, and amassed enormous wealth during this period. These regime barons are not, as some American journalists have suggested, necessarily averse to the fact that Assad handed the reigns of power to his son. Most of them, in fact, have also used their political influence for the advancement of their own progeny, either within the regime or, more often, in parasitic private sector enterprises that earn millions of dollars from contracts with the state. What these barons are averse to is the idea that Bashar, having benefited from the rules of the game in his own climb to power, should suddenly change the rules now that he is at the top.

     But this is precisely what Bashar has been doing. Dozens of former and current senior government and military officials have been arrested, exiled, or worse as result of the "anti-corruption" drive that, by all accounts, has been directed from behind the scenes by Bashar's allies since 1998 and escalated into a bona fide purge two months ago. The indictment of former prime minister Mahmoud al-Zu'bi and his "suicide" while under house arrest in May were only the beginning. On June 5, the head of Syrian military university training, Brigadier Khalil Khodr, was found stabbed to death in his apartment.5 On June 6, Al-Hayat published leaks by Syrian officials saying that corruption charges would soon be filed against former armed forces chief-of-staff Hikmat Shihabi--a pillar of the Assad regime who held this post for 24 years before being pushed into retirement by Bashar's allies in July 1998. Shihabi, who was in Lebanon at the time, promptly boarded a flight to Los Angeles at Beirut International Airport and, needless to say, is not expected back anytime soon. On June 24, former Syrian deputy prime minister for economic affairs Salim Yassin was arrested on corruption charges related to the 1996 purchase of Airbus jetliners by Syria's state-run national air carrier.

      Thus far, Bashar has demonstrated little willingness to actually reform the system which enriches these elites, preferring to target them individually and replace them one by one with close allies. This reduces the risk of instigating a collective backlash--members of the old guard who still occupy positions of power are more likely to try to avoid being singled out than risk an unsuccessful attempt at containing the purges. For the moment, these purges have earned Bashar a considerable degree of popularity among ordinary Syrians. In a country where half the population is under the age of 25 and unemployment is skyrocketing above 20%, the public humiliation of corrupt officials and highly-publicized auctions of their ill-gotten assets can be a very effective means of temporarily mobilizing popular support. This banner has also endeared him to those in the business community who aren't draining the coffers of the state through illicit kickbacks.

     However, removing individuals from a corrupt system (even if their replacements are, on the whole, less corrupt) is not going to dramatically affect the lives of most Syrians. Living conditions have gone from bad to horrendous in recent years as a result of a state-run economy plagued by nepotism and corruption. Syria is perhaps the only country in the world which has a declining literacy rate, resulting from the growing tendency of Syrian youths to drop out of school and work menial jobs to help their families pay the bills. In order to seriously entertain systemic reforms, Bashar is going to have to begin withdrawing some of the enormous sums of money that the state lavishes on high-ranking members of the bureaucracy and officer corps of the Syrian military (who enjoy extremely generous subsidies on housing and most consumer goods) and cut the flow of indirect funds that they derive from illegal private-sector activities.

     Admittedly, such systemic reform was difficult to undertake while Bashar was acting behind the scenes. Now that he has ascended to power, it appears that he will rely on backing from the Ba'ath party apparatus as a counterweight to the elites in the security/military services. He set the stage for this last month by replacing twelve of the twenty-one members of the Ba'ath party Regional Command Council with people who have comparatively little stake in preserving elite privileges. In addition to Bashar himself, the new faces on the council include several members of the new cabinet that Bashar handpicked last March: Prime Minister Mustafa Miru, Deputy Prime Minister for Public Services Naji Itri, Minister of Local Government Sallam al-Yasin (as well as the long-serving Foreign Minister Farouk al-Shara). In an apparent effort to solidify grassroots support for the regime, he also added Ibrahim Heneidi, the governor of Soueida, Walid Al-Bouz, the governor of Quneitra, Muhammad Said Bakhtiane, an ex-governor of Hama, and two other local political leaders to the Council. The other two new members are both university professors, giving the council a technocratic edge. Prominent long-serving members of the council who retained their posts include Defense Minister Mustafa Tlass; Vice-presidents Abdul Halim Khaddam and Zuheir Masharqa; the two deputy secretaries-general of the Baath party , Abdallah Al-Ahmar and Soliman Kaddah, and Parliament Speaker Qaddoura. All have been carefully vetted by Bashar's allies to make sure that they will not stand in the way.

