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Assad's Failing Health May Pose Obstacle to Israeli-Syrian Settlement
MEIB Staff
According to intelligence and diplomatic sources, the health and mental capacities of Syrian President Hafez Assad are rapidly deteriorating, endangering prospects for an Israeli-Syrian peace agreement.
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| Hafez Assad |
Jordanian Foreign Minister Abdul Ilah Khatib reportedly told foreign diplomats last month that Assad's health is now deteriorating at an alarming rate and advised Israeli diplomats to hasten the resumption of negotiations with Syria. Assad is known to suffer from a multitude of different medical problems. The first and most serious is a form of cancer called chronic lymphocytic leukemia. In addition, al-Assad has suffered from an inoperable coronary artery disease since the mid-1970's and has carotid artery stenosis, which put him into a light coma for two weeks during the early 1980's. Assad also has insulin dependent diabetes mellitus. Israeli intelligence recently estimated his remaining life-span to be anywhere from "a day to two years."
According to a CIA report recently shown to Israeli officials, Assad also suffers from intermittent dementia, "a condition of deteriorated mentality, often with emotional apathy." The report was based upon the testimonies of diplomats who have met Assad personally in recent months and noted a tremendous deterioration in his ability to concentrate. After meeting with Assad, the foreign minister of Switzerland reported that the Syrian leader "appears fragile." Assad participates only passively in meetings with visiting Western diplomats and often his comments are not translated. "It is obvious that the translator is told what to say in advance," said one source. A European diplomat who recently visited Assad was quoted on Israeli radio earlier this month as saying that Assad's "speech is hesitant and lethargic, and he has difficulty completing sentences."1
Israeli and American officials are concerned only that an agreement with Syria be signed prior to Assad's death, believing that his son and apparent successor, Bashar Assad, will be able to maintain stability and honor the accord even if the Syrian president dies shortly after its signing. Assad's importance to the peace process is at this point primarily symbolic--his endorsement of the agreement, preferably in person, is needed to legitimize the path toward peace taken by his successor.
The hasty arrangement of Clinton's meeting with Assad later this month is designed to bring the ailing Syrian dictator publicly into the peace process before it is too late. Public appearances by the two leaders will reportedly be heavily scripted in order to avoid any outward signs that Assad's mental faculties are diminished--this means allowing for no impromptu interaction between Assad and the swarm of reporters expected to converge on the site of the meeting in Geneva.
In light of Assad's deteriorating health, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak has come under considerable political pressure to suspend negotiations with Syria until a stable political succession in Syria has taken place. At least one member of Barak's cabinet--Eli Suissa of Shas--has publicly called for a halt to the negotiations for the same reason.2 Moreover, a number of prominent U.S. supporters of Israel, including Henry Kissinger, have advised Barak to wait until Bashar formally assumes power rather than arrive at a deal with the ailing dictator. According to a Gallup poll earlier this month, 60.9% of adult Israelis would prefer to wait and sign a peace settlement with Assad's successor if the Syrian president is expected to die "within a short period of time." Only 21.4% of those polled preferred to "hurry and sign an agreement" in advance of Assad's death.3
1 Voice of Israel (Jerusalem) 20 March 2000.
2 Voice of Israel (Jerusalem), 16 March 2000.
3 IMRA (Independent Media Review & Analysis), 6 March 2000.
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