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The most immediate issue concerning Iraq today, as it has been for nearly a decade, is how to rid the country of Saddam Husayn and the odious Ba‘th regime.  But even the most ruthless dictators do not live forever and their regimes seldom survive them for very long. Beyond this immediate problem lies the even more perplexing one of rehabilitating Iraq. Any plan for post-Saddam Iraq must go beyond simply the replacement of the leader himself to include clearly delineated goals and methods for removing the power of his Tikriti mafia and Ba‘thist influence generally.1 What are the options to remove the power and influence of Saddam's clan, his ruling elite, and the Ba‘th ideology? What choices exist to cleanse Iraq of official criminality, fascist ideology, and the decay of civil society?

In the absence of advance planning, the post-Saddam era is likely to be utterly chaotic. It is easy to foresee a collision, or a perverse embrace, of an Iraq run by Saddam's despotic henchmen by the world economy, a (black) gold rush that enriches the entrenched and robs the vast majority—recreating the very conditions that produced Saddam in the first place.2

Healing a Country

The long-term restoration of Iraq involves, among other things, two major challenges: the identification, removal, and (if warranted) prosecution of criminals (primarily in the military, security services, and ruling elite) and a similar removal of Ba‘thist functionaries in other sectors of society.

Criminals: Iraqi society has been profoundly tortured and torn to pieces by close to four decades of Ba‘thist rule. The regime's violence against its own citizenry is barely comprehensible, going far beyond the well-documented use of poison gas and including such horrors as an official culture of criminality and genocide.3 To effect these atrocities has required a maze of security institutions, concentric circles of suspicion and paranoia which ultimately center on Saddam, his sons ‘Udayy and Qusayy, and a few other family members. These are further supported by the organs of the state, primarily the military and security services, but also other ministries, whose first responsibility it is to preserve and protect the regime. To institutionalize this culture, the Ba‘thist police state has penetrated all levels and sectors of Iraqi society, through control of the educational system, the co-optation of professional and trade organizations, and an environment of fear, repression and collaboration down to the level of the neighborhood, street, building, and family.

Rooting out these criminal institutions and restoring civil society is a task as vital, and perhaps more challenging, than that of replacing Saddam. If justice and civil society cannot be restored on the street, then there is little hope that any sort of democratic ideals will succeed overall. A successor regime ought to heal a brutalized society by applying a mix of democratic politics, historical transparency, and retributive justice, both to restore a healthy system and to prosecute past criminal acts.

Functionaries: Dealing with the sheer size and complexity of the Iraqi military and security forces, not to mention the related military industries, is a formidable problem.4 The large numbers of military and security officials who are involved in activities that are illegal under Iraqi or international law—ranging from the development of weapons of mass destruction, to masterminding the smuggling of goods and black marketeering, to detention, torture, murder, and genocide— makes it difficult to find military officials not complicit in the regime's activities. In fact, finding individuals within the security apparatus without some blood on their hands seems almost impossible. We are dealing with thousands if not tens of thousands of individuals involved in criminal activities. Difficult distinctions and moral compromises must ultimately be made, however, between those who were co-opted by the regime and those who directed it, those who were brutalized and in turn became brutal, and those who practiced abnormal brutality.5

Any claimant to legitimacy as leader of a new Iraq must have the bureaucratic capability to document the crimes of its predecessor, both as a means of providing a moral basis for succession and the rebuilding of Iraqi society, and for the practical prosecution of criminals. The bureaucratic tendencies of the Ba‘thregime to document its own crimes provide a working basis for this task. The early implementation of reconstruction plans is also an important part of getting the new Iraq started. Just as Palestinians have begun to develop bureaucratic and administrative institutions outside of the former revolutionary cadres of the Palestine Liberation Organization, precisely by studying the situations on the ground and planning for the future, and by not neglecting the prosaic details of national infrastructure, so too Iraqi resistance groups might be able to mature into the core of an effective government in exile.

