Syracuse University’s Associate Professor of Political Science Dr. Mehrzad Boroujerdi sat down with Douglas Savage of the Institute of World Affairs to discuss the state of affairs in Iran last Tuesday at UW-Milwaukee’s latest Great Decisions lecture.
The lecture, entitled “The Persian Perspective: How Tehran’s Leaders See the World”, was held in the UWM Union Ballroom. The goal, as stated by Boroujerdi, was to give his own thoughts as well as a theory of inside perspective regarding how Iran’s leadership approaches and views politics and international relations.
The lecture covered a range of topics from historical blunders and failed diplomacy, to the possibility of an Iranian revolutionary regime overthrow much like the 1979 revolution, which some see as a necessary step to positive development.
Boroujerdi first covered a historical diplomatic relationship, casting overtones of a severe lack of ability and infrastructure for successful communication between the U.S. and Iran.
He referred to Iran as the “Bermuda Triangle” citing issues dating back to the Hostage Crisis under the Carter administration, the Iran Contra Affair under Reagan, George Bush Sr. dealing with hostages in Lebanon, Clinton’s Dual Containment of Iran and Iraq, and George Bush Jr.'s “Axis of Evil” speech.
The question remaining concerns the future for Iranian relations as the Obama administration proceeds forward in its term.
“This eclectic nature of politics in Iran basically has meant that there are too many chiefs in town,” Boroujerdi stated. According to Boroujerdi, this sometimes-counterproductive structure is a result of a lack of distinctly defined lines of authority within the country.
But Iran’s unrest does not lie solely in the hands of clumsy theocratic political structure. Boroujerdi cites hyper-politicization as consistently problematic for misinterpretation of the speech and actions of the public, interior factionalism and backstabbing existing within the regime, and a lack of transparency, all as prominent thorns in the side of Iran’s possibilities for successful politics.
He further references the nearly doubled population since the 1979 revolution, a shift of geographical population concentration from rural-agricultural to urban centers, rising literacy rates (nearly 80% according to Boroujerdi), and a younger, education-oriented population.
“So, you understand what type of political headache, [the] guys in power are now facing when you are dealing with this type of constituency: young, educated, urban. In political science we say, when these three elements come together, you have a revolution of rising expectation,” Boroujerdi stated.
Naturally, the words nuclear and oil also became prominent as Boroujerdi began speaking of the “mutual paranoia” between Iran and the U.S., noting that each country continuously speculates every move and every word muttered about the other, an instable ground to stand upon while entertaining any hopes of reaching peaceful diplomacy.
“Neither side has a coherent policy for dealing with the other,” Boroujerdi said in a prelude to the similar faults, accusations, and beliefs amongst both the U.S. and Iran.
Delving into the Iranian perspective he notes the moralistic discourse that is key to the “narrative” of Iran’s view of itself as well as others; a self-victimization Boroujerdi applied to the Arab-Israeli dispute as well as the Iran-U.S. relationship. One of the results being that this moralistic discourse speaks loudly amongst the post-revolutionary Iranian views of America leaving a strong distasteful sentiment for American objectives and practices.
“When it comes to American foreign policy, complaints are of the following source: unilateralism in foreign policy…[the United States] as having a hunger, burning desire for hegemony and being the world empire…a modern day rogue, if you wish,” Boroujerdi described Iran’s views of the U.S, "…it doesn’t matter what the facts are, right? What matters is what representation becomes powerful, and takes hold.”
This image that many countries in the Middle East has become accustomed to believing tends to take a negative toll when attempting to bolster international relations in the region, and also can become instrumental in reaction to U.S. attempts to influence Iran.
Boroujerdi emphasized disapproval of Bush’s “Axis of Evil” argument, regarding it as a “terrible, terrible policy” while explaining the effects that the American policy can have on a fluctuating regime like Iran, and continued to emphasize that military confrontation would be “futile, and set back the cause of democracy within the country for decades if not more,” he said.
