Stephen Blank is professor of national security affairs at the Strategic Studies Institute in Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, and author of The Sorcerer as Apprentice: Stalin's Commissariat of Nationalities (Greenwood, 1994). The views expressed here are those of the author alone.
On April 28, 1994, Russia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent the British Foreign Office a remarkable démarche, in which it claimed the right to veto any oil exploration in the Caspian Sea, even in those areas beyond Russia's boundaries. In a dramatic assertion of power, the document declared that without Russian approval, oil projects in those regions "cannot be recognized":
The Caspian Sea is an enclosed water reservoir with a single ecosystem and represents an object of joint use within whose boundaries all issues or activities including resource development have to be resolved with the participation of all the Caspian countries. . . . Any steps by whichever Caspian state aimed at acquiring any kind of advantages with regard to the areas and resources . . . cannot be recognized . . . [and] any unilateral actions are devoid of a legal basis.1
This letter was not an abstract intimidation but a direct threat to large oil projects about to take form in the independent countries of Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan. It marks Russia's most blatant and public assertion of proprietary rights over the oil and economic destiny of Central Asia and Transcaucasia (hereafter collectively called the Southern Tier) and climaxes a Russian campaign to reestablish the Soviet economic space. More than that, it reveals Moscow's belief that these new states deserve no more than very partial sovereignty.
That being the case, it is a mistake for U.S. policy makers to worry primarily about the danger of the mostly Muslim states of the Southern Tier's falling under fundamentalist Islamic influence coming out of Iran. The real worry concerns Russia's sustained effort to subordinate and reduce the Southern Tier's economic and political independence.
The real worry concerns Russia's sustained effort to subordinate and reduce the Southern Tier's economic and political independence.
RUSSIAN CLAIMS ON SOUTHERN TIER OIL AND GAS
For Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan, the foreign sale of oil and gas represents their main (if not only) path into the world economy. It also provides the means for them to escape economic domination by Russia. Foreign interest in the Southern Tier creates for them the possibility of gaining enough freedom of action to play off rivals who might otherwise seek to dominate them. This freedom is not, however, something Moscow is about to accept; it prefers their oil to stay undeveloped and for the Southern Tier republics to remain "quasi-autonomous appendages" of Russia's economy.2
To prevent the Southern Tier states from attaining true independence, Moscow uses several tactics in what can only be described as economic warfare.
Russian leadership. Moscow covets the lucrative possibilities offered by the energy business, for example by redirecting energy trade to its transport network. Indeed, the Russian authorities have not only announced their interest in joining OPEC (only to retract that intent for now)3 but have flirted with compelling the oil producers in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) to integrate under Russian auspices and become a mini-OPEC.4
A cut of the profits. In Azerbaijan, Moscow coerced the authorities into granting Lukoil, the Russian state oil firm, 10 to 20 percent of projected revenues from future Caspian Sea oil finds--all this without Lukoil's putting up any equity. The Russians also pressured Kazakhstan for preference in granting exploration licenses and to let it join the massive Chevron-Tengiz project.5 Viewing oil debts as a way to promote integration, they began promoting debt for equity swaps in Kazakhstan, where the equity was shares in the republics' oil and gas firms.6 That proposal meant an effective Russian takeover of these firms.
Transit through Russia. In some instances, Russia has threatened to or actually cut off oil exports from Southern Tier states. The Southern Tier states being effectively landlocked, Moscow exploits Russia's geographic advantage to gain control over their oil -- getting them "by their pipelines."7 It has tried to coerce Azerbaijan to ship oil only through Russian pipelines. Making the most of Kazakhstan's and Turkmenistan's dependence on Russian transport routes, Moscow systematically blackmailed them in 1993-94. Gazprom, Russia's company, in November 1993 cut off Turkmenistan's gas exports to Europe, its main source of profits.8 Moscow demanded 20 to 40 percent of the revenues from various oil and gas projects under exploration in Kazakhstan in return for use of its pipelines.9 It insisted that Kazakhstan's oil be loaded onto Russian tankers, mainly in Novorossiisk, for export abroad.10 There are unconfirmed reports that Russia won this concession.