How to do this? The twentieth century's need to deal with the aftermath of fascism and communism provide examples of political, legal, and judicial means of addressing the criminality of ousted regimes. Several broad models exist for the task of removing the institutions, structures and ideologies of fascism or its secret sharer, communism. With all due caveats and with care to avoid facile comparisons, there are lessons to be drawn from the twentieth century's experiences in national regeneration. In thinking about the future of Iraq, it is well to consider, imaginatively and pragmatically, comparable totalitarian experiences in Nazi Germany, Stalinist Russia, Maoist China, Khmer Rouge Cambodia, and North Korea. In addition, Iraq's recent past can also be compared to the experiences of a number of other countries where repression had a systematically corrupting effect, notably Fascist Japan, apartheid South Africa, Pinochet's Chile, and Argentina and Guatemala under military juntas. Truth telling, clemency, and prosecution have been combined in these cases with decidedly mixed results. Simply put, history, justice, and politics have very different needs. Lustration has vied with impunity, and no one solution can be offered as the cure-all. Some of the problems and possibilities are outlined here.

The Russian, Japanese, and German Models

The simplest but most dangerous approach is to do nothing. This has been the course followed by Russia and several of the successor states of the Soviet Union. By incorporating the security forces and military into the new regime, Russia and such countries as Kazakstan weakened their moral foundations and compromised their future as democratic nations. The transition to democracy and devolution of the empire occurred so rapidly and unexpectedly, and the succeeding leaders derived exclusively from within the previous system, they were and are dependent on the security forces, many of which participated in the plunder of the old regime and the construction of the new kleptocratic oligarchy. Furthermore there is no accounting or justice for seven decades of massive internal repression or often brutal imperial domination. In other republics former party apparatchiks have frequently emerged as either strongmen spouting nationalist rhetoric or as leaders easily manipulating new and weak democracies.6

While ordinary Russian citizens enjoy levels of freedom of expression and assembly previously unknown, and the right to undertake economic activities, these are circumscribed by the power of the oligarchs over the media, government, and financial institutions. The West has been content to call this evolution progress, which perhaps it is, and to deal with the new "center" without placing any serious pressure on it for accountability (past or present.) The result is not only that justice has not been served for seventy years of communist crimes, but that crime is still acceptable if it pays.

Japan underwent an American military occupation but this did not achieve great results. The country was placed under American protection and constitutional limits were established on Japan's military; a small number of war crimes trials were held, both of the leadership and military officers accused of specific atrocities; and various institutions were reformed. But Japanese society never fully addressed its role in World War II. This is reflected in the begrudging legal admission of liability to compensate Korean "comfort women," the rejection of lawsuits by former Allied prisoners of war, and continuing denial of Japanese responsibility for atrocities in China. A sense of responsibility for aggression is still too often deflected into triumphal victimhood by continued genuflection toward Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Japan more than a half century later is haphazardly forgetting its fascist interlude, rather than systematically incorporating that knowledge into a new understanding of itself. The same applies, roughly to Austria.

The purge that was conducted under foreign guns in Germany after the defeat of Nazism in 1945 was much more effective. During the first several years of occupation, American, British, and French officials, military and civilian, supervised the revamping of Germany's civic institutions. At lower levels of society in Germany, efforts at de-Nazification proceeded through the early 1950s. Various tribunals and certification boards of occupying military officers and anti-Nazi Germans purged the judiciary, educational system, and medical establishment of especially noxious individuals, and to redress wrongs, such as appropriation of property. Reparations for victims of fascism were also undertaken by the successor Federal Republic of Germany. The process of de-Nazification went far, aided by the towering presence of anti-Nazi leaders, such as Konrad Adenauer. The incorporation of the Federal Republic into the world social and economic system further set Germany on the path towards pervasive change. The Germans took part – sometimes under duress – in their own rehabilitation. The German example suggests that a thorough vetting of the country is one key to helping it attain a position as a legitimate nation.

To be sure, de-Nazification fell short of its ideal goals: many individuals who had functioned as Nazis turned themselves successfully into "good Germans." The process of de-Nazification was compromised by the need to integrate the Federal Republic rapidly into the anti-Soviet alliance. The cold war of the late 1940s, and the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, short-circuited, to some degree, the efforts to remake Germany, where the perceived need to create reliable allies took precedence over calls to justice, and led to the incorporation of defeated intelligence services and military scientists into the cold war effort. That many individuals successfully disguised or hid their criminal or immoral activities, and the fact that de-Nazification efforts quickly turned into a rubber stamp—primarily it seems at the urging of both German and American officials—does not negate the utility of de-Nazification as a model for Iraq.7

Other Methods

The de-Nazification model is useful in suggesting the issues a country emerging from totalitarianism should confront. But the special conditions of post-World War II Germany – military occupation by victors intent on rehabilitation as much as punishment, the country occupied by foreign armies for four decades – is not likely ever to obtain in Iraq. The absence of a direct Western occupation, and with it the ability to do everything from indicting war criminals to rewriting textbooks, means that a successor regime is a more fragile enterprise. In the absence of these conditions, other methods must be tried. 

