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I haven't posted for a while, but this is remarkable.
Michael Goldfarb at the Weekly Standard discovered ("J Street Adviser Morton Halperin Goes to Work for Goldstone") that a letter purportedly written by Judge Richard Goldstone to criticize a House of Representative resolution condemning the Goldstone report (HR 867 sponsored by Ileana Ros-Lehtinen and Howard Berman) was substantially written by Morton H. Halperin, who serves on the J Street advisory council and is a senior adviser at George Soros's Open Society Institute. The original document can be downloaded from the Standard. A check of the file's "properties" revealed the author as Halperin.
There has been a lot of warm and cozy talk about expanding our definition of the pro-Israel family to include some cousins who dissent a little here and there, like calling for less pressure on Iran and more on Israel. But this Goldstone maneuver is not mere dissent, but an apolgia for a report that would, if left unanswered, make it impossible for Israel to defend itself against a systematic campaign to target Israeli civilians. Mort Halperin was one of the key founders of J Street, and held what may have been the first serious fundraiser for the new organization in his home. This is not merely wrong, but profoundly evil, and it is being done by one of the fathers of J Street, which tosses around the phrase "pro-Israel" while robbing it of all meaning.
By Steve Rosen | November 2, 2009 at 9:03 pm | Permalink
One of the essential elements of a workable compromise on the settlement issue that has roiled Obama's relations with Netanyahu seems to be in the works. The Administration apparently recognizes that it made a mistake lumping construction inside the juridical limits of Jerusalem in the same basket with the Administered Territories in Judea and Samaria, the West Bank. Reportedly, the U.S. will not endorse new construction in Jerusalem, but also will not demand a freeze there.
By Steve Rosen | August 27, 2009 at 9:31 am | Permalink
The effort to close the gaps between the Israeli and American positions on the terms of a settlement freeze are accelerating. Netanyahu's top negotiator, Yitzhak Molcho, arrives in Washington Monday, to prepare for the Netanyahu/Mitchell meeting planned for London on August 26. Netanyahu and Obama may meet in late September when world leaders gather for the opening of the UN General Assembly.
Major gaps remain on many of the specific dimensions of a settlement freeze:
(1) Projects already under construction: Of the 2,500 units already in some stage of construction, which projects, and where, will be "grandfathered in" and exempted from the "freeze"? Netanyahu is willing to suspend new approvals for a period of time, but he has no remaining authority over many of the projects already under construction.
(2) Jerusalem: Israel will not accept the principle that any part of Jerusalem inside the juridical boundaries of the city that were recorded in the "Basic Law--Jerusalem" in 1980 be treated as merely "administered territory" like the West Bank. The United States has never recognized Israel's law as binding, and in fact voted for U.N. Security Council Resolution 478 (1980) which described it as "Null and void…a violation of international law." How will the U.S. explain the exclusion of Jerusalem from the terms of a settlement freeze?
(3) Duration: Netanyahu is prepared to agree to a freeze of six months duration. The U.S. seeks a more extended freeze.
(4) The "Exit Strategy": When the agreed period of a freeze expires, who will decide whether sufficient progress is being achieved in political talks to justify an extension, and on what terms? Under what circumstances will the U.S. accept that the freeze has expired and construction may resume? In what sense is a temporary freeze temporary?
(5) The Bush/Sharon understandings: Israel is quite unhappy that the Obama Administration refuses to recognize the validity of understandings about limitations on settlements that were agreed between past governments of the two countries. At the end of the agreed freeze period, Israel would like either a reaffirmation of those understandings, or their replacement by an acceptable set of new understandings that will prevent future conflicts over this vexing issue.
(6) Written agreement: Because the Obama team has declined to recognize a previous verbal understanding as binding, Israel wants any new understanding in writing.
Progress is being made on some of these issues, but agreement remains elusive. Haaretz notes that email correspondence and telephone calls have been conducted between Molcho, Uzi Arad, and Ron Dermer and Mitchell's staff, as well as with White House officials Dan Shapiro and Denis Ross.
By Steve Rosen | August 16, 2009 at 9:00 am | Permalink
The Netanyahu-Mitchell meeting already postponed twice--first in late June, and again late in July, is now planned for August 26 in London. But the two sides still have significant gaps on the terms of a settlement freeze, and I am hearing that another delay is a real possibility.
Some in the Democratic coalition are questioning whether the Administration was wise to launch its Mideast diplomacy by confronting Netanyahu on the most vexing issue in the U.S.-Israel relationship, instead of building a relationship with the new Israeli Prime Minister.
Today, Netanyahu visited Hatzerim Air Force Base, accompanied by Defense Minister Ehud Barak, Chief of General Staff Lt.-Gen. Gabi Ashkenazi and IAF commander Maj.-Gen. Ido Nehushtan.