Also, Moscow wants U.S. companies to pay massive bribes to Russia in order to produce and export oil from the Southern Tier. Indeed, the press has reported its efforts to coerce Chevron into making such payments.11
Refining. Although all these states produce much oil and gas, they cannot refine these and produce finished goods. Russia alone has that capacity, for until now foreign firms have showed no interest in this business. This gives Moscow control over not just the pipelines but also finished petrochemical goods.
In a show of political muscle, Lukoil recently petitioned Moscow to appoint it coordinator of projects to develop Caspian Sea oil and gas fields lest Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and Turkmenistan sign contracts with foreigners, a prospect said to "bewilder" Russian businessmen.12 Admitting this is mainly a political question where the Foreign Ministry must lead, Lukoil's president, Vagit Alekperov, observed that if Russia did not take such control over the Caspian shelf, it "risked losing its positions on the Caspian Sea."13
Armed force. The Russians turn to force, ostensibly for peacemaking purposes, but actually to alter state boundaries or uphold client regimes. Russia's active role in mediating the war over Nagorno-Karabakh includes hints that an oil concession is to be the payoff. Except for the forces deployed in Tajikistan's civil war, economic and political means are Russia's most effective levers in the campaign to gain control over the Southern Tier states.
As in the bad old Soviet days, Moscow again today consciously uses its control of the oil and gas industry to force not just the Southern Tier states, but also Ukraine, the Baltic states, and Belarus into economic integration and political union. In all, even in its vastly reduced condition, the Kremlin shows every sign of a sustained neo-imperial offensive. Needless to say, this differs markedly from the visions some had that Russia would collapse after the USSR collapsed, to be followed by a breakup of Southern Tier states.14
As in the bad old Soviet days, Moscow again today consciously uses its control of the oil and gas industry to force not just the Southern Tier states, but also Ukraine, the Baltic states, and Belarus into economic integration and political union.
Russian policy makers take it for granted that economic factors make reintegration necessary and leave the Southern Tier no other choice.15 Both Russian president Boris Yeltsin and Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin insist that economic unity is but a prelude to military and political reunion.16
With this background, let us look again at the Russian démarche to London of April 28, 1994. In addition to representing the high point of Russia's campaign to exert influence over Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan, it reveals broader intentions. By asserting Russia's preemptive rights over Caspian Sea energy ventures, the démarche implicitly claims rights to all CIS energy ventures, and thereby claims a virtually imperial right to energy across the whole of the CIS.17
The démarche's not being addressed to Baku but to Great Britain suggests that Russia sees this claim in the old East-versus-West terms; and its destination implicitly reveals Moscow's reluctance to recognize Azerbaijan and the other CIS states as independent and sovereign.
The letter implies that if the Caspian littoral states are not dominated by Russia they will either adopt some anti-Russian ideology, such as Pan-Turkic nationalism or fundamentalist Islam, or join an anti-Russian coalition led by the West--principles that underpined much of tsarist thinking and then dominated during the Soviet period.
In brief, the letter shows how the brutal, Mafia-like tactics of old, and the imperial currents of thought, remain in place. At the same time, this démarche is not born of Russian strength. It has a menacing and peremptory tone at the same time that it reflects an awareness that Baku, Ankara, and the Western capitals were about to overcome Moscow's wishes in the oil and Nagorno-Karabakh issues. It replies to Baku's successful initiatives to win French, British, Turkish, and U.S. support for a peacemaking presence from the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), and for Western-led energy projects.
TWO EXAMPLES OF RUSSIAN AGGRESSIVENESS
Two case histories show to what lengths the Russians are now going to control the Southern Tier oil and gas industries.
Kazakhstan. The Kazakhstanis know about Russian pressure and are looking for Western support to resist it. Very politely but firmly, Foreign Minister Kanat Saudabayev explained this to a NATO audience:
Kazakhstan is obliged to pursue its foreign policy in the context of the existing balance of forces and interests, with certain states waxing stronger and other nations growing weaker, and with no firm guarantees that zones of conflicts or instabilities will not appear in direct proximity to Kazakhstan or jeopardize its security. As a consequence, the Republic of Kazakhstan has no alternative but to strengthen its own and regional security, strive to attain real economic independence, and become gradually integrated into the world community. To improve [the] international situation and in order to strengthen stability and security, it is most important to develop international contacts and cooperation. The role of international organizations, including NATO, can therefore hardly be overestimated.18
Kazakhstan's prime minister at the time, Stepan Tereshchenko, was equally candid about foreign economic ties.