Organize an international tribunal. As called for by the INDICT campaign and now being applied in a limited way to war criminals in the Balkans.8  This approach, though high-minded, has very limited practicality, especially against an entrenched totalitarian regime. A Nuremberg-like trial could only be applied were the West to gain a complete military victory over Iraq, followed by a lengthy occupation. Even then, as continues to be the case with World War II war crimes tribunals, the accusations of "victor's justice" will be heard for decades to come. It is also unlikely that the victors will have much of a stomach for the job. Whatever justice is to be had can only be accomplished within Iraq, by Iraqis.

Support opposition groups. Relying on the opposition makes sense only if some of its groups have the capabilities, legitimacy, and stature to establish a post-Saddam regime in Iraq. Trouble is, no group or leader has emerged as the clear or obvious successor to Saddam. The leaders of a post-Saddam Iraq, which will be a neo-colonial protectorate in all but name for at least a few years, must be both benign and firm, personally irreproachable and yet deeply committed to Iraq. What is needed is an equivalent to Konrad Adenauer – an outstanding figure who smoothes the way to democracy. The individual most frequently cited in this role is Ahmad Chalabi of the Iraqi National Congress (INC), but his problem is an almost complete lack of following within Iraq itself. The two Kurdish groups (Patriotic Union of Kurdistan and Kurdish Democratic Party) both have some administrative experience, and might even be capable of instigating an open military rebellion, but neither is equipped nor inclined to take control over the whole of Iraq. Smaller groups (the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq, the Islamic Movement of Kurdistan, the Iraqi National Accord) lack the capabilities or support to administer even portions of Iraq. In all, then, supporting the opposition is not a way to plan for post-Saddam Iraq.

Pick a king. The weakness of the opposition groups suggests an alternative: finding a monarch and rallying support behind him. A parliamentary monarchy with a king as the head of state and symbol of unity might bring one great advantage: the question of which abstract political ideology should be in control could be replaced by the question of which development plan will succeed. The Hashemites – members of the dynasty that ruled Iraq until 1958 – are the natural candidates here. A Hashemite king might be expected to have little appeal outside of central Iraq; the Hashemite dynasty was never accepted as anything but an British imposition in the Shi‘i regions of the south and certainly not in the Kurdish areas of the north. But times change and a monarchy could be appealing after decades of Saddam Husayn. By similar token, few expected the Bourbon restoration in Spain – another country with deep regional separatist tendencies and a de facto federal structure -- to be as successful as it has been under King Juan Carlos. The retention of the monarchy in Spain represented a series of compromises between pro- and anti-Franco forces made in the wake of Franco's death. That Juan Carlos, hand-picked by Franco, turned out to be a dedicated democrat was initially surprising. His skilled leadership, which included securing the loyalty of the military, the freeing of political prisoners on the left, and the avoiding the lustration of Francoists, was critical to securing democracy, as was the transition to regional autonomy, political pluralism, and rapid elections. All of these features have relevance for Iraq. One possibility is to call on Sharif ‘Ali bin al-Husayn, leader of the Constitutional Monarchy Movement, or more creatively, Prince Hasan of Jordan, his distant cousin and the former crown prince, who just missed inheriting the throne in Amman in 1999.

Partition Iraq. Iraq has been unified within something approaching its modern boundaries only during periods of imperial strength: during the Assyrian, Babylonian, early caliphal, Ottoman, and modern eras. In fact, through the millennia, the unity of northern and southern Iraq has been the exception, not the rule.9 Today's Iraq coheres as a natural unit only when a single power, local or foreign, has the power to unify all the parts into a single polity. The existing borders are an imperial creation of the British, cobbled together out of the Ottoman administrative districts of Basra, Baghdad, and Mosul. Geographically, culturally, and linguistically diverse, Iraq consists of three de facto nations: a Shi‘i one in the south, a Sunni-Shi‘a mix in the mostly urban center, and a Kurdish in the north.

