Camp David: Farseeing Diplomacy or Neocolonialism?
The key to lasting peace

by Daniel Pipes
Christian Science Monitor
April 25, 1979

http://www.meforum.org/article/pipes/4147

Analyses of the prospects for lasting peace between Egypt and Israel tend to concentrate too much on the possiblllity of its undoing by other Arabs (Palestinians, the Eastern front, Saudi Arabs) and too little on the disruptive factors within Egypt and Israel themselves.

The other Arabs are not so strong for these reasons: .

• The Palestinians on their own carry no weight. Few in numbers, outgunned, internally fractured, limited in resources, and scattered geographically, they depend entirely on sup­port from Arab governments.

  Without this support, Palestinian organiza­tions would have no established bases, few weapons, and minimal political importance. They are at the mercy of the Arab govern­ments (even in Lebanon, where it is the Syrian Government) and have little significance on their own. Consequently, the Palestinians mat­ter less as an independent force than as an ex­pression of the will of Arab governments.

  The notion that there can be no peace in the Middle East without settlement of the Palestin­ian problem ignores the fact that the Arab governments can settle that problem anytime they wish simply by withdrawing support (as Egypt has recently done).

• The Eastern Front (Syria, Jordan, and whatever such countries as Iraq or Iran add) has little military potential without Egypt fighting too.

  Since 1948, Egypt has provided the Arabs with their largest and most powerful army; and its military involvement forced Israel to fight a two-front war. With Egypt pulling out as an active participant, the Eastern front stands alone.

  From all evidence: it appears unlikely that any combination of forces along this front can challenge Israel. If true, then Egypt's with­drawal from warfare implies that the other Arab countries, unable to confront Israel, will eventually have to come to terms with it. With time, Syria and Jordan will accept military re­alities and will follow Egypt's example in mak­ing peace in return for regaining lost territories.

• Saudi Arabian influence is less than it ap­pears to be. While the Saudis can freely dis­perse their money as a lure, they cannot freely cut funds off when displeased. Their payments to Arab governments and to Palestinian organ­izations serve as hostage money: these pro­tect the vulnerable Saudi Arabians from sabo­tage and disruption. Such payments are neces­sary to buy good will and to leave the rich but weak Arabians in peace. The billions of dollars granted to Egypt will therefore most likely continue, regardless of Sadat's policies. Saudi Arabia, for all its money, lacks the military and political power to use its wealth as a weapon.

Turning now to problems within Egypt and Israel, these are primarily economic:

For Egyptians, peace implies an improved standard of living. Economic pressures more than anything else sent Sadat to Jerusalem in November, 1977; the Egyptians have suffered from 30 years of unrecovered military ex­penses and are desperately looking for im­provements. Should peace not bring economic benefits, the Egyptians may become impatient. This could lead to political disruption, instability, a coup d'etat, and a return to radical politics, in­cluding the resumption of hostilities against Is­rael.

Israel faces sharp short-term economic diffi­culties, too, for it will be going through a com­plete economic transformation. Measures taken since 1977 to establish a free market in Israel have damaged its already fragile finances; if peace comes, then Israel will also have to reduce its military complex and con­vert to a peace economy. This double transition will strengthen Israel in the long run, but it intensifies current prob­lems. This situation demoralizes Israelis; it even makes some wonder if they can afford peace. Thus, Israeli economic problems could deflect its pursuit of peace.

Together, these arguments point to Arab in­effectiveness and the importance of the United States. Israel's enemies will not prevent Egypt from making peace. Yet, since both Egypt and Israel are experiencing ominous economic dif­ficulties, the US has a leading role to play. By making large sums available to these two countries, it can greatly facilitate the way to peace. Although the amounts involved are large (perhaps $20 billion over five years, maybe more), the US can make no better in­vestment.