We have been convinced repeatedly that for our foreign partners a serious guarantee of the development of economic ties with Kazakhstan is the level of its interstate relations with other countries, the existence of contracts and agreements that determine priority spheres of cooperation, direct participation in negotiations on large projects by the head of our state and other leaders, and the course that is being pursued towards strengthening political stability in the Republic.19
These remarks show the stakes of Kazakhstan's energy independence and implicitly point out many avenues by which Russia can obstruct it.
By April 1994, the Kremlin had issued its ultimatum on the Caspian to Great Britain; less publicly, a month later it blocked almost all Kazakh oil exports, in one coup depriving Kazakhstan of foreign oil sales, foreign currency, and economic ties with the West, and forcing Kazakh refineries to stop production. Kazakh energy officials claim this pressure is tied to Russian demands for a share in local oil projects.20 In response, the Kazakhstanis hurried to commission the construction of new pipelines and to search for alternate pipeline routes.21 Russia's pressure worked. The Kazakhstanis and their potential Western partners realized that unless Russia's interests were recognized, they could not market Kazakhstan's oil.
Russian pressure has also stalled work on Kazakhstan's showcase Chevron-Tengiz project and contributed to its spiraling costs, factors that, in turn, led Chevron to cut back its investment in May 1994. Since that project is a litmus test for other foreign ventures, cancellation would be a disaster for Kazakhstan, and would leave it no option but Russia for developing its oilfields.22
Turkmenistan. Turkmenistan faces similar problems. The Russians not only cut off its gas exports to Europe but also tried to profit from any future pipeline. Russia apparently bought Turkmenistan's gas supply at low prices and resold it to Turkey at a 300 percent markup. Through early 1994, Russia also negotiated with Turkmenistan, Iran, and Turkey to build a pipeline to ship oil and gas from Turkmenistan to Europe and to build oil and gas complexes. Thus Russia forced itself onto the consortium. From Ankara's standpoint, shipping the oil and gas through Turkey by 1996 is essential and the delay strikes at its vital interest.23 But in June 1994, Turkish papers reported that Russian bureaucratic obstruction had held up work on the pipeline, preventing project plans from being drawn up. Consequently, the $5 billion in financing needed to lay the pipeline has not yet been arranged.24
Russian policies in Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan offer a harbinger of future actions with regard to other CIS countries. But if Turkmenistan can resist pressure to submit to Moscow's economic and domestic policies, it will prove Roland Dannreuther's assertion that despite the Southern Tier's current dependence upon Russia, the latter is in an irretrievable retreat from the Southern Tier and the Muslim world.25 Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan still have and are exercising the option to find alternative routes for their oil and gas.26 Azerbaijan, after all, did sign with Great Britain and resist Russia. Nor does U.S. preference for a Russian route bind other states. Should other options appear, they will likely move them further away from Russia's embrace.
EXPATRIATE RUSSIANS AND THE RUBLE
In addition to gaining control over Southern Tier oil, Moscow uses two other principal mechanisms to gain control of the CIS: expatriate Russians and the ruble.
Expatriate Russians. Russia's Vice Premier Aleksandr' Shokhin stated in November 1993 that Russia would use every instrument of economic policy to advance the Russian diaspora and reintegration. He said the issue of the "Russian-speaking people" (i.e., not just ethnic Russians) abroad would appear in all economic talks with the Southern Tier and CIS members generally. Moreover, as Shokhin asserted,
We shall negotiate the extension of credits solely with those states which will first conclude with Russia agreements on emigration with rigid obligations, including that on material compensation for migrants and second, conclude an agreement on dual citizenship. . . . We tie politics with economics. . . . The same is true of the condition of the Russian-speaking people in the "near abroad." Whenever some benefits are requested from us, we are entitled to pose a question about the balance of interests. . . . I believe that with time we will all become accustomed to the thought that this does not amount to some imperial ambitions but a normal negotiating process.27
Shortly after, Moscow pushed the CIS for dual citizenship for Russians abroad. President Nursultan Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan publicly blasted this idea, saying it recalled Nazi policy toward the Sudeten Germans; the notion was promptly shelved. But Kyrgyzstan, with an economy in ruins, did agree to this demand, and Turkmenistan followed suit.28
The Russians seek to codify a privileged position for their colonists in the new states. The Kremlin insisted on CSCE membership for the Southern Tier states so they could be arraigned at the CSCE, if need be, for denying Russians' civil rights.29 In July 1994, the Russian government drafted guidelines for Russian policy that tied economic and military cooperation with CIS states to their observance of the rights and interests of their Russian communities. They demanded talks on establishing Russian-language radio and television service. Enterprises with Russian workers and public organizations of Russian communities should receive support from Moscow and host states. A share of Russian credits to CIS members should go to support "Russian" factories, making legal what is already routine practice vis-à-vis Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan.30 This policy, which took effect in September 1994, is essentially the nineteenth-century imperialist policy of extraterritoriality in new guise.