This raises the option of breaking Iraq into as many as three states.10 But Western policymakers reject this course, fearing as they do anything that could advantage Iran. Their Middle Eastern counterparts also oppose this option, fearing Iraq's return to colonial status. The Iraqi opposition groups, with the possible exception of the Kurds, also agree on the inviolable territorial integrity of Iraq, worrying that a permanently fragmented and weakened Iraq would fall under the control of its acquisitive neighbors. Despite this wide opposition, the process of geographic breakup and reconstruction is not farfetched (consider the contemporary history of Germany or Yemen). Such a radical proposal could only be made in the explicit context of a plan for the federal reconstruction of Iraq that delegates power to both geographic regions and ethnic and tribal groups, and that incorporates legislative and judiciary mechanisms for adjudication.

Truth and Reconciliation Commissions

Which brings us to the idea of a truth and reconciliation commission. These tribunals have much to recommend them, as shown by the experience of East Germany, Chile, Argentina, Guatemala, and South Africa. They combine in different measures accountability and forgiveness with indictment and prosecution. They are constitutionally empowered to gather evidence from witnesses and government files, issue subpoenas, offer partial or total amnesty in exchange for testimony (or deny amnesty).  They also recommend administrative and legislative reforms and issue reports, all of which simultaneously address society's need for judicial and historical accounting, and catharsis.11

East Germany. The Study Commission for the Assessment of History and Consequences of the SED Dictatorship in Germany was established by members of the German parliament in March 1992. Its mission was primarily investigative rather than judicial. Its results were published in eighteen volumes in 1995. As part of this research the authorities established procedures to make available to the public the innumerable personal dossiers and surveillance files of the Communist secret police, the Stasi. The effect of this is to make the pervasiveness and deeply corrupting system, which caused neighbors and families to spy on one another, comprehensible to Germans.12 The long-term effects of this process have yet to be seen, but German democracy has clearly been strengthened by it. The East German case apparently demonstrates that it is possible for people to account for what they did to one another in the service of a dehumanizing ideology and a coercive regime. But the peaceful reunification was orchestrated by a democratic and prosperous Western state, a unique context.

Chile. In 1990 the Aylwin government established the National Commission on Truth and Reconciliation, or Rettig Commission, which released its report in 1991. Severely hampered by the military dictatorship, which also demanded sweeping amnesties in exchange for permitting the restoration of democratic government, information has continued to emerge, usually by the efforts of journalists, lawyers, and intellectuals. The 1995 confessions of retired naval Captain Adolfo Scilingo about "death flights" in which thousands of prisoners were thrown, alive, into the ocean generated new calls for justice and reparations for victims of human rights abuses in Chile. These culminated, in the indictment of former dictator Augusto Pinochet by a Spanish court in 1998, followed by his detention in England for sixteen months. The Chilean experience is still in flux, but the international turmoil over Pinochet himself has galvanized calls for justice both inside and outside Chile.13.

Argentina. In Argentina, justice has been deferred, largely due to the conditions established by the outgoing military regime. The Alfonsin government established the National Commission on the Disappeared in 1983, which completed its work in 1984. A succession of democratic governments has been unable or unwilling to officially address human rights abuses by their fascist predecessors.14 However, the growing number of civil suits has begun to undermine the amnesties accorded the agents of the military dictatorship's repression. Continued public demonstrations by relatives of the "disappeared," men, women, and children abducted, killed, or "illegally appropriated" by the military, created a moral force that continues to pressure for democratic change and accountability. Former military officers cleared in the 1985 junta trial or by subsequent laws were placed under house arrest on charges of kidnapping and murder, crimes for which there is no statue of limitations. The role of the judiciary in furthering (and occasionally hindering) investigations has been critical.

Guatemala. The United Nations-sponsored Historical Clarification Commission in Guatemala, established in 1994, has only been able to investigate around the edges of official wrongdoing during the military dictatorship and guerrilla war of the 1980s. Information is so tightly controlled that lists of individuals abducted and executed by the military and security services have only recently been leaked anonymously to the press and human rights activists. Even so, the commission was able to document hundreds of massacres of civilians by the military and a much smaller number by the guerrillas. The civilian government dismissed the results and the recommendations and called instead for forgiveness from the people. Human rights abuses by the police and military are increasing, accused abusers have been released with impunity by courts, and lynching is increasing. The results are that peace accords which brought the long conflict to a negotiated end are eroding. Overall, the experience of Guatemala with a truth and reconciliation commission has been a failure.15

South Africa. In 1995 the post-apartheid regime established perhaps the most effective and cathartic truth commission, one with the power to issue or refuse amnesty for everyone from criminals to mass murderers. Under the forceful moral figure of Bishop Desmond Tutu, the commission (which closed down in October 1999, though amnesty hearings continue) was a powerful force for investigating the apartheid regime and, significantly, the African National Congress (ANC) as well. With the revelations of apartheid-era death squads, and continued calls for indictments of previous leaders such as P.W. Botha, the commission served an invaluable function in revealing the true scope of apartheid and the abuses it generated among its opponents. The commission was also in the unique position of shining light on the successor state which issued its charter.16 Overall, the South African experience with truth and reconciliation must be seen as a model of procedure and probity, but one which exists in the context of a nation still decaying socially and economically.

