Middle East Intelligence Bulletin
Jointly published by the United States Committee for a Free Lebanon and the Middle East Forum
  Vol. 2   No. 5

1 June 2000 


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Why Did Arafat Arrest Muhammad Deif, and Why Now?
by Reuven Paz

The arrest earlier this month of Muhammad Deif, the most wanted Hamas military commander, by the Palestinian security service raises several questions, primarily concerning the timing and the goals of the arrest. Deif, a resident of the Gaza Strip, was one of the closest aides of Yahya ‘Ayyash, the commander of Hamas’ Iz al-Din al-Qassam military apparatus known as "the Engineer," who was killed by a very sophisticated bomb in January 1996. The death of ‘Ayyash brought about the division of the terrorist group into two parts: one in the West Bank, led by Muhi al-Din al-Sharif and the ‘Awadallah brothers until they were killed in 1998; the other in the Gaza Strip, led by Deif, who was considered the senior activist of the terrorist apparatus. Israeli officials have long demanded the arrest of Deif, who is reportedly responsible for the most bloody Hamas operations during the second half of the 1990s in Israel and the Palestinian areas.

Hamas
Hamas militants burn an Israeli flag in Gaza on May 26 (AP/Adel Hana)
    The fact that Deif openly resided for the past five years in Gaza, a closed area controlled by the Palestinian Authority (PA), raised many questions in Israel. His arrest was regarded by Israel as an important test of PA's declared intention to fight Hamas terrorism.

Why now?

    The general belief among Israeli security and intelligence circles in the last few years was that the Palestinian security services have long monitored Deif's activities, but refrained from arresting him for several reasons: they wished to keep him as a bargaining card both with Israel and Hamas; his popularity among larger parts of the Palestinian public than just Hamas supporters being a symbol of revenge in the Israelis; and the possibility of supervising Hamas' terrorist activity through the surveillance of his moves. In return, the Qassam brigades under Deif's command refrained in the past two years from using Gaza as a base for bloody operations in Israel against civilians. Qassam Brigades attacked only in the West Bank or Jerusalem, mainly in those areas still militarily controlled by Israel.

    What made the Palestinian leadership decide on his arrest now, several days prior to the May 15 memorial of the Palestinian nakbah (catastrophe), which was accompanied by large organized popular demonstrations? Was it the wish to promote and encourage the Israeli decision to hand Abu Dis over to Palestinian rule? Another plan for terrorist operation in Israel? Or the wish to show the leadership of Hamas that Arafat was not losing his power, as some observers have recently claimed?

    One of the reasons may be found in the events in which Israeli security forces uncovered Hamas squad in the Israeli Arab village of Taybeh last February. This squad was sent from Gaza by Muhammad Deif and planned to carry out at least three major suicide operations against Israeli civilians. It may have been considered a break from the unwritten "rules of the game" between Hamas and the PA, the rules that prevented the Palestinians from arresting Deif earlier. Another reason could be Israeli intentions to hit him on one hand, or very reliable information given by Israel in regard to his whereabouts, so the Palestinian could no longer ignore his activity.

Hamas' new strategy of "Lebanonization"

    Statements of Hamas activists have focused on the need to "Lebanonize" the Palestinian territories. In an unsigned article in the May edition of the London-based monthly Filastin al-Muslimah, the main official organ of Hamas, the movement published a special report on its terrorist activity in the past two years, under the title "If Hamas operations in the past two years would have succeeded they would create an horror in Israel". The article described the development by Hamas of new kinds of sophisticated weapons and remote controlled devices, in order not to use suicide bombing. One of the goals of these new weapons was to use them against Israeli patrols, like in Lebanon. Another major attempt was made to kidnap Israeli soldiers. In general, the article emphasizes the wish of Hamas to undertake guerrilla warfare against the IDF, a modus operandi that could easily win the support of the Palestinian public.

    Another important issue that Hamas is admitting for the first time in the article is the operational support of Iran to the movement. The article quotes reports in the Israeli press, but brings them for the first time in the written media of the movement, saying that the external command of Hamas tried to establish a military wing in the territories by recruiting Palestinian students abroad. They were trained in the military college in Iran in all kinds of fighting techniques, using all kinds of weapons and explosives. They were then sent back to the Palestinian territories in separate stages through the bridge, in order to use as special forces for commando operations against the Israeli troops.

    Following this article, Filastin al-Muslimah has published a series of interviews with various Palestinian prominent figures, on the question of "Is the resistance still possible in the shadow of peace?" The longest and most publicized interview was with Dr. Abd al-Aziz al-Rantisi, who was just recently released from a long period of detention by the Palestinian Authority, and who is number two in the Hamas political hierarchy. Most of the interviewed, except for those who are Palestinian officials, praised the Lebanese model of resistance. They argue that "the language of resistance is the only language understood by the Israelis, and not the language of negotiations." In other words, the article raises a general sense among many Palestinians that they should adopt the Lebanese model of resistance and move to a general armed struggle of guerrilla warfare that will focus on Israeli soldiers rather than civilians. It is worth remembering that the name Hamas--Harakat al-Muqawamah al-Islamiyyah (the Islamic resistance movement)--was first used by Hizballah in the second half of the 1980s. The name was later adopted by the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood in December 1987, in order to mark their total change in the policy towards Israel, from passive opposition to violent struggle.

    The Lebanese model could obtain the support of a relatively large proportion of the Palestinians. This would be dangerous not only to Israel, but to Arafat and the PA as well. Arafat and the Palestinian security services may have been trying to block support for Lebanonization by arresting the person who could lead such a struggle, and at the start of the process before it is too late.

Reuven Paz is the Academic director of The International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism in Herzliya, Israel, and a senior visitor fellow in The Washington Institute for Near East Policy in Washington DC. He is specialized in the research of Islamic movements and Palestinian society.

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