Middle East Intelligence Bulletin
Jointly published by the United States Committee for a Free Lebanon and the Middle East Forum
  Vol. 3   No. 3 Table of Contents
MEIB Main Page

March 2001 


Syria's Foreign Relations: Iraq
by Gary C. Gambill

The following is Part I of a series of articles examining Syrian foreign policy under President Bashar Assad

Assad and Aziz
Assad and Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz last September [SANA]
Syrian President Bashar Assad has presided over a dramatic transformation in Syrian-Iraqi relations since his ascension to power in July 2000. The two countries, which severed relations two decades ago after Damascus sided with Iran in it's 1980-1988 war against Iraq, have rapidly accelerated the rapprochement that began in 1997 and significant steps have been taken to promote military, economic and political cooperation.

Economic Cooperation

In recent months, Syria and Iraq have reopened their border, lifted visa requirements for each other's citizens, increased bilateral trade, and signed a host of agreements concerning commerce, transport and communications. For Syria, increased trade with Iraq is considered a critical element in reviving its stagnant economy. Like many other states in the region, Damascus wants to establish a foothold in the Iraqi economy now that an end to the sanctions may be on the horizon. For Iraq, trade with Syria promises to help erode UN-imposed trade restrictions, since the UN has no monitors in Syria.

On January 31, Syrian Prime Minister Muhammad Mustafa Miru and Iraqi Vice President Taha Yassin Ramadan signed a tariff reduction accord to reduce and gradually eliminate most trade restrictions between the two countries, an occasion which the state-run media called "a starting point towards turning over a new leaf of Syrian-Iraqi cooperation."1 The current trade volume between the two states, around $500 million a year, is expected to double or even triple in 2001.

One of the most lucrative aspects of Syrian-Iraqi economic cooperation was Assad's decision last November to reopen the 500-mile oil pipeline running from the Kirkuk oil fields in northern Iraq to the Syrian port of Baniyas. Since then, around 150,000 barrels of oil per day have passed through it. The pipeline, if fully repaired, can handle up to 800,000 barrels per day.

For Syria, whose dismal economy is starved for cash, the deal was a bonanza. Syria has bought the oil from Iraq at a price estimated to be between $10-15 per barrel, allowing it to export more of its own oil at the international price of crude oil, around $24. For Iraq, smuggling oil through Syria is a way of bypassing UN sanctions. Whereas Iraq's oil revenues are supposed to go into a UN-controlled escrow account and be disbursed only for humanitarian purposes, Saddam has been able to earn around $2 million a day in illicit proceeds from this oil. However, American Secretary of State Colin Powell reportedly won Assad's agreement to allow the UN to monitor the pipeline during his visit to Damascus last month.

Military Cooperation

Syrian concerns about growing Turkish-Israeli military ties and the deterioration of the peace process with Israel have led Assad to pursue the highest level of military cooperation with Iraq since the 1973 October War, when Iraqi units were sent to fight Israeli forces in the Golan Heights.. Iraq, for its part, is interested in rebuilding its military. Since Syria possesses many of the same Soviet-built weapons systems as Iraq, the newly-reopened border between the two countries could potentially serve as a conduit for Iraq's acquisition of spare parts and upgrades for its military.

On January 31, Iraqi Vice-President Taha Yassin Ramadan said that the two countries are negotiating a "long-term strategic cooperation agreement." Speaking in Damascus shortly after the free trade agreement was signed, Ramadan said that the main terms of the accord only need "drafting and finalizing."2

Arab diplomatic sources in Damascus reported late last year that Maher Assad, the brother of the Syrian president, made a secret two-day visit to Baghdad to discuss military cooperation with the Iraqi regime. During his visit, he met with Qusay Hussein, the younger son of Saddam Hussein who has taken charge of important security functions for the Iraqi regime. Shortly thereafter, Assad appointed a committee of military and intelligence officials, headed by Vice President Abdul Halim Khaddam, to oversee military ties with Baghdad.3

According to Israeli intelligence sources, Qusay visited Damascus in January to discuss contingency plans for Syrian-Iraqi military cooperation in the event of an Israeli attack. Qusay reportedly agreed to establish a joint command and control center and place two Iraqi armored divisions (the 10th Armored Division and an unspecified Republican Guard division) on a state of heightened readiness for deployment to Syria.

Political Cooperation

Syria and Iraq, which are led by separate wings of the Ba'ath party, have long been engaged in a fierce political rivalry. Each regime has striven to prove itself to be the most authentic representative of secular Arab nationalism, while seeking to undercut the legitimacy of the other by sponsoring its dissident groups. In recent months, however, the two sides appear to have called a truce. Iraq opened an interests section in Damascus a year ago, and Syria is preparing to do likewise. The two countries have also exchanged numerous senior-level visits since Assad's ascension to power in July.

Moreover, the Iraqi regime has issued instructions to all organs of the ruling Ba'ath Party in Iraq, as well as its branches overseas, to support the Assad regime's policies. Iraq has also strictly curtailed the activities of Syrian opposition groups based in Baghdad, which include Islamist, Marxist and Ba'athist dissidents. These organizations have been ordered to stop issuing statements that criticize the Assad regime and told that violating these instructions will result in deportation from Iraq.4 While Syria has toned down its support for Iraqi dissidents, it has not taken the same kinds of measures that the Iraqis have.

Conclusion

While Syrian-Iraqi ties are the closest they have been in over twenty years, it is not clear where this relationship is going in the long term. Since inter-Arab treaties tend to suffer from an extremely low level of implementation, one must be careful not to read too much into the succession of agreements that have been signed by the two countries.

Ultimately, Assad places a much higher value in improving relations with the US and the Arab Gulf states. It is likely that, to some extent, improving ties with Iraq is primarily a means of gaining bargaining leverage for more important diplomatic pursuits. For example, Assad's "concession" to Powell's request that he permit UN monitoring of the Iraqi-Syrian oil pipeline has apparently resulted in increased US support for Syria's control of Lebanon (at least for the time being) and may even result in Syria obtaining one of the rotating seats on the UN security council.

Likewise, a delegation from the Kuwaiti national assembly arrived in Damascus earlier this year seeking assurances that Damascus will support the sheikhdom if its security is threatened by Iraq. There is no word yet on what the Kuwaitis offered in return.

Notes

  1 SANA news agency (Damascus), 31 January 2001.
  2 Al-Hayat (London), 1 February 2001.
  3 Al-Quds Al-Arabi (London), 29 December 2001.
  4 Al-Majd (Amman), 5 February 2001.


� 2001 Middle East Intelligence Bulletin. All rights reserved.

MEIB Main Page