The Alawite-Sunni Divide

The relatively few number of foreign journalists who broke away from the crowds in Damascus last month to visit the Syrian city of Hama reported encountering a strikingly different reaction to the death of Assad.6 In contrast to Damascus, there were no black flags hanging from private residences and few public expressions of remorse among ordinary people living there. Hama was the scene of the bloodiest chapter of modern Syrian history. In February 1982, Syrian security forces massacred up to 20,000 people in the city after members of the Muslim Brotherhood ambushed an army unit in the center of the city.

     The Alawite community, members of an offshoot sect of Shi'ite Islam, constitutes about 12% of the population in Syria, concentrated mainly in rural areas of the coastal governate of Latakia and Tartous. Like many other minorities in the Middle East, the Alawites have developed an existential fear of majority rule. Their ascent to political supremacy in Syria began during the French occupation of earlier this century, when colonial officials began recruiting them into the military as a counterweight to the majority Sunni population of the country that defiantly opposed the French presence. With the Ba'ath party's seizure of power in 1963, political power increasingly began to gravitate toward the Alawite-dominated officer corps, particularly after Assad's ascension to the presidency in 1970.

     In order to disguise Alawite control of the regime, Assad was careful to saturate the "public face" of government, consisting of powerless institutions such as the parliament and cabinet, with Sunnis. The positions of prime minister and defense minister, for example, have always been held by a Sunni, but both are completely subservient to the presidency. Underneath this veneer of parliamentary institutions, the real nerve centers of government authority--the military and intelligence services--are dominated by Alawites [see "Syria's Intelligence Services: A Primer" in this issue of MEIB]. The commanders of military units within striking distance of the capital are said to be all Alawites.

      The prospect of yielding political power to Syria's majority Sunni population is anathema to most Alawites. Assad's thirty-year reign witnessed a dramatic improvement in Alawite living standards (only 10% of households in Latakia had running water in 1970 ; by 1985, this figure had increased to 70%). Many in the Alawite community believe that Sunni rule will lead to a return of their impoverishment or worse. Sunni resistance to the regime has often explicitly targeted Alawites, the most notorious case being the massacre of 83 Alawite cadets in June 1979.

     Bashar thus faces two challenges: First, he must convince the Alawite community that their long-term interests lie in accommodation with the Sunnis, while at the same time demonstrating that his leadership is strong enough to contain any Islamist challenge to the regime. Second, he must convince the Sunni population that their desire for greater political participation will be best served through gradual political and economic reforms under his leadership, rather than by violent opposition to the regime. Indeed, the official slogan of the regime, "change through continuity," appears as if it was coined to project exactly this message.

     Bashar may not be able to square this circle. The Sunni population is well aware that Bashar's allies have been conducting the "hirings and firings" within the epicenters of the regime for the last few years. Thus far, there has been no visible decrease in the concentration of Alawites within the military and security apparatus. In fact, it has increased somewhat--one of the only Sunnis widely regarded as having significant influence within the regime's security apparatus was Gen. Shehabi--who was replaced as military chief of staff by an Alawite, Gen. Ali Aslan. There have been several reports, however, that Bashar is grooming one of his close friends, Manaf Tlass, the son of Syrian Defense Minister Mustafa Tlass, to be the regime's token front-rank Sunni in the military. Manaf, a lieutenant-colonel in the tank corps, was recently "elected" to the 90-member central committee of the Ba'ath party and it is rumored that he will soon be promoted to brigadier-general.7

     Another problem is that any effort to promote economic liberalization will inevitably have sectarian implications. Syria's traditional urban bourgeoisie, which suffered considerably under the statist economic policies of the Assad era, is largely Sunni, whereas the inefficient state sector employs a disproportionate number of Alawites. Sunni commercial elites will no doubt push for extensive privatization of state enterprises, cuts in government spending, and downsizing the state bureaucracy--all of which are all likely to engender opposition in the Alawite community.

