Middle East Intelligence Bulletin
Jointly published by the United States Committee for a Free Lebanon and the Middle East Forum
  Vol. 2   No. 2

February 2000 


Back to February 2000 Table of Contents
Back to Middle East Intelligence Bulletin homepage.


Israeli Public Disillusioned with Lebanon Occupation
by Uri Appenzeller

Israeli funeral
Yafit Yitah and Arieh Yitah during the February 13 funeral of their son, Tsahi, who was killed by a Hezbollah attack in south Lebanon
What started as a small movement of mothers whose children served, and in some cases, were victims of the conflict in Lebanon, has grown into a nation-wide public call for Israel's permanent withdrawal from Lebanon. It has become a popular apolitical movement uniting people from all corners of Israeli society and all sides of the political spectrum. A movement of this scale and apolitical nature has not been evident since the post-Yom Kippur War movement that toppled Golda Meir's administration. What ignited the public in Israel and what is motivating more and more people to join, is what many consider to be the Barak administration's weak standing both in its foreign policy and in its domestic justification for the ongoing occupation of south Lebanon.

    In April 1996, Israel launched Operation Grapes of Wrath in response to Hezbollah missile attacks on the northern villages of Israel. At that time, I was a corporal in the Israeli Air-Force central film unit, which gathers video data and puts together graphic and computer generated visuals for operating units in Lebanon, as well as Israeli and foreign media. Public opinion in Israel supported the operation and many, including myself, felt that carefully planned air attacks, without the use of ground troops, would coerce the Syrian and Lebanese governments into suppressing Hezbollah activities.

    After the Qana fiasco, in which over 100 Lebanese civilians who had taken refuge at a UN compound were killed by Israeli shells, Peres agreed to sign the so-called April Understanding whereby Israel agreed not to launch attacks on villages or public installations while Hezbollah pledged to refrain from missile attacks on northern Israel and from operating within populated areas and villages.

    Operation Grapes of Wrath failed to achieve its main goal of regulating a cease-fire and bringing the parties back to the negotiation table. Rather, it promoted future hostilities by regulating the "rules", implicitly legitimizing Syria's use of Hezbollah to attack Israeli soldiers, and strengthening Hezbollah's military and political power base. After three years of continuous fighting and intermittent violations of the agreement on both sides, Ehud Barak (then a candidate for prime minister in Israel) declared that within a year of his election he will withdraw all Israeli forces from Lebanon with or without a peace treaty with Syria. This election statement was considered by some to be a brilliant move, especially in light of Syria's return to the negotiation table after his inauguration. But it would soon become obvious that by setting a date, Barak broke down the last psychological barrier that stood between the Israeli public and the demand to pull the army out immediately.

    Paradoxically, Ehud Barak failed to realize that by surrendering to the assumption that a settlement in Lebanon could be found only through negotiations with Syria, he invited popular opposition to the fact that Israeli soldiers remain stationed there as ready targets for Hezbollah attacks while the Syrian sphinx ponders whether or not to accept peace with Israel (which already agreed to relinquish the Golan Heights).

    Recent complications in the peace process have led to yet another violent escalation in Lebanon and has further increased the level of support for a unilateral withdrawal. In the last month, seven Israeli soldiers have been killed in Israel's self-declared security zone in Lebanon. Several were killed in clear violation of the April Understanding by attacks launched from Nabatiya, southwest of the city of Sidon. Voices in the newly elected Israeli left-wing government, which only recently pointed out Syria's political motivation to promote Hezbollah violence against Israelis in order to achieve Israeli diplomatic concessions, have now revised their statements, claiming that Hezbollah is an independent group sponsored solely by Iran and the local Shi'ite population. It seems that whenever it is comfortable for the Israeli government, Syria is no longer the chief manipulator of affairs in Lebanon, and its responsibility for Hezbollah is shrugged off. Barak's government refused to endanger negotiations with Syria by pointing the finger at Hafez Assad and instead carried out yet another bombing campaign against the Lebanese (Assad's "strategic victims").

    The Israeli public is not convinced by these explanations, and recent polls show that public support has grown tremendously for a unilateral withdrawal from Southern Lebanon. For this there are several reasons. First, the April Understanding is now perceived by most Israelis as an unacceptable threat to the lives of IDF soldiers in Lebanon because it legitimizes Hezbollah attacks and limits the IDF's ability to act. Second, it is now clear to most Israelis that staying in Lebanon allows Syria to put pressure on Israel at the negotiation table by pushing Hezbollah to attack Israeli soldiers. And third, the Israeli public is striving to get back the sentimental comfort of policy making that is grounded on a national consensus. Israelis are tired of appearing as the "aggressor" and want to return to the moral high ground by dispelling once and for all the myth of Israeli expansionism. However, many government representatives and army officials still hold the position that a unilateral withdrawal from Lebanon would put Israel's security at risk and would harm the ongoing attempts to resume talks with Syria.

    Many in Israel's military intelligence community believe that Hezbollah would not cease to attack Israel after it withdraws, and it would be harder to defend the international border. Their critics point out a systemic failure in their long standing assessment and claim that while army officials defend their reputation, reassessment is either avoided or becomes incremental. An Israeli unilateral withdrawal from Lebanon would certainly create turbulence in the peace process with Syria. However, more violent escalations would not only cost more lives but would also threaten the complete breakdown of the negotiations. As long as Israel is in Lebanon, Syria and Hezbollah have a common interest to wage war against Israelis. Following a withdrawal, however, it is not at all clear that these common grounds will sustain. Syria will not risk negative world public opinion or the loss of U.S. support by promoting Hezbollah attacks and Israel will have a chance to negotiate peace without having a warm trigger-happy gun pointed at her from the north.

    The bottom line is that whenever there are casualties in Lebanon, Israel loses points in its struggle to reach a settlement and Syria receives a boost to the recognition of its control over Lebanon and its demand for the Golan Heights. Whether Ehud Barak will indeed withdraw Israel's defense forces from Southern Lebanon by July 7 remains to be seen. But, for any outsider looking in, public opinion in Israel is clear. Israelis are tired of this violent and unproductive cycle.

� 2000 Middle East Intelligence Bulletin. All rights reserved.

MEIB Main Page