By Steve Rosen | August 12, 2009 at 1:02 am | Permalink
If Netanyahu did accept a temporary settlements freeze for a period of six or nine months, imposing limits on new construction stricter than those accepted by Ariel Sharon, would the Obama Administration make the reciprocal concession to Israel, that at the end of this period, the U.S. would accept "natural growth" at levels to which it has heretofore objected?? This is one of the "new" issues that is impeding progress on settlements between the two countries, according to well-informed sources, an issue the Israelis call the "exit strategy".
If the U.S. demands on Israel would be unabated the "Morning After" a temporary freeze expired, what is the meaning of "temporary"? Conversely, If the U.S. did agree to relax the standard to which it is holding Israel at the end of X months, how would it explain this to the Arab side??
Officials told the New York Times that the two countries "are narrowing the gap on a deal to freeze construction of Jewish settlements in the Palestinian West Bank for a period of time, possibly six months," but George Mitchell told the Times that "the deal would probably not be one that 'everyone is going to stand up and cheer about.'"
As I previously reported, the Obama team is divided on how strict a settlements deal needs to be, with the Left, typified by Mara Rudman, taking an "absolutist" approach, and the Center willing to entertain options somewhere near the zone of the achievable in israel.
By Steve Rosen | August 3, 2009 at 10:53 pm | Permalink
A lively debate has erupted inside and outside the Obama Administration about the wisdom of Obama's decision to confront Netanyahu on settlements. The New York Times commends Obama and rejects compromises proposed by Netanyahu as "a weak offer." But the Washington Post thinks Obama's "absolutist" approach is "self-defeating… Palestinian and Arab leaders who had accepted previous compromises immediately hardened their positions [and] balked at delivering the 'confidence-building' concessions to Israel … Negotiations, which were active during the Bush administration's final year, have yet to resume…Mr. Obama will need to show both sides that they can trust him…[but] only one country has worse relations with the United States than it did in January: Israel."
In a Foreign Policy piece , I quoted Palestinian leaders boasting that they achieved considerable progress with the Olmert government between the November 2007 Annapolis talks and the end of 2008 in as many as 288 negotiation sessions by 12 committees—all while Olmert was openly avowing that "natural growth" would continue under the Bush understandings that Obama now disavows. Olmert told Yedioth Ahronoth in April 2008, "It was clear from day one to Abbas ... that construction would continue in population concentrations -- the areas mentioned in Bush's 2004 letter. ... Beitar Illit will be built, Gush Etzion will be built; there will be construction in Pisgat Ze'ev and in the Jewish neighborhoods in Jerusalem ... areas [that] will remain under Israeli control in any future settlement." Abbas did not break off the talks when Olmert said this; he continued meeting with the Olmert government. Now the same Palestinian leaders are refusing to meet at all unless Israel capitulates to Obama on demands that no major Israeli party can accept.
Aluf Benn of Ha'aretz, no hawk, wrote in the New York Times that Obama's policy is "counterproductive…Israelis [are] increasingly suspicious of Mr. Obama. All they see is American pressure on…Netanyahu…Only 6 percent…consider the Obama administration to be pro-Israel, while 50 percent said that its policies are more pro-Palestinian than pro-Israeli…Netanyahu enjoys a virtual domestic consensus over his rejection of the settlement freeze…No Israeli political figure has stood up to…support Mr. Obama…And why deny with such force — as the administration did — the existence of previous understandings between the United States and Israel over limited settlement construction? There is simply too much evidence proving that such an understanding existed. To Israelis, the claim undermined Mr. Obama's credibility — and strengthened Mr. Netanyahu's position."
Now I am hearing the first reports of a split between the Left and the Center inside the Obama Mideast team, along the same lines as the public debate. Mara Rudman—Mitchell's principal deputy—is said to be the most outspoken in the pressure camp, while Dennis Ross and Tom Donilon (Deputy National Security Adviser under Jones) advocate working with the government of Israel to achieve progress. The Left says that Israel is a drunk at the wheel and needs to be saved from itself, and claims that Netanyahu can be brought to heel if enough leverage is applied. The Center says this approach is failing and calls for a course correction.
The immediate issue between the two camps is the terms of a settlements freeze. The Left thinks it can achieve zero growth, but the Center thinks a compromise will have to be found combining principles from the Bush understandings with additional elements for a temporary period. Watch this space.
By Steve Rosen | July 31, 2009 at 9:47 am | Permalink
An article coming Sunday in the New York Times Magazine, based on extensive interviews with members of the Obama Mideast team, predicts that, in the end, the Administration will accept a nuclear-armed Iran. Roger Cohen reports that, "What Obama's precise tolerance threshold is for the Iranian nuclear program is in fact unclear. ...A military strike on Iran by Israel is Obama's least-favored outcome: it would inflame the region he's trying to quiet and sabotage his outreach to the Muslim world, while perhaps only delaying Iran's nuclear program a year or two. So deterrence may indeed be the administration's reluctant bottom line."