     Complicating matters is the fact that the Alawites are as homogeneous as most press reports usually imply. The Alawite community is divided into four main Alawite tribal confederations (the Haddadin, Matawira, Khaiyatin, and the Kalbiya), as well as several smaller ones, and there is no overarching religious hierarchy--each tribe has its own religious leaders (rijal al-din). Economic reforms might cause divisions among these tribal confederations to resurface as each competes with the others for a greater share of the Alawites' diminishing slice of the political pie. Bashar already appears to have been consolidating support within his own clan of the Kalbiyya tribe, through the appointment of Gen. Aslan, and members of his own extended family, through the rise of his brother-in-law, Gen. Assef Shawkat, the de facto head of military intelligence.

     Should Bashar hesitate to implement economic and political reforms demanded by the Sunni population (and opposed by Alawite elites), support for Islamist opposition movements in Syria is likely to increase. For the time being, the Muslim Brotherhood has adopted a policy of accommodation toward Bashar, but it is conditioned on certain expectations. "We do not hold him responsible for what happened in the past--be it in Hama or elsewhere," said the secretary-general of the Brotherhood, Ali Sadreddin al-Bayanouni, in an interview shortly after Assad's death. If Bashar is willing gradually introduce civil liberties, democratization, respect for human rights, and a government "based on institutions," said Bayanouni, "we would deal with him as if nothing had ever happened."8

     However, a dissident faction of the Muslim Brotherhood led by Adnan Saadeddin has staunchly opposed Bayanouni's overtures to the Syrian regime. Saadeddin, who led the Brotherhood prior to the 1982 crackdown, and his allies cannot seriously threaten the regime without significant support from neighboring states. Although he reportedly met with Turkish officials in Ankara last July,9 the fact that his supporters still operate out of Jordan--which presently has no intention of permitting vibrant opposition activity by the Brotherhood--suggests that his options are limited.

     The Islamic Liberation Party (Hizb al-Tahrir al-Islami), a shadowy group with a significant presence within Syria itself is also virulently opposed to reconciliation with the regime. The ILP is said to have been responsible for the December 1999 assassination of Muhammad Amin Yakan, a leading Muslim cleric who was mediating between the regime and the Brotherhood, as he was driving in the village of Tarhin, near Aleppo. Syrian security forces responded with massive arrests of members of the ILP as well as other Islamist and secular opposition groups. The ILP then retaliated by assassinating a number of Syrian intelligence agents, sparking an even heavier crackdown that resulted in about 800 arrests according to opposition sources.10

     Sooner or later, the radical Islamist opposition will mount another challenge to the regime. When this happens, the leadership of the mainstream Brotherhood will be carefully watching to assess Bashar's willingness to use deadly force. Should he hesitate to ruthlessly strike back with all means at his disposal, the movement may decide to mobilize its cadres into action against Bashar's regime . . . before the Alawite generals replace him with someone who is.

  1 "Albright urges Syria to open up, urges Bashar to assume father's mantle," AFP, 12 June 2000. Even UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan referred to Bashar as the "future leader of Syria" during his visit to Damascus on June 22 (Agence France Presse, 22 June 2000).
  2 "Egypt shows signs of concern for Syrian stability," AFP, 11 June 2000.
  3 Al-Hayat (London), 12 June 2000.
  4 Voice of Israel (Jerusalem), 20 June 2000.
  5 Al-Safir (Beirut), 9 June 2000.
  6 See Robert Fisk, "No tears for Assad in city of slaughter," The Independent, June 18, 2000.
  7 Al-Zaman (London), 21 June 2000.
  8 Mideast Mirror, 15 June 2000.
  9 Al-Hayat (London), 20 July 1999.
  10 See Syrian, Lebanese Security Forces Crush Sunni Islamist Opposition, Middle East Intelligence Bulletin (Vol.2, No.1), January 2000.

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