The experiences of truth and reconciliation commissions suggest that this could be a key way both to move beyond the Saddam regime's criminality and fascism, as well as a means legally to help the transition to civil society. What model is the best to follow? The ideal would be a purge combining some aspects of German de-Nazification and elements drawn from the experiences of truth and reconciliation commissions. A commission could provide a process for bringing together diverse opponents of the Saddam regime and act as a moral keystone to their activities.

But this is easier said than done. Who would run the commission and do the legwork to make it effective? Who will take over and remake the Iraqi military? And who will take over responsibility for the daily operation of the criminal justice system? And how will the almost two million Ba‘th party members be sorted out? These are tremendous complications for any successors of Saddam.

Here the moral authority of Prince Hasan of Jordan could be a tremendous advantage, as well as that of high-profile opponents such as Ahmad Chalabi of the Iraqi National Congress, the author Kanan Makiya (who also directs the Iraq Research and Documentation Project), and possibly even defectors such as Khidir Hamza, formerly Saddam's director of nuclear weaponization. The involvement of prominent Shi‘i clergy and representatives from at least some of the major Kurdish factions would be necessary to demonstrate the inclusive nature of the commission. Were it constituted on neutral territory, such as Sweden or Switzerland, adequately funded by contributions from opposition groups and even Western governments (not just the United States), and willing to conduct highly public and highly transparent proceedings, it could, at least in theory, begin to change the nature of resistance to Saddam.

But such a commission will face many problems. A successor regime might find it expedient to place limitations on its activities, either as part of any agreement to hand over power or in efforts to sweep matters under the rug in the name of "getting Iraq going again." Were this to occur, justice and accountability would be deferred and would almost inevitably resurface as issues, as they have in Argentina, Japan, and even France. Justice delayed is political legitimacy defiled. A corrupt judiciary could block investigations, and the military and security services would be a continual threat. All these problems suggest the establishment of a truth and reconciliation commission now, to assemble a core group familiar with the problems, and to generate an environment of morality that can be transferred to Iraq in the aftermath of Saddam. Transparent procedures, and an aggressive plan of dissemination, not simply public relations, must also be an integral part of any plan.

Conclusion

The proclamations and manifestos produced by the Iraqi opposition to date contain heartfelt calls for democracy, pluralism, and national pride, but little about the process of bringing criminals to justice, much less restoring the functions of a modern state. Similarly, Western powers have repeatedly called for building a broad-based opposition to Saddam's regime. But the administration of justice, much less water and sewage, air traffic control, banking and currency, trade unions, educational reform, nutrition and public health, have not been discussed publicly.

The powers that have taken responsibility for containing Iraq have an obligation, to their own citizens as well as to the long-suffering Iraqis, to think and plan for the Saddam regime's day of reckoning and Iraqi society's time of reconstruction. Unfortunately, the democratic West's proven short attention span in matters of foreign policy means that after a regime change in Iraq, the West will want the new leadership to take over, keep quiet, and make the problem go away. One hint of this came not long ago when Ellen Laipson of the National Intelligence Council noted a "residual longing among many Iraqis for an authoritarian leader."17 Will the West opt for the painful process of building democracy in Iraq rather than abide by another authoritarian regime? Will it be more eager to buy oil and sell weapons to strongmen rather than support the often chaotic growth of democratic institutions?

Taking realities into account, we conclude that Westerners must minimally take the following steps:

• Convene an international conference to design a truth and reconciliation commission, perhaps involving leaders of previous commissions with high moral and international standing, such as Desmond Tutu.

• Expand the INDICT campaign beyond Saddam and a few henchmen by publishing as comprehensive lists as possible of Iraqi victims and perpetrators. Lobby the international community to apprehend criminals accused of internationally recognized human rights abuses.