By Steve Rosen | July 30, 2009 at 8:36 pm | Permalink
Ha'aretz reports that, "Next Wednesday, a senior U.S. delegation led by National Security Adviser James Jones will arrive in Israel. He will be accompanied by President Barack Obama's special Mideast adviser, Dennis Ross, who recently served as Clinton's special adviser on Iran. The delegation will also include representatives of the CIA, Defense Department, Treasury and State Department. These officials were invited to Israel by National Security Advisor Uzi Arad, who will lead the Israeli side in what is said to be a continuation of talks held in Washington around three weeks ago. "
By Steve Rosen | July 22, 2009 at 8:44 am | Permalink
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton is denying that there were understandings between the Bush Administration and the Sharon and Olmert governments that limited natural growth of settlements but permitted some construction within agreed constraints. She said on June 17, "In looking at the history of the Bush Administration, there were no informal or oral enforceable agreements. That has been verified by the official record of the Administration and by the personnel in the positions of responsibility." Clinton pointed to an op ed "Our former ambassador Dan Kurtzer has written...that appeared in the last few days that lays out our position on that." Kurtzer said a draft agreement on the "construction line" principle "was never codified, and no effort was made then to define the line around the built-up areas of settlements. Nonetheless, Israel began to act largely in accordance with its own reading of these provisions, probably believing that U.S. silence conferred assent.... [but] there never were any 'agreed principles of settlement activities.'"
Continue to full text of posting...
By Steve Rosen | June 25, 2009 at 10:44 am | Permalink
The fog surrounding informal understandings between the Bush Administration and the then-government of Israel over growth of settlements deepened today. Daniel Kurtzer, who was U.S. Ambassador to Israel from 2001-2005 and played a role in part of the Bush Administration negotiations with Israel over settlements, published a piece in the Washington Post today denying in detail that there was a U.S. commitment to limited natural growth. Kurtzer does not deny that there were informal understandings, but he asserts that these did not rise to the level of a formal, codified commitment on the part of the U.S. to which the Obama Administration should feel bound.
Here is an extended excerpt:
"...Today, Israel maintains that three events -- namely, draft understandings discussed in 2003 between Prime Minister Ariel Sharon and U.S. deputy national security adviser Stephen Hadley; President George W. Bush's April 14, 2004, letter to Sharon; and an April 14 letter from Sharon adviser Dov Weissglas to national security adviser Condoleezza Rice -- constitute a formal understanding in which the United States accepted continuing Israeli building within the "construction line" of settlements. The problem is that there was no such [formal] understanding.
"The first event the Israelis cite is the 2003 discussions on a four-part draft that included the notion that construction within settlements might be permitted if confined to the already built-up areas of the settlements. ...This draft was never codified, and no effort was made then to define the line around the built-up areas of settlements. Nonetheless, Israel began to act largely in accordance with its own reading of these provisions, probably believing that U.S. silence conferred assent.
"Second, President Bush's 2004 letter conveyed U.S. support of an agreed outcome of negotiations in which Israel would retain 'existing major Israeli population centers' in the West Bank 'on the basis of mutually agreed changes . . . .' One of the key provisions of this letter was that U.S. support for Israel's retaining some settlements was predicated on there being an 'agreed outcome' of negotiations. Despite Israel's contention that this letter allowed it to continue building in the large settlement blocs of Ariel, Maale Adumim and Gush Etzion, the letter did not convey any U.S. support for or understanding of Israeli settlement activities in these or other areas in the run-up to a peace agreement.
"In his 2004 letter to Rice, Weissglas addressed the issue of the 'construction line,' saying that 'within the agreed principles of settlement activities, an effort will be made in the next few days to have a better definition of the construction line of settlements in Judea & Samaria.' However, there never were any 'agreed principles of settlement activities.' Moreover, the effort to define the 'construction line' was never consummated: Israel and the United States discussed briefly but did not reach agreement on the definition of the construction line of settlements. ...
"Throughout this period, the Bush administration did not regularly protest Israel's continuing settlement activity. But this is very different from arguing that the United States agreed with it. In recent days, former senior Bush administration officials have told journalists on background that no understandings existed with Israel regarding continued settlement activity."
Contrary to Kurtzer, Elliot Abrams, who participated in arriving at the understandings with the government of israel, wrote that ""There was something of an understanding realized on these questions, but it was never a written agreement" and that there were "guidelines that were discussed with the United States but never formally adopted..." See my pieces, "There was a Bush Agreement on Settlements" and "Obama and a Settlements Freeze."
By Steve Rosen | June 14, 2009 at 9:02 am | Permalink