Furthermore, he discussed the use of asymmetrical warfare as a somewhat justified tactic employed by Iran, as they rightly feel trumped as a regional power and desire to gain stability and command in the region. Boroujerdi noted that when considering the economy, the technology, and the sheer size of Iran in terms of population, it is perfectly reasonable for the country to expect respect as a regional power. He further noted that if the Obama administration were to decide to leave Iran out while attempting to create regional stability, it would result in failure.
While consistently remaining under the nuclear spotlight, Iran feels they have to use what advantages they have to promulgate the influence of their perceived right to power in the region. This means asymmetrical warfare. This means “war by proxies” as Boroujerdi referred to it. This means using Hezbollah and Hamas as tactical assets, using the strengths available to not become insignificant within the Middle East.
Boroujerdi suggests that in light of nuclear weapons, Iran makes the argument of having no real back-up or protection, reminding of the chemical warfare Iraq used against them while the international community conveniently “looked the other way.”
In further attempt to point out the possible thought process of further power development in Iran he points out Iran’s own insecurities in a region that has consistently remained very hostile giving them a somewhat understandable cause to want nuclear weapons, at the least as a deterrent.
“After all, look at the differential treatment that we have given Iraq and North Korea. Iraq did not have nuclear weapons, we invaded. North Korea has it, right, we treat it with [a] kids glove,” Boroujerdi suggested, “I mean, put yourself in their shoes…they want to be recognized as a regional power, and then they look around themselves and they see Israel, Russia, Pakistan, India, China, North Korea, and nuclear submarines all in their neighborhood. You cannot be a regional superpower and then not have the goodies that the big kids on the block have.”
The topics of the night continued to remain centralized around the instability of the Iranian government, and talk of another revolution ensued. Boroujerdi brought up the reminder that throughout the past century Iran has been through two revolutions, numerous regional conflicts, and extensive human rights violations.
“As someone [who] 30 years ago took part in that revolution, I don’t want another revolution. Revolutions are too costly for a country,” he said. He continued to observe that while Iran has historically been rhetorically excessive in the public eye, they should not be considered “lunatics,” almost suggesting their bluff in most cases, citing the possibility of internally smarter discourse, the prevention of allowing Hezbollah to fire more advanced weapons on Israel in 2006, as well as the fact that they historically have never been an invasive country.
Boroujerdi concluded with three options for President Obama, including bombing Iran, containing and detering the threat with sanctions and embargos, or engaging in diplomatic discussions.
“Despite the fact that, you know, I don’t like the ones sitting in Tehran, I think the last option is the only option,” he responds to the choices, stating that there is no military solution, referring to sanctions against an oil power as strong as Iran as useless, embargos as overly difficult due to “porous borders”, and does not overlook the fact that the U.S. has only increased Iran’s own strength by ridding Iran of Sadaam and the Taliban since 2002. He also suggested that we stop blaming our own failures in the region on Iran, such as attempted connections with terrorism.
“After 30 years of being in this state of ‘cold war’, not talking with the other, we have not gotten anywhere. As somebody who is interested in the cause of democracy in Iran, I’d much prefer if the United States does engage the Iranian government. But also, puts pressue on them about the human rights issue, that you do not make a deal with Iran merely on the account of its [nuclear issue], and forget about the human rights violation.”
Boroujerdi also serves as the Founding Director of the Middle Eastern Studies Program and Co-Director of the Religion, Media and International Relations Program at Syracuse, and is frequently consulted by the media (including the Associated Press, BBC, National Public Radio, New York Times, Reuters, and the Washington Post).
The Great Decisions lectures are hosted by the Institute of World Affairs and will next feature Economist Michael Rosen and the Milwaukee Journal Sentinel’s Patrick McIlheran discussing the state of global capitalism, Tuesday Feb. 9 at 7 p.m. in the Union Ballroom.