• Organize study groups of Iraqi and Western experts to address key problems, including the delegation of power in a federal Iraq, the dismantling of intelligence and security services, the allocation of oil revenue, educational reform, and the restoration of basic services and infrastructure.

• Communicate these plans directly to the Iraqi people through radio and television broadcasts.

The U.S. money appropriated by the Iraq Liberation Act would be better spent studying the crimes of the existing regime and planning for the future, rather than arming groups who must still demonstrate the willingness and ability to cooperate with one another. A full page ad in The New York Times discussing the reconstruction, moral and material, of Iraq, would be a more effective and threatening weapon than shuttling between meetings and luncheons. The convening of a truth and reconciliation commission in Geneva under the auspices of Prince Hasan, with, say, presidents Clinton, Mubarak, and Demirel in attendance, would send a far stronger message than any State Department briefing or INC press release.

Now—and not when crisis is upon us—is the time to think through the ways to bring Iraq back to the community of civilized states. Addressing this issue now may have as much significance for the Middle East as the comparable questions fifty-five years ago had for the long-term well-being of Europe and East Asia.
Alexander H. Joffe taught in the department of anthropology at the Pennsylvania State University from 1993-2000.
1 The best discussion to date of post-Saddam scenarios is James W. Moore, "Après Saddam, Le Déluge? Speculating on Post-Saddam Iraq," Middle East Policy, 6 (1999): 27-44.
2 Samira Haj, The Making of Iraq, 1900-1963: Capital, Power, and Ideology (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), pp. 136-139.
3 Samir al-Khalil (pseudonym for Kanan Makiya), Republic of Fear: The Politics of Modern Iraq (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989), pp. 46-72. See also Genocide in Iraq: The Anfal Campaign against the Kurds (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1993).
4 William J. Chambliss, "State-Organized Crime: The American Society of Criminology, 1988 Presidential Address," Criminology, 27 (1989): 183-208.
5 Timothy Garton Ash, "The Truth about Dictatorship," The New York Review of Books, Feb. 19, 1998; Mark J. Osiel, "Why Prosecute? Critics of Punishment for Mass Atrocity," Human Rights Quarterly, 22.1 (2000): 118-147.
6 Brian Kuns, "Old Corruption in the New Russia," The Russian Transformation: Political, Sociological, and Psychological Aspects, Betty Glad and Eric Shiraev, eds. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999), pp. 119-132.
7 Thomas Alan Schwartz, "John J. McCloy and the Landsberg Cases," in Jeffrey M. Diefendorf, Axel Frohn, and Hermann-Josef Rupieper, eds., American Policy and the Reconstruction of West Germany, 1945-1955 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 433-454.
8 See the INDICT website at http://www.indict.org. For a comprehensive discussion of legal issues in successor states see Neil Kritz, Transitional Justice: How Emerging Democracies Reckon with Former Regimes (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace, 1995), 3 vols.
9 Norman Yoffee, "The Collapse of Ancient Mesopotamian States and Civilizations," The Collapse of Ancient States and Civilizations, Norman Yoffee and George L. Cowgill, eds. (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1988), pp. 44-68.
10 Daniel Byman, "Let Iraq Collapse," The National Interest, 45 (1996): 48-60.
11 United States Institute of Peace materials at www.usip.org/library/truth.html.
12 Angela Kuntz Mendelson, "A Quiet Land: Reflections on Dictatorship in East Germany," Dimensions of German Unification, Economic, Social, and Legal Analyses, A. Bradley Shingleton, Marian J. Gibbon, and Kathryn S. Mack, eds. (Boulder: Westview, 1995), pp. 119-130.
13 Mary Helen Spooner, Soldiers in a Narrow Land: The Pinochet Regime in Chile (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), pp. 258-260. Richard J. Wilson, "Prosecuting Pinochet: International Crimes in Spanish Domestic Law," Human Rights Quarterly, 21 (1999): 927-979.
14 Rita Arditti, Searching for Life: the Grandmothers of the Plaza de Mayo and the Disappeared Children of Argentina (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), pp. 32-78.
15 See reports by Amnesty International, http://www.amnesty.org/ailib/aireport/ar99/amr34.htm; Human Rights Watch, http://www.hrw.org/worldreport99/americas/guatemala.html.
16 Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report (New York: Grove's Dictionaries, 1999), five volumes. See their web site at www.truth.org.za.
17 In "Symposium: After Saddam, What then for Iraq?" Middle East Policy, 6 (1999): 1-26, especially pp. 2-3.