The ruble. Moscow has made several shifts in its effort to use its currency to gain economic control over the Southern Tier since the fall of the USSR. At first, Soviet-era subsidies to the Southern Tier for finished goods and energy products continued. The Kremlin allowed CIS central banks to issue ruble-denominated credits, but this greatly stimulated inflation in Russia and undermined Russia's own economic interests, costing some 10 to 15 percent of Russia's GNP.31 The Russians then changed policies and forced the Southern Tier republics from the old ruble zone into a new market-dominated system that allowed them more control over the CIS economies.32 In 1992-93, Russia issued ultimata to the republics that they either accept Russia's Central Bank as their monetary authority or stop issuing rubles as their domestic currency.
These ultimata triggered a series of moves that led to the breakdown of the ruble zone and the creation of independent currencies by all the Southern Tier states save Tajikistan. Though this appeared to be a Southern Tier declaration of independence, it really only altered the form of dependence on Moscow. Fiona Hill and Pamela Jewett observe:
The republics have been encouraged to introduce their own currencies and abandon the [old pre-1993] Russian ruble. They have also been asked to peg the new currencies to the ruble, coordinate their economic and monetary policies with Russia, and desist from any actions that either lead to the creation of alternative economic zones [involving Turkey or Iran] or impinge upon Russia's access to strategic raw materials. In the case of [Kyrgyzstan,] Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, Moscow is using their ethnic-Russian and Russian-speaking populations as an instrument to coerce them into playing by its rules. The end goal is a Russian-dominated economic zone within the CIS and the option of creating a new Russian ruble once economic stability has been achieved.33
Since then, Kyrgyz, Kazakh, and Uzbek officials have frequently charged that Russia is exporting its inflation to them, failing to pay debts for Southern Tier goods, and holding Southern Tier oil pipelines hostage.34
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES
The Clinton and Bush administrations have both declared an interest in the Southern Tier's movement toward market democracy and denuclearization, and away from fundamentalist Islam. The central goals of current policy are regional democratization through open and fair elections, freedom of assembly to form political parties, and the freedoms of speech, press, and religion.35
In pursuit of these democratic goals--nowhere fully practiced in the Southern Tier--U.S. officials pursue a series of avowedly linked policies to foster market democracy there. In practice, Washington pursues a policy, as Undersecretary of State Strobe Talbott has put it, "focusing on those areas of the globe where success in one country or region will have an influence on surrounding areas."36 That means, and Talbott acknowledges as much, that Washington mainly targets Russia for reform (which includes renunciation of neo-imperialist ambitions) in the belief that success there is likely to lead to other happy results among Russia's neighbors.37
Unfortunately, the opposite is happening. In other words, reform in Russia is not what its supporters hope it to be--a model for a democratic Southern Tier or an end to imperial longings. Indeed, the whole notion of casting one country as a model for another is based on a false premise. These models, like Turkey and Russia, take their role too seriously. Since Russian policy in the Southern Tier is frankly and unabashedly imperial in tone and content, strategic alliance with Russian reform, as Talbott calls U.S. policy, essentially means accepting Russia's neo-imperial or neocolonial relationship to the Southern Tier. This relationship cannot sustain true market reforms or promote democracy in either Russia or the Southern Tier since Russia and the Southern Tier states do not seek less empire or more democracy, respectively. Nor does Russia want the reformers to win in the Southern Tier because that would accelerate its retreat from the region.
