Jointly published by the United States Committee for a Free Lebanon and the Middle East Forum
Back to June 2000 Table of Contents
Back to Middle East Intelligence Bulletin homepage.
Strategic Implications of the Israeli Withdrawal from South Lebanon
by Gary C. Gambill
The withdrawal of Israeli forces from south Lebanon earlier this month has completely transformed the strategic playing field between Israel and Syria. While Israel has no doubt lost a defensive buffer against Syrian-orchestrated paramilitary attacks, the withdrawal allows Israel to adopt a strategy of military deterrence against Syria that had until now been politically inexpedient.
 |
| The Israeli-Lebanese border fence near Metulla (AP Photo/Eyal Warsavsky) |
The control of southern Lebanon by Syrian paramilitary forces is a significant asset for Damascus from a military operational standpoint. Hezbollah, whose military wing consists of 600-800 well-trained, experienced guerrillas and around 2,000-4,000 reserve fighters, clearly has the capability to strike more effectively at Israel. In light of the militia's renowned success in launching coordinated assaults on heavily fortified outposts in the former security zone, it should have little difficulty undertaking deadly attacks on the exposed civilian settlements of northern Israel. A correspondent for the Economist who toured the Israeli-Lebanese border earlier this month wrote that "the hills on the Lebanese side rise so steeply above the border that a determined guerrilla could jump the fence without difficulty, or lob grenades into one of the settlements on the other side."1
While the withdrawal has tremendously empowered Syria's surrogate military presence in south Lebanon, the window of justification for unprovoked attacks against Israeli forces has narrowed considerably. Syria's proxy war against Israel encountered little international criticism as long as Israel occupied Lebanese territory--indeed, with the exception of the U.S., most countries tacitly recognized the Syrian-sponsored campaign as an indigenous national liberation movement (which, strangely enough, seemed more intent on preventing an Israeli withdrawal in recent months). If the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanese territory is officially deemed by the United Nations to fulfill the requirements of UN Security Council Resolution 425, then the Syrian regime will risk international isolation if it continues to sponsor such attacks.
Not surprisingly, Damascus has desperately sought to preserve a pretext for sponsoring guerrilla war against Israel by attempting to forestall UN recognition that a full Israeli withdrawal has been completed. Lebanese officials have recently advanced a claim to the so-called "Shab'a farms," a 25 square kilometer area of rich agricultural land on the Western slope of Mt. Hermon. According to their position, this enclave, which was seized by Israeli forces during the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, is Lebanese territory. The implication of this claim is that the Israeli pullout from Lebanon is incomplete, legitimizing the continuation of attacks against Israel by Syria's Lebanese surrogates. In fact, Hezbollah guerrillas launched an artillery assault on an Israeli military post in the enclave just prior to the Israeli withdrawal (the first time the area has been attacked since 1967).
Most international observers have disputed the Lebanese claim on several grounds. The Shab'a farms were clearly designated as part of Syria by the original 1923 border demarcation. Syrian and Lebanese officials claim that Syria ceded the territory to Lebanon in 1951, but according to UN cartographic expert Miklos Pinter, no official maps of the Syrian-Lebanese border have ever indicated Lebanese sovereignty over the enclave.2 Moreover, the region was continuously occupied by Syrian forces until its capture by the Israelis in 1967. The fact that no Lebanese official had never mentioned this bizarre claim until now further aroused suspicion.
To the chagrin of Syria, Israel is garnering strong international support for its claim to have fully withdrawn from Lebanon in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 425. In a report to the UN Security Council, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan avoided an explicit ruling on the Shab'a farms dispute, but stated that that Resolution 425 applies only to territory occupied by Israel since its March 1978 invasion--refuting Syrian and Lebanese allegations that the Israeli withdrawal stipulated by this resolution is incomplete.
"It is our emphatic view that there can be no justification for initiating acts of violence [against Israel] at a time when Israel is in the process of implementing Resolution 425," said the U.S. State Department in a May 23 press release, which added that the Lebanese government now has a "responsibility" to restore its "effective authority in the area." Vice-President Al Gore went a step further, declaring that if Syria allows Hezbollah to continue acts of violence against Israel after the withdrawal, "President Assad will bear a heavy responsibility before the world." American congressional lawmakers introduced a bipartisan resolution explicitly applauding Israel's compliance with UN Resolution 425. Concurrent Resolution 331, passed on May 24 by the Senate and House of Representatives, also called upon the Lebanese government to maintain security in south Lebanon and ensure the disarmament of Hezbollah. The resolution explicitly mentioned the continuing occupation of Lebanon by 30,000 Syrian troops and called for "the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanese territory so that Lebanon may exercise sovereignty throughout its territory."3
In light of this consensus, Syria is likely to face immense international criticism if its Lebanese proxies resume attacks against Israel in the aftermath of this month's withdrawal. The real question, then, concerns the extent to which international public opinion will deter Syria from sponsoring such attacks. As a result of the failed Clinton-Assad summit earlier this year, the Assad regime has come to recognize a harsh reality: Western economic and military support for Syria is, and will always be, contingent upon a final settlement in the Syrian-Israeli track of the peace process. The rapid diminishment of prospects for such a settlement may lead the Assad regime to conclude that nothing more can be gained from its embryonic love affair with the West, in which case international opprobrium will not necessarily prevent Syria from reigniting hostilities.
The Barak administration will ultimately rely first and foremost on a policy of direct military reprisals to deter Syria, in lieu of its previous (and ineffective) policy of indirect deterrence (administered by retaliation against non-Syrian forces and economic installations in Lebanon). "We have a plan for responding to any attack against us, one that includes Syrian targets in Lebanon," said Israel's chief of staff, Lt Gen Shaul Mofaz, just hours after the last Israeli soldier left Lebanon.4 In fact, the Israeli air force has already begun training its pilots to bomb two life-sized replicas of Syrian airfields in the Negev desert.5
In light of the unquestioned military superiority of the Israeli air force, Damascus will try to minimize the risk of retaliation by striving for what terrorism experts call "plausible deniability." This can be achieved by sponsoring attacks ostensibly launched by "lone individuals" or militant groups with no clear connection to Damascus. Hezbollah, which is well-known for its internal discipline and relative subservience to Syria, may not fit the bill, but Syria has ties with dozens of obscure Palestinian groups and splinter factions that have proliferated in the refugee camps of Lebanon in recent years. In order to maximize its plausible deniability, Syria must ensure 1) that its client regime in Beirut continues to exercise no authority over the Palestinian refugee camps and 2) that there is no UN presence in the Israeli-Lebanese border area capable of monitoring or obstructing cross border attacks. The latter may prove difficult for the Syrians to obstruct. American and European officials are strongly pushing for the deployment of UN peacekeeping troops in the area. In fact, despite sustained Syrian objections, most major Arab countries have expressed explicit support for UN involvement.6
Nevertheless, Damascus has already begun bolstering the military strength of pro-Syrian military factions in Lebanon. Ahmed Jibril's Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC), which is based in Damascus, has greatly expanded its military presence in the Syrian-controlled Beqaa Valley of Lebanon. PFLP-GC forces in the Beqaa, reportedly under the command of Jibril's son Jihad, are headquartered at the Dir al-Raza base, three km from the Syrian border with Lebanon. The forces there have been equipped with outdated Soviet-built T-55 tanks and the base is surrounded by Syrian anti-aircraft guns, as well as SA-2 and SA-6 surface-to-air missiles.
The Israeli air force attacked Dir al-Raza for the second time in three months on May 20, reportedly destroying ten tanks and killing three guerrillas. Syria is "doing everything in order to push Palestinians into activities against Israel following the withdrawal," an Israeli defense source quoted in Ha'aretz said after the attack. "As far as they are concerned, the advantage is that this will allow them to disclaim responsibility from attacks after they are done . . . We are sending a number of messages to the Syrians, which they understand."7 The attack may be a sign of things to come--a "preemptive" deterrence policy, so to speak, of targeting any buildup of forces by Syria's proxy forces in Lebanon.
1 The Economist, 27 May 2000.
2 "Pull-out Pitfalls," Middle East International, 19 May 2000.
3 U.S. Congress, Concurrent Resolution 331, 24 May 2000.
4 The Daily Telegraph (London), 25 May 2000.
5 The Jerusalem Post, 1 May 2000.
6 The Jordanian government announced its support for "a strong and effective UN presence in southern Lebanon" in order to ensure "security and stability as quickly as possible" (Jordanian TV, Amman, 24 May 2000).
7 Ha'aretz 21 May 2000.
� 2000 Middle East Intelligence Bulletin. All rights reserved.
MEIB Main Page