It is clear that economic diktats from Moscow do nothing to promote Southern Tier growth or resolve local problems. These look backward to the Soviet infrastructure rather than forward to the world economy. Russia has nothing to offer the Southern Tier other than the perpetuation of its inferior place in a regional division of labor--and it has already become clear that Russia cannot afford that reintegration. In a larger sense, Russian strategic ambitions exceed capacities. Efforts to realize those ambitions will probably accelerate a breakdown of both Russia and the Southern Tier, to the detriment of all involved.
Such a calamity will engage the United States and drastically magnify the difficulties it faces in every issue where it relates to Russia, the CIS, and the neighboring states. If for no other reason, it behooves Americans to use their influence to encourage the Southern Tier's independence, not Russia's hegemonic policies. This gives Southern Tier affairs an importance for the United States that transcends opportunities for investment or the vagaries of the international energy economy. But, as Dannreuther observes, this will not come easily. "The West will only be able to influence Russian policy in Central Asia and the Persian Gulf to the extent to which it shows a willingness to become engaged."38
It behooves Americans to use their influence to encourage the Southern Tier's independence, not Russia's hegemonic policies.
Until and unless that sustained engagement comes about, Central Asia will remain economically endangered and an object of international contention. In short, without foreign support, Central Asia could soon become another breeding ground of failed states.
1 John Lloyd and Steve LeVine, "Russia Demands Veto Over Caspian Oil Deals,"Financial Times, May 31, 1994, p. 2.
2 Martha Brill Olcott, "Central Asia and the New Russian-American Rapprochement," in George Ginsburgs, Alvin Z. Rubinstein, and Oles Smolansky, eds., Russia and America: From Rivalry to Reconciliation (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1993), p. 129.
3 ITAR-TASS, Jan. 29, 1994, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report: Central Eurasia (hereafter FBIS, Sov), Jan. 31, 1994, p. 1.
4 INTERFAX (Moscow), Feb. 8, 1994, in FBIS, Sov, Feb. 9, 1994, p. 22; Kommersant-Daily, June 21, 1994, in FBIS, Sov, June 23, 1994.
5 The Washington Post, Mar. 18, 1994; Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (hereafter RFE/RL) Daily Report, Apr. 6, 1994; and Feb. 10, 1994.
6 Kommersant-Daily, Dec. 7, 1993, in FBIS, Sov, Dec. 8, 1993, p. 2.
7 The Washington Post, Mar. 18, 1994; June 8, 1994.
8 Julie Corwin, "Too Close for Comfort,"U.S. News & World Report, Feb. 7, 1994, p. 43.
9 RFE/RL Daily Report, Apr. 6, 1994; Ahmed Rashid, "Renewed Hegemony," Far Eastern Economic Review, Feb. 24, 1994, pp. 22-23.
10 Stephen J. Blank, "Turkey's Strategic Engagement in the Former USSR and U.S. Interests," in Stephen J. Blank, LTC. William T. Johnsen, and Stephen C. Pelletiere, Turkey's Strategic Position at the Crossroads of World Affairs (Carlisle Barracks, Penn.: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1994), pp. 75-77.
11 "Chevron Denies Caspian Pipeline Move,"The Los Angeles Times, Nov. 14, 1994, p. D8.
12 Segodnya, July 6, 1994, in FBIS, Sov, July 6, 1994, p. 5.
14 Paul A. Goble, "CIS, Boom, Bah: The Commonwealth of Independent States and the Post-Soviet Successor States," in Allen C. Lynch and Kenneth W. Thompson, eds., Soviet and Post-Soviet Russia in A World of Change (Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1994), pp. 192-93.
15 Vitaly Naumkin, "Russia and the States of Central Asia and the Transcaucasus," in Robert D. Blackwill and Sergei A. Karaganov, eds., Damage Limitation or Crisis? Russia and the Outside World CSIA Studies in International Security No. 5,(Washington, D.C.: Brassey's, 1994), p. 199; Yuri V. Gankovsky, "Russia's Relations With the Central Asian States Since the Dissolution of the Soviet Union," in Hafeez Malik, ed., Central Asia: Its Strategic Importance and Future Prospects (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994), pp. 121-23.
16 John Lloyd, "Slav States Pledge Economic Union,"Financial Times, July 12, 1993, p. 2; Russian Television Network, July 15, 1992, in FBIS, Sov, July 16, 1992, p. 21.
17 The Washington Post, Mar. 18, 1994; Financial Times, May 31, 1994.
18 H.E. Kanat Sudabayev, "Kazakhstan and NATO--Towards an Eurasian Security System," NATO's Sixteen Nations, no. 2, 1994, p. 33.
19 Almaty,Kazakhstanskaya pravda, Oct. 12, 1993, in FBIS, USR, Jan. 26, 1994, p. 63.
20 INTERFAX, June 24, 1994, in FBIS, Sov, June 27, 1994; RFE/RL Daily Report, June 29, 1994.
21 Almaty,Panorama in Russian, July 2, 1994, in FBIS, USR, July 11, 1994, pp. 80-81. Kazakhstan also turned to Japan who have indicated a "basic agreement" in April 1994 to construct a new refinery in Aktau and are discussing modernizing the existing one at Atyrau, two projects that are part of a pipeline project where Mitsubishi is building a pipeline from Western to Eastern Kazakhstan, joining the Caspian Sea deposits like Chimkent to the Eastern half of the country. These projects are explicitly intended to buttress Kazakhstan's oil independence, Foreign Broadcast Information Service Pacific Rim Economic Review, Aug. 10, 1994, pp. 13-15.
22 Andy Pasztor, "Chevron Cuts Investment at Big Project in Kazkahstan, Hits Impasse on Pipeline,"The Wall Street Journal, May 9, 1994, p.A3.
23 U.S. News & World Report, Feb. 7, 1994; Izvestiya, Apr. 7, 1994, in FBIS, Sov, Apr. 8, 1994, pp. 10-11; ITAR-TASS, Apr. 5, 1994, in FBIS, Sov, Apr. 6, 1994, p. 46; Turkish Daily News, June 21, 1994, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report: Western Europe (hereafter FBIS, WE), June 24, 1994, pp. 45-46.
24 Turkish Daily News, June 21, 1994, in FBIS, WE, June 24, 1994.
25 Roland Dannreuther, "Russia, Central Asia and the Persian Gulf," Survival, XXXV, No. 4,Winter 1993, p. 94. This is his more general theme.
26 Ibid., pp. 99-102.
27 Quoted in Fiona Hill and Pamela Jewett, "Back in the USSR": Russia's Intervention in the Internal Affairs of the Former Soviet Republics and the Implications of United States Policy toward Russia (Cambridge, Mass. Strengthening Democratic Institutions Project, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 1994), p. 36.
28 The New York Times, Dec. 25, 1993.
29 ITAR-TASS, July 8, 1994, in FBIS, Sov, July 8, 1994, p. 10.
30 Kommersant-Daily, July 29, 1994, in FBIS, Sov, Aug. 1, 1994, p. 1; Rossiyskiye vesti, Aug. 16, 1994, in FBIS, Sov, Aug. 17, 1994, pp. 12-13.
31 Ilya Prizel, "The United States and a Resurgent Russia: A New Cold War or a Balance of Power Recast?" in Stephen J. Blank and Earl H. Tilford Jr., eds., Does Russian Democracy Have a Future? (Carlisle Barracks, Penn.: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1994), pp. 142-43.
33 Hill and Jewett, "Back in the USSR," p. 30.
34 Moscow RIA, Sept. 1, 1993, in FBIS, Sov, Sept. 3, 1993, p. 11,; ITAR-TASS, June 22, 1993, in FBIS, Sov, June 23, 1993, pp. 43-44; and "Nazarbayev's Complaints from Madrid,"ABC, Mar. 23, 1994, in FBIS, Sov, Mar. 28, 1994, p. 52.
35 Strobe Talbott, "Promoting Democracy and Prosperity in Central Asia," address at the U.S.-Central Asia Business Conference, Washington, D.C., May 3, 1994, in U.S. Department of State Dispatch, V, no. 19,May 9, 1994, p. 280.
38 Dannreuther, "Russia, Central Asia and the Persian Gulf